The Federal-Local Nexus in Immigration Enforcement Policy

An Evaluation of the Secure Communities Program

by

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A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

Approved May 2015 by the
Graduate Supervisory Committee:

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ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

August 2015

ABSTRACT

This study analyzes how current U.S. immigration enforcement policy has been carried out, specifically under the implementation of the Secure Communities (S-Comm) program. Paying special attention to the enforcement-only policy hysteria and immigration patchwork trend since the 2000s, this study has the following research questions: (1) whether S-Comm has faithfully implemented enforcement actions for removing "dangerous" criminal noncitizens; (2) how counties with different immigration perspectives have responded to such an immigration enforcement program; and (3) whether the implementation of S-Comm has really made local communities safer as in the program goal.

For analysis, 541 counties were selected, and their noncitizen enforcement results under S-Comm were analyzed with 5 time points, covering a 13-month period (Dec. 2011 - Jan. 2013) with longitudinal data analyses. In spite of the rosy advertisement of this program, analysis of S-Comm showed a very different picture. Unlike the federal immigration agency's promise of targeting dangerous criminal noncitizens, 1 in 4 noncitizen removals were for noncriminal violations, and more than half of noncitizen deportations were for misdemeanor charges and immigration violations in the name of "criminal aliens." Based on latent class analysis, three distinct subgroups of counties having different immigration enforcement policy perspectives were extracted, and there have been huge local variations over time on two key intergovernmental enforcement actions under the implementation of S-Comm: immigration detainer issuances and noncitizen deportations. Finally, unlike the federal immigration agency's "immigrant-crime nexus" assumption for legitimating the implementation of S-Comm, no significant

and meaningful associations between these two factors were found. With serious conflicts and debates among policy actors on the implementation of S-Comm, this program was finally terminated in November 2014; although, the essence of the policy continues under a different name.

A series of results from this study indicate that the current enforcement-only policy approach has been wrongfully implemented, and fundamental reconsideration of immigration policy should be made. Enforcement-focused immigration policy could not solve fundamental immigration-related problems, including why noncitizens immigrate and how they should be dealt with as humans. More rational and humane approaches to dealing with immigration should be discussed at the national and local levels.

DEDICATION

I dedicate my dissertation to my loved family, my academic father, and the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC). A special thanks to my loving parents, Daebak Jung and Oakjoo Byun, for their endless patience, encouragement, and love to their second son. My younger brother Dongwon Jeong always encouraged me to concentrate on my studies without any financial concerns, giving his full material and emotional support.

I also dedicate my dissertation to my dissertation co-chair and academic father, Professor Emeritus N. Joseph Cayer, who taught me important academic and life values in person during his advisership. I will never forget his endless humbleness, patience, consideration, and respect for his students.

I dedicate my work and give special thanks to TRAC at Syracuse University. As a massive data-gathering research institute, TRAC and its co-director Susan Long accepted my TRAC Fellowship and generously gave me an opportunity to access public data from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement on immigration detainer issuances received through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. Without TRAC's support, I could not have completed this dissertation project.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation could not have been completed without the support and consideration of my dissertation committee members. First, I would like to thank Professor Emeritus N. Joseph Cayer, my dissertation co-chair as well as my academic father for graduate studies in the School of Public Administration and Policy at Arizona State University. I am very honored to have met, studied, and worked with him in my School, and through my connection with him, I have learned a lot as a scholar and a human. He never once said "no" to any my questions and requests during my graduate studies. He always praised, encouraged, and helped me not to lose my self-confidence and -esteem. All of his endless consideration, patience, and love are beyond what I deserve. As my role model for what I would like to become in my future academic journey, he has been the best of the best kind of mentor. I would also like to express my gratitude and respect to Professors Paul G. Lewis and Christopher M. Herbst. Although Professor Lewis is an outside faculty, he generously accepted my request to participate in my dissertation committee as a co-chair without any conditions, and played a key role in sharpening the substantive policy ideas and perspectives on U.S. immigration and related issues. I also appreciate Professor Herbst for his valuable comments and advice during the development of the method sections for the dissertation. This dissertation project also could never have been completed without generous public data sharing from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University. After accepting me as a TRAC Fellow, TRAC provided me with invaluable immigration enforcement data covering more than 24 months which were obtained from U.S.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. I specifically appreciate TRAC's co-director Susan Long for her consideration and technical assistance in helping me to access immigration enforcement-related data from TRAC.

Many people in the Arizona State University community helped me to develop this dissertation. Faculty, staff, and doctoral students in the School of Public Administration and Policy were always the first place for me to get and share fresh ideas and information. Of them, I would like to express a special gratitude and respect to Professor Thomas Catlaw for his personality, humbleness, and academic strictness. I am also deeply indebted to Patsy Kraeger and Joe West for their friendship and encouragement during my doctoral studies. My 10 doctoral cohorts - precious academic brothers and sisters - always gave me humor and encouragement. I would also like to express my gratitude to Professor Natalie Wilkens at the Sanford School for her methodological contribution to the longitudinal modeling topic.

In addition to the ASU community, I also offer a big thank you to outside academic and nonacademic friends: Soogil Oh, Young Aa Ryoo, Daegeon Kim, Wooseong Jeong, Dongsuk Shin, Roger Chin, Daniel Chand, William Schreckhise, Viola Lerma Fuentes, Jaewan Bhak, Jun-hyuk Byun, Jong-kyu Cho, Jihyee Kim, Cheol Kim, Geiguen Shin, Kyungim Park, Janice, Faiza Rais, and Sarah Andrews. Without their consideration, encouragement, kindness, and support, my doctoral life at Arizona State might have been more difficult.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER Page

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation critically and empirically examines current U.S. immigration policy, focusing specifically on internal immigration enforcement policy and implementation of a related administration program, the federal-local cooperative immigration enforcement program called Secure Communities. By using noncitizen enforcement-related data collected since the initiation of this program, this study analyzes how current U.S. immigration enforcement policy under the Obama administration has been implemented and whether it has faithfully followed the stated policy goal. Moreover, considering changing political and policy contexts on immigration at the intergovernmental level since the 2000s, this study also analyzes how localities having different perspectives on immigration have followed various noncitizen enforcement trajectories over time and whether there are local variations in the process of implementation of federal immigration enforcement policy. Latent variable analyses - including longitudinal growth curve modeling and latent class analysis - and multinomial logistic regression are used for analyses.

1.1. Background of Research

As a wicked policy issue, immigration in the Unites States has been debated in terms of who can and cannot immigrate and naturalize, and what categories of noncitizens should not be allowed to assimilate and should finally be removed. Historically, such dividing lines for noncitizen integration and punishment (expulsion)

have been changed depending on geopolitical and socioeconomic contexts and ideological factors (Constable, 2013; Jimenez, 2012; Plascencia, 2013; Rosenblum, Meissner, & Hipsman, 2014; Schrag, 2010; Walker & Leitner, 2011). The social construction of noncitizens[1] has also varied over time in its framing by policymakers and the public, from noncitizens as social and economic "contributors" complementing inadequate labor forces and diversifying America's society and economic system to unnecessary socio-economic "burdens" or "threats" taking American jobs and depending on public services to, most extremely, "terrorists" or "risky enemies" negatively influencing public safety and national security (Chavez, 2013; Chiswick, 2008; Ingram & Schneider, 2005; Menjivar & Kanstroom, 2014; Moloney, 2012; Newton, 2008; Tichenor, 2002, 2012). The negative social and political construction of noncitizens has been expanded since the 1990s in response to an uncontrollable inflow of the undocumented, and the 9/11 terrorist attack laid the foundation for the federal government to reframe noncitizens as a "dangerous population" who should be removed in terms of the national security perspective (Á guila, 2013; Magana, 2013; Plascencia, 2013; Podgorny, 2009; Winders, 2007). Since then, the main discourse and direction of U.S. immigration policy has been immersed in how noncitizens without legal documents (i.e., "unauthorized" noncitizens) or with criminal or immigration law violations (i.e., "criminal" noncitizens or those related to visa violations or Enter Without Inspections

[1] There are similar terms reflecting noncitizens living in the United States - such as "immigrants," "aliens," "noncitizens," or "foreign-born" persons. Although these terms have been used interchangeably in government documents and social science scholarship, in this dissertation I will use the term "noncitizens" when referring to those having foreign nationality ("non-U.S. citizens") while living in the United States without citizenship status for various reasons.

charges) should be effectively controlled and enforced, without more comprehensive and constructive alternatives or approaches to deal with immigration-related issues.

Reflecting this series of socio-political contexts and environments, two striking trends on U.S. immigration policy have been made since the 2000s. The first trend is increasing local immigration activism in response to the federal inability to create a comprehensive immigration framework (Ackerman & Furman, 2013; Gilbert, 2009; Inda, 2013; McDowell & Provine, 2013; Plascencia, 2013; Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, 2013; Varsanyi, 2010, 2011; Varsanyi, Lewis, Provine, & Decker, 2012a, 2012b). Starting with California's Proposition 187 (the *Save Our State* initiative) in 1994, a host of very punitive and restrictive local immigration ordinances and state laws have spread and transferred across localities, from Hazelton, Pennsylvania[2] (2006), through Riverside, New Jersey[3] (2006), Escondido, California[4] (2006), Valley Park, Missouri[5] (2007), Farmers' Branch, Texas[6] (2006), Fremont, Nebraska[7] (2010), Arizona's Senate Bill 1070[8] (2010), to Alabama's House Bill 56[9] (2011). Although some localities still orient toward an integrative and welcoming immigration policy stance, many local immigration ordinances or state laws did follow punitive and restrictive tones, through barring the undocumented from safely and legally living everyday life in their jurisdictions - such as restricting their ability to rent an apartment, drive a car, get a job, or access social or public services, and using English as the only valid language in everyday life (Becerra,

[2] City of Hazleton Ordinance 2006-18, The Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance.
[3] City of Riverside Ordinance 2006-16,The Riverside Township Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance.
[4] City of Escondido Ordinance No. 2006-38R, An Ordinance of the City of Escondido, California Establishing Penalties for the Harboring of Illegal Aliens in the City of Escondido.
[5] City of Valley Park Ordinance 2007-1722, The Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance.
[6] City of Farmers' Branch ordinance No. 2892.
[7] City of Fremont Ordinance No. 5165.
[8] The Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhood Act.
[9] The Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act.

2012; Filindra & Kovács, 2012; Marquez & Schraufnagel, 2013; Olivas, 2007; Pedroza, 2012; Reich & Barth, 2012; Sabia, 2010; Stuesse & Coleman, 2014). Expanding local roles and voices in the process of immigration policymaking since the 2000s, in connection with the blurring lines between criminal laws and federal immigration policy (sometimes called *crimmigration* trend) since the passage of the 1996 federal immigration laws - the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) - brought about serious debates in terms of what government can make and implement immigration policy, and how the federal government can establish the relationship between local counterparts in the process of implementing immigration policy at the comprehensive level (Arrocha, 2012; Cimini, 2014; Filindra & Kovács, 2012; Leaman, 2012; Tichenor & Filindra, 2012; Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, 2013; Varsanyi, 2011).

The second striking trend of U.S. immigration policy since the 2000s is the heavy reliance on "enforcement-focused" or "enforcement-only" policy and related administrative initiatives (Ewing, 2014; McDaniel, 2014; Hagan, Rodriguez, & Castro, 2011; Holland, 2014; Meissner, Kerwin, Chishti, & Bergeron, 2013; Menjivar & Kanstroom, 2014; Palasz & Fennelly, 2013; Sanchez, 2009; Stumpf, 2014a; Suro, 2015). In U.S. immigration history, target noncitizen groups (categories) for admission restriction and punishment have fluctuated repeatedly, but since the passage of the 1996 federal immigration legislation, such scopes and categories for punishment have radically increased, and noncitizens in these categories have been criminalized under the label "criminal aliens" (Brock, Glasbeek, Murdocca, 2014; Eagly, 2013). External and internal shocks, such as the 9/11 terrorist attack and the economic decline at the end of the 2000s,

also gave rise to the strengthening of such a punitive/restrictive immigration-control policy direction. With such a series of punitive turns on immigration issues, noncitizens have been considered as the subjects of "control" and "enforcement" in the name of public safety and national security. Such construction is rooted in the perspective that noncitizens cannot be integrated into U.S. society and culture, and "we [Americans] can punish you [noncitizens]" if you violate the law (National Public Radio, 2009) based on the "us versus them" approach (Natalie, 2013; Neilson, 2014; Poo, 2012).

The approach for controlling and enforcing noncitizens under an enforcement-only policy follows two tracks: (1) border control and management and (2) interior enforcement actions. The former focuses on efforts to deter the illegal inflow of noncitizens - frequently called a "prevention through deterrence" strategy (Barry, 2011; Nowrasteh, 2014; Rodriguez & Parades, 2014) - via militarization of the border, while the latter is related to catching, detaining, and finally removing noncitizens who are already in U.S. jurisdictions without documentation or with law violations under the criminal and immigration system; these internal enforcement efforts mainly consist of workplace or home raids, employer sanctions, and policing with cooperation of local law enforcement agencies on the street (American Immigration Council, 2013; Immigration Policy Center, 2014a; Stuesse & Coleman, 2014). These two different enforcement tracks have different working mechanisms, availability of budgets and forces, and primary public agencies, but under current legal and administrative operating procedure, they commonly target noncitizens who have violated laws - including criminal and immigration laws - and enforce their authority and discretion to catch, detain, and finally remove noncitizens. Under the enforcement-first policy stance, management and

operation of detention facilities and processing removal proceedings have been considered as key components for effective immigration policy (Menjivar & Kanstroom, 2014). Based on this enforcement system, in the first five years of the Obama administration, about 34,000 noncitizen detainees have been in federal and local detention facilities or jails per day, and about 1,010 noncitizens have been deported per day, with a total of more than 2 million noncitizens having been deported through March 2014 (Bender, 2013; Department of Homeland Security, 2014a; Lind, 2014). This is considered record-breaking enforcement performance relative to the performance under the previous administrations at the same point in their terms[10] (Democracy Now, 2014; Ewing, 2014; Immigration Policy Center, 2014b).

One interesting point on recent noncitizen enforcement policy is that the focal point for enforcement actions has been oriented more toward internal enforcement actions and related administrative programs (Meissner, Kerwin, Chishti, & Bergeron, 2013), in spite of some conflicting perspectives and arguments.[11] With legal support of the 1996 federal immigration law, since the 2000s the federal immigration policy began to design and implement federal-local cooperation or partnership programs for carrying out enforcement policy, such as 287(g) agreements of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Criminal Alien Program (CAP), and Secure Communities. The programs were

[10] According to ICE's *FY 2014 ICE Immigration Removals*, deportation numbers include all interior removals associated with criminal and immigration violations. The latter refers to noncitizens charged with EWI(Enter Without Inspection), visa violators and overstays, ICE fugitives, and prior removals and returns (having a previous removal case or confirming return entered in DHS systems).

[11] Noncitizen enforcement performance by the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement was at its peak in fiscal year 2012, with more than 400,000 noncitizen removals. However, removal performance in fiscal year 2013 dropped to less than 370,000 (about a 10% decline relative to that of the previous year), and critics have sharply criticized the current direction of deportation policy under the Obama administration, which means most deportation performance was due to border apprehensions and removals, and deportation was less likely for internal noncitizens who had already spread extensively across U.S. jurisdictions (Bennett, 2014; Goodman, 2014; Stiles, 2014; Vaughan, 2013).

intended to target risky noncitizens who pose threats to public safety and national security, but also often enforce noncitizens without legal documentation or fugitives who fail to appear in immigration courts for enforcement processes. However, in spite of clear program goals of targeting and removing "dangerous" criminal noncitizens from local communities, there has been debate and conflict in the process of implementing these programs because they brought about unexpected results such as racial or ethnic profiling by targeting the Latino population and removing too many noncitizens without criminal violations or with merely misdemeanors (Chand & Schreckhise, 2014; Cox & Miles, 2013; Ewing, 2014; Kanstroom, 2012; Menjivar & Kanstroom, 2014; Sweeney, 2014; TRAC, 2014a). With the complex horizontal (within federal agencies) and vertical (between federal immigration-related agencies and local law enforcement agencies) cooperation mechanism, internal enforcement programs have been rapidly expanded in terms of budgets spent, personnel, scope and numbers of noncitizens deported, and ripple effects at the local level. As Ewing (2014) points out, current enforcement policy for targeting and punishing noncitizens has become increasingly systematic and automatic, and under such a "deportation" or "enforcement machine" system with enforcement quotas set by Congress, large numbers of noncitizens might fall into the trap of removal regardless of the level of their legality or criminality[12].

[12] Since the passage of the 1996 federal immigration laws - IIRIRA and AEDPA - even legal noncitizens, such as legal permanent residents (LPRs) and green card-holders, fall into the trap of deportation when they commit any level of crime or have committed crimes in the past. Many legal noncitizens who lived in the United States for decades were deported due to retroactive applications of law violations or misdemeanor charges (Brotherton & Barrios, 2013; Immigration Policy Center, 2010; Kanstroom, 2012).

1.2. Purpose of the Research

Based on the contextual background on the current directions and practices of U.S. immigration policy, this dissertation pays special attention to two key trends and logics currently driving U.S. immigration policy: (1) local immigration activism under immigration federalism and (2) internal enforcement policy for targeting and enforcing noncitizens under the broad federal-local cooperative framework. These two logics play an important role in answering how current U.S. immigration policy works and how certain localities support noncitizen enforcement policy while others do not in the intergovernmental policy implementation perspective.

Through "rescaling" of immigration policy and politics at the local level (Varsanyi, 2010), localities have been the heartland for debating who noncitizens are, how they are socially, economically, and legally constructed in their jurisdictions, and how their presence in these localities influences American residents' everyday life. In spite of a traditionally recognized "federal preemptive authority" principle, which means immigration is the responsibility of the federal government, the federal government failed to create a comprehensive immigration framework since the 1990s that reflects the changing socioeconomic and political atmosphere. Under such a federal void on immigration policy, localities have responded differently to immigration issues, reflecting their respective demographic and political changes through local versions of immigration laws and implementations. Many states and localities - specifically border and southern states and localities - passed local immigration ordinances to reflect their political voices. Their common argument is that immigration is a local issue influencing their everyday political and socioeconomic realities (Walker & Leitner, 2011).

However, in contrast to these local political voices, the federal government's counterargument is that immigration is inherently a national issue regarding foreign relations, so legally states and localities cannot be involved in immigration policy. However, ironically but interestingly, the federal government has encouraged localities to "administratively" be involved in get-tough immigration enforcement policy via an intergovernmental cooperative framework since the mid-2000s (Jung, 2014, 2015a; Palasz & Fennelly, 2013). This framework reflected shared responsibilities on the immigration issue (Suro, 2015), but such ironic intergovernmental relations on immigration brought about the blurring of roles between traditional federal immigration agencies and local law enforcement agencies (Palasz & Fennelly, 2013).

Regarding internal noncitizen enforcement policy, DHS/ICE created and implemented multiple administrative programs under the Bush administration. These federal-local cooperation or partnership programs, including 287(g) partnerships, the Criminal Alien Program, Secure Communities, Fugitive Operations, the Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the Criminal Alien Removal Initiative, have been expanding in scope. Of these federal-local cooperative programs, Secure Communities (S-Comm) has specifically been a key immigration enforcement program under vertical (federal-localities) and horizontal (ICE/DHS - FBI) cooperation through an information-sharing process on noncitizen enforcement actions. It has been rapidly expanded under the Obama administration in an attempt to effectively catch and remove risky and criminal noncitizens.

In spite of the clear and straightforward program goal of S-Comm, "making local communities safer" by catching and removing dangerous criminal noncitizens, this

program has been at the center of conflicts and criticism among policy actors and stakeholders because of its unanticipated policy malfunctions. Unlike the promise that S-Comm focuses on the removal of dangerous noncitizens who have committed violent crimes, almost half of noncitizens deported during the first 6 years of implementation either had no criminal violations or had only misdemeanor charges, such as traffic violations or drug possession. Several localities criticized such enforcement outcomes since 2010, and requested revisions of the program implementations. Some localities - including New York City; Cook County, IL; the state of Massachusetts; and the District of Columbia - requested to opt out of this program in 2011, but DHS/ICE institutionally made it impossible to do so by declaring S-Comm a mandatory program. Such unintended deportation outcomes from localities brought about serious collateral damages in immigrant communities - damages such as tearing families apart and putting many U.S.-born children with undocumented, deported parents into the foster care system - and local communities became so fearful that immigrants were reluctant to contact local police due to concerns that their families or friends might fall into the trap of deportation through police interactions (Jung, 2015b). These enforcement results from S-Comm ironically made communities more insecure (Kubrin, 2014; Theodore, 2012; Tramonte, 2011). With this political and policy context on immigration enforcement policy in mind, this research critically and empirically analyzes how current U.S. immigration enforcement policy under the S-Comm framework has been implemented, whether this program has faithfully followed the key policy goal of targeting and removing the real "dangerous" noncitizens, and whether activation of S-Comm has made local communities safer.

Under strong enforcement-only immigration policy environments, local responses have not been consistent. While some localities - Maricopa County, AZ; Los Angeles County, CA; and Harris County, TX - have actively participated in enforcement policy, others - San Francisco County, CA and New York City - have still oriented toward an integrative immigration policy and limited the level of noncitizen enforcement actions. Still others have done nothing on immigration-related issues because they view immigration as the responsibility of the federal government, not of localities. Under this "multilayered jurisdictional patchwork" trend on immigration issues (Varsanyi, Lewis, Provine, & Decker, 2012a, 2012b), localities tend to have different perspectives on S-Comm as a mandatory noncitizen enforcement program. Therefore, this dissertation also analyzes how localities (counties) have responded to noncitizen enforcement policy under the S-Comm framework. That is, I analyze how each county has followed different (or similar) noncitizen enforcement trajectories over time, and what factors account for these local variations in the process of immigration enforcement policy.

1.3. Research Questions

This dissertation focuses on how S-Comm has been implemented at the local level, and whether this program has faithfully followed its stated goal of removing dangerous noncitizens with criminal convictions and consequently making communities safer. With regard to the first question (the working mechanism of immigration control policy), I analyze how different levels of government interact with each other to implement noncitizen enforcement actions under S-Comm, and how (in)actively localities participated in this enforcement system. Regarding the second question, I

analyze deportation outcomes under S-Comm at the community level during the first 5 years of implementation, and determine which noncitizen groups have actually been targeted for deportation using policy (enforcement) factors of this program. To account for the current U.S. immigration enforcement policy process with a more comprehensive perspective, I add contextual factors representing local political, economic, geographic, and demographic changes, and analyze how these factors create local variations on the extent of immigration enforcement policy participation. Finally, with deportation outcomes from S-Comm implementation, I analyze whether local immigration enforcement actions based on the intergovernmental cooperation framework fulfill the key goal of this program, to improve public safety. In summary, the following research questions for this dissertation are analyzed:

Question 1: Analysis of S-Comm implementation in terms of the stated program goal

- Has S-Comm faithfully followed its program goal of targeting and removing the "worst of the worst" noncitizens at the national, state, and local levels since the initiation of this program? That is, how many noncitizens with Level 1 offenses (serious crimes which ICE targets for noncitizen enforcement policy) have been caught and removed per locality? How many noncitizens with Level 3 (less serious crimes or misdemeanors) and non-criminal offenses have been caught and removed per locality?
- Are there any local differences (or similarities) on local immigration enforcement policy under the S-Comm framework? That is, which counties have "relevantly" implemented this program, targeting noncitizens with Level

1 offenses? On the other hand, which counties have "misleadingly" implemented this program, removing noncitizens with Level 3 or non-criminal offenses? What factors create this enforcement variation among counties? Activation orders of S-Comm or intensity of immigration enforcement by county can be considered for local variation, based on previous studies (Cox & Miles, 2013; Miles & Cox, 2014; Treyger, Chalfin, Loeffler, 2014).

Question 2: Analyzing inter- and intra-locality noncitizen enforcement outcome changes over time, especially focusing on three contextual variables (local classifications on the extent of immigration enforcement policy participation and two key intergovernmental interactions on noncitizen enforcement actions)

- Are there any empirical subgroups or classes on the extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation, considering contextually a strong "multilayered jurisdictional patchwork" trend on immigration issues?
- How have immigration enforcement actions been implemented under the current enforcement machine? Narrowly focusing on the implementation of S-Comm, how have two key federal-local interactions (immigration detainer issuances and deportation outcomes) been carried out, and how are they interrelated? Adding local variations on immigration enforcement policy participation, how are these three contextual factors interrelated with each other? Do we find any patterns, characteristics, or directions of local immigration enforcement policy implementation under the S-Comm framework?

Question 3: Finding factors influencing the shape of local immigration enforcement policy and analyzing the program outcome under S-Comm: Did the implementation of S-Comm really make local communities safer?

- Considering local patterns or directions on immigration enforcement policy under the S-Comm framework (question 2), what contextual factors influence the shaping or reshaping of the direction of local immigration enforcement policy?
- Based on noncitizen removal outcomes under S-Comm in terms of longitudinal perspectives, have local crime rates representing the level of public safety really been improved after the implementation of this program?

1.4. Organization

This dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter 2 briefly reviews historical U.S. immigration policymaking in terms of the main policy goals and directions taken by policy actors and stakeholders. How noncitizens have been socially framed and constructed under changing policy goals and directions is also reviewed. Focusing on the theoretical and contextual background on U.S. immigration policy, Chapter 3 discusses how immigration enforcement policy has been implemented in terms of the cooperative federalism perspective, and considering local immigration activism and the immigration patchwork trend since the 2000s, I also theoretically touch on what factors influence local participation in immigration enforcement policy. Moreover, as a key administrative enforcement program for this dissertation, S-Comm is also reviewed, in terms of what S-Comm is, how this program has been implemented and how localities have participated,

and what its enforcement outcome has been relative to the stated program goals. Chapter 4 empirically analyzes whether S-Comm has really followed the stated program goal of catching and removing risky and criminal noncitizens at the national, state, and local level. For analysis, I use monthly noncitizen deportation data ("IDENT/IAFIS interoperability" statistics) from S-Comm. I selected 541 localities that have activated S-Comm, and 5 time points (Dec. 2011 - Jan. 2013) are used for analysis, covering a 13-month period out of more than 6 years of implementation (Oct. 2008 - present). With descriptive and graphical analyses, I follow deportation outcomes over time graphically at the different enforcement levels and find implications. Considering local variations on the direction of immigration policy, Chapter 5 first classifies all 541 localities (counties) into statistically reliable numbers of subgroups based on items regarding the extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation - such as 287(g) partnerships and activation orders of S-Comm - by using latent class analysis. After that, I use longitudinal growth curve modeling to analyze how two repeatedly measured enforcement actions - monthly immigration detainer issuances and noncitizen deportations under S-Comm implementation - are interrelated with each other under the enforcement machine system over time. Finally, combining all three abovementioned contextual factors, longitudinal mediation analysis is also used to grasp how each group has similar (or different) enforcement performance over time. To account for the comprehensive working logic of the immigration enforcement machine, in Chapter 6 I add some local political, economic, geographic, and demographic factors and, via multinomial logistic regression analysis, analyze how they influence local differences on the extent of immigration enforcement policy participation. Moreover, whether the implementation of S-Comm during a 13-

month period really reduced crime rates and increased public safety in localities is also discussed by using longitudinal data analysis. Finally, chapter 7 summarizes results of the three research questions of chapters 4 through 6, and discusses policy implications, limitations of this research and suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER 2

U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY CHANGE: SHIFTING POLICY GOALS AND DIRECTIONS

This chapter follows historical U.S. immigration policy and its changes in terms of policy goals and priorities. Policymakers have varied their policy goals and preferences on immigration-related issues with changing socioeconomic and political contexts, and the social, economic and legal construction of noncitizens has been shaped and reshaped under the repeatedly changing immigration pendulum - from a construction of "deserving" noncitizens who help America grow and prosper, to "undeserving" noncitizens who threaten national and economic security. Internal or external perturbations or shocks - such as the 9/11 terrorist attack or serious economic decline - in U.S. history made swift changes in the direction of immigration policy, and immigration policy at the national level since the 2000s has been mainly oriented toward an "enforcement-first" stance connecting noncitizens with a national security and public safety agenda. Such a punitive turn on U.S. immigration policy made it possible for immigration policymakers to successfully frame noncitizens as a "dangerous class" (Plascencia, 2013) and to create and implement multiple stepped-up immigration enforcement programs, such as S-Comm, under the guise of removing criminal aliens and making communities safer.

2.1. Social Construction and Policy Responses to Noncitizens

Historically, perspectives on noncitizens in American society have repeatedly oscillated from welcoming to unwelcoming under changing socio-economic, political, and cultural contexts and environments (Dingeman & Rambaut, 2010). According to Newton (2005) and Rivera (2014), the direction of public perspectives on noncitizens has mainly depended on the following two discourses: (1) whether noncitizens are "good" persons contributing to American society and the economy, or are "problematic" persons putting a socioeconomic burden on the nation; and (2) of all noncitizens in the society, which categories or subgroups can be assimilated and which are incapable of integration in the nation. Through such discourses on noncitizens, social construction[13] of noncitizens in American society has been described, defined, and framed by policy actors and stakeholders (Johnson, 1996-97; Magaña & Short, 2002; Newton, 2005; Rivera, 2014). Politicians and policymakers sometimes positively construct a certain category of noncitizens[14] - such as legal noncitizens (frequently called "lawful permanent residents")

[13] Social construction framework in policy studies refers to the ways in which social realities, target groups, words, or symbols are shaped and perceived (Magaña & Short, 2002; Pierce, Siddiki, Jones, Schumacher, Pattison & Peterson, 2014; Schneider & Ingram, 1993). This framework nicely shows how certain target groups or populations can be framed and named by policy actors and stakeholders, and based on this construction, how government sets and designs a certain direction and type of public policy to treat these target populations. In the field of public policy, Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram's social construction framework has been widely discussed and applied to various substantive policy arenas. For studies on social construction of noncitizens or immigration in American context, see Eagly (2013); DiAlto (2005); Johnson (1996-97, 2013); Magaña (2013); Magaña and Short (2002); Newton (2005, 2012).

[14] It is not clear how many categories of noncitizens can be officially made and considered by politicians and policymakers under the U.S. immigration policy system and discourse. Under immigration law, noncitizens are simply dichotomized into the categories "legal" (or "documented" or "authorized") and "illegal" (or "undocumented" or "unauthorized"), and policy discourse on noncitizens has traditionally followed this dividing line (DiAlto, 2005). However, noncitizens in these two categories can also consist of multiple subgroups having different legal, political, and social influences and constructions (Eagly, 2013). Therefore, noncitizens can be considered as various social groups across a spectrum, rather than a clear and simple dichotomy. By using the "alien spectrum," Eagly (2013, p. 1138) divides noncitizens in the United States into multiple groups: "repeat [law] violator," "recent entrant," "long-term undocumented resident," "deferred action recipient applicant," "visa holder," "asylee," "conditional resident," "lawful permanent resident," and "long-term lawful permanent resident."

or temporary or seasonal workers complementing the labor force, while most frequently noncitizens, especially the undocumented crossing the border and noncitizens with criminal charges, have been constructed based on negative meanings, rhetoric, and narratives, such as *job stealers*, *welfare queens*, *anchor babies*, *human and drug traffickers*, and *criminals* (Chomsky, 2014; Cox & Miles, 2013, p. 90; Golash-Boza, 2014a, 2014b; Holland, 2014; Leitner, 2012; Newton, 2005; Provine, 2013; Suro, 2015).

Under this context, two disparate policy responses on social construction of various categories of noncitizens have also been created and widely used by government: a "welcoming" and a "warning" message. The former is related to defining noncitizens who are positively considered as desirable and "potential citizens" or "model minority" (DiAlto, 2005), while the latter construct negatively defines noncitizens as "unassimilable aliens" (Newton, 2005, p. 140), "social deviants," "undesirable minorities," or "cultural problems" (Rivera, 2014, pp. 46-50). With such different responses, noncitizen groups receiving a welcoming response have become the objects of integration to American society, while those subject to a warning message have become the objects of control, regulation, and punishment (Plascencia, 2013). That is, U.S. immigration policy history has been a series of selection processes of "admissible" and "inadmissible" noncitizens, and from an enforcement angle, it has been the selection of the scope and boundary of "deportable" or "removable" categories of noncitizens who were negatively framed and constructed (Chomsky, 2014; Jung, 2015b; Newton, 2005, 2008). Policymakers and politicians have considered several factors - such as ideology, race, ethnicity, religion, health, economic vitality, and education attainment - in selecting who can or cannot be legally admitted and live here; some factors have been repeatedly and consistently

considered important while others have been ignored or underemphasized according to the shift of political and socioeconomic contexts. Policy tools or programs for legitimating these factors, such as setting national or geographical quotas, deporting/punishing certain nationals or categories of noncitizens (i.e., Asian Americans at the end of the 1880s and Mexicans since the mid 1990s), or implementing seasonal and temporary worker programs in certain regional areas, have been implemented and frequently changed with other policy programs or tools according to the direction of national immigration policy.

Based on such historical distinction or selection processes for noncitizen and immigration management at the national level, only limited categories or groups of noncitizens, especially White Europeans, were relatively easily welcomed and legally allowed to migrate, stay, and finally become U.S. citizens (FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014; Rivera, 2014; Wong, 2014a). Others not included in these groups were negatively considered and targeted by the government for punishment and control. However, one interesting aspect of negative noncitizen construction is that the main groups targeted for punishment have historically and contextually been changed, from Asian Americans to (eastern) Europeans to Latin Americans, especially Mexicans, with different policy tools and programs. According to Cuéllar (2012, p.88), such immigration system and selection processes also had many "self-defeating" features in the process of incorporating these ideologies and policy responses.

2.2. Shifting Policy Goals and Directions: Historical Trends

To fully understand historical U.S. immigration policy changes and directions and how noncitizens under national immigration discourse have been constructed and framed by politicians and administered by policy programs, we need to review how policy goals and directions/priorities on immigration have shifted under U.S. political and economic systems. Moreover, what categories or groups of noncitizens have become targeted by politicians and policy elites in the process of immigration policy, and why they became the target for shaping of immigration policy in historical contexts should also be analyzed.

2.2.1. Removals and Exclusion (1880s - 1920s)

There was no clear national immigration law and system in the United States until the 1890s, and until then individual states had their own migrant-related legislation or administrative actions for managing and controlling the inflow of immigrants (Chomsky, 2014; Koven & Götzke, 2010; Vecchio, 2013). However, changing political and economic climates since the 1830s in the United States - such as the Gold Rush and post-Civil War railroad construction - brought about increasing waves of immigrants from European and Asian countries (especially China),[15] and labor unions and conservative

[15] European immigration until the 1880s was dominated by northern and western Europe - such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Germany - but after the 1880s, the numbers of southern and eastern European immigrants from Russia, Greece, Italy, and Hungary explosively increased, accounting for more than half of total European immigrants in the 1890s (Vecchio, 2013). In the case of Asian immigration at that time, Chinese and Japanese made up a large percentage of immigrants. As a key target population for immigration control, about 110,000 to 300,000 Chinese entered the United States between 1850 and 1882, and most of them resided in California as cheap labor in the areas of farming, mining, laundries, and domestic services. Japanese had been allowed full-fledged immigration to the United States since the 1880s based on the 1868 Meiji Restoration, and between 1880 and 1894, around 30,000 Japanese contract

businessmen strongly criticized this influx of noncitizens, arguing that noncitizen laborers took American workers' jobs and caused a decrease in the average wage level (Escudero, 2014). Through lobbying efforts to politicians for controlling the inflow of immigrants, the first comprehensive immigration law and policy in the United States began between 1875 and 1891, including three pieces of back-to-back federal immigration legislation: the Page Law of 1875, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, and the Immigration Act of 1891 (Moloney, 2012; Vecchio, 2013). An official public institution for managing immigration-related public affairs, the Bureau of Immigration under the Treasury Department, was first created under the 1891 Immigration Act, and this function was transferred to the newly created Department of Commerce and Labor in 1903. Such organizational responsibility on immigration in this period shows that noncitizens were mainly considered as economic goods to complement a labor force needed to fill labor-intensive and dirty jobs. In 1906, the government functions of immigration and naturalization were merged, and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization was created.

Immigration laws in this period commonly included strong restrictive messages and provisions on exclusion and inadmissibility of noncitizens of certain national origins, especially those of Asian origin. The immigration policy focused on controlling the entry of noncitizens who were "undesirably constructed" in socioeconomic, political, cultural, and moral contexts - such as idiots, lunatics, those convicted of felonies or misdemeanors (regarding moral turpitude), polygamists, communists, the poor and uneducated, those with non-Christian traditions, and non-whites (Bausum, 2009; FitzGerald & Cook-

workers began to work in Hawaii. According to FitzGerald and Cook-Martin (2014), the number of Japanese workers in California drastically increased between 1890 and 1910, from 1,000 to 41,000.

Martin, 2104; Moloney, 2012; Vecchio, 2013). Through immigration laws, various criteria were set to decide which noncitizens were inadmissible and undeserving and to control their ability to enter the United States. Such criteria included public health (noncitizens with contagious diseases or mental health disorders were inadmissible under the 1891, 1907, and 1917 Immigration Acts), knowledge level (the literacy test in the 1917 Immigration Act), poverty (level of dependence on social welfare programs and imposing a head tax under the 1882 and 1907 Immigration Acts), aging, religion (those based on non-Christian traditions),[16] political ideologies (prohibiting the entry of anarchists or anti-U.S. government adherents in the 1903 Immigration Act), and race/ethnicity (favoring whiteness and controlling nonwhites under the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and, the 1902, 1904, 1907, and 1917 Immigration Acts).

Under such regulation mechanisms, Asian noncitizens, especially Chinese, were the key group targeted with restrictive immigration policies in this period (FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014; Koven & Götzke, 2010; Moloney, 2012; Railton, 2013; Vecchio, 2013). Although European noncitizens made up the largest share of immigrants during the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Chinese became the main target of punishment and were considered as a negative social force in the U.S. social and economic system.[17] Politicians and policymakers negatively framed Chinese immigrants as "coolies," unskilled cheap laborers, "strikebreakers," and an "inferior race" (Escudero, 2014;

[16] Although few federal immigration laws directly touched on aging and religion for controlling the inflow of undesirable and excludable noncitizens, these attributes were widely used for immigration regulation in U.S. immigration history. As Jews were negatively constructed and considered one of the "racial" groups subject to deportation at the beginning of the 20th century, and older immigrants were also defined as having "poor physique" or "senility," so many older immigrants were excluded in the process of entry to Ellis Island in the 1900s (Moloney, 2012, pp. 126-130).

[17] According to Vecchio (2013), a total of 138,941 Chinese entered the United States as immigrants between 1870 and 1880, making up about 4.3 percent of the total number of immigrants in that period.

FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014, pp. 91-93; Vecchio, 2013), and such negative responses and anti-Chinese sentiment brought about back-to-back anti-Chinese laws, including the Page Law of 1875 and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Follow-up legislation after the 1882 act strengthened admission restrictions on all Chinese and placed stringent enforcement on Chinese already residing in the country through requiring possession of "certificates of residence" and "certificates of identities" as proof of legal identification (Vecchio, 2013, p. 1486). Negative framing and construction of noncitizens in this period did not end with the Chinese; it had spread and been institutionalized to almost all Asian noncitizens through the Immigration Act of 1917. Through setting the "Asiatic Barred Zone" (FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014; Moloney, 2012; Vecchio, 2013), then-U.S. immigration policy laid the foundation to legally and systematically restrict and prohibit Asian immigrants as labor forces and deport them if they illegally entered or were smuggled into the society. That is, the direction and priority of immigration admission and integration was basically determined by race, with the consideration that, for the protection of racial purity and public safety, nonwhites could or should not become U.S. citizens. Using "scientific" or "biological racism" including eugenics theories (FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014; Moloney, 2012), politicians and policymakers legitimated the idea that Asians could not integrate and the inflow of Asian noncitizens negatively influenced U.S. society and economy. Therefore, under such racialized immigration policy in this period, it was thought that the "Oriental invasion" (FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014, p. 97) or "yellow peril" (Bausum, 2009; FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014) brought by increasing numbers of Asian noncitizens should be thoroughly restricted and regulated.

Unlike Asian noncitizens who were severely targeted by politicians and policymakers, noncitizens of other races were not the main target for enforcement and immigration regulation in this period. For example, Europeans, in spite of some controls on and inadmissibility of European noncitizens, especially from eastern and southern areas, were allowed almost open immigration between 1880 and World War I (FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014; Vecchio, 2013). Mexicans were also relatively welcomed and constructed as "constructive friends" in this period due to the common consideration that Mexicans, unlike Asian noncitizens, were "temporary migrants" (Moloney, 2012, p. 117) or "transient laborers" (Chomsky, 2014, p. 50). Therefore, Mexicans under the 1917 law were exempted from the literacy test and paying the head tax and were actually free to cross the border until 1919 (Chomsky, 2014).

2.2.2. "Selective" Integration/Enforcement Based on National Quotas (1920s - 1960s)

As in the previous stage, the basic direction of national immigration policy in this period was still oriented toward a restrictive tendency. With a mix of economic, eugenics, and political perspectives and administrative support from the 1911 Dillingham Commission and its recommendations, racialized and racist immigration policy was openly legitimated and institutionalized (Koven & Götzke, 2010). Interestingly, one key mechanism that differentiated immigration regulation and management in this period from the previous period is that "nationality" was heavily considered for deciding who and how many noncitizens could or could not immigrate into the United States (Chomsky, 2014; Moloney, 2012; Tichenor, 2013). With the passage of the Quarter Act of 1921 and the Immigration Act of 1924, the national quota system became a key

mechanism for filtering "undeserving" and "unworthy" noncitizens. Under this system, noncitizens targeted for immigration control were eastern and southern European - especially Germans and Jews - and Asians. Setting the quota for each country at 3% of the total foreign population from that country already in the U.S. permitted a fixed number of noncitizens to enter the United States. However, because the quota was based on immigrant populations allowed into the country under the previous noncitizen admission policy favoring white western Europeans, only "deserving" western European noncitizens were allowed to legally enter and live in the United States, and others were still denied under this system (Chomsky, 2014; FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014; Moloney, 2012). However, nationals of the Western Hemisphere[18] were exempted from such national quotas, so there was room for politicians and policymakers to allow noncitizens from Western Hemisphere countries to immigrate depending on political and economic climate changes or on demands. Follow-up legislation on federal immigration policy in this period gradually expanded the scope of racial exclusion and inadmissibility of noncitizens through the Immigration Act of 1924 and the Registration Act of 1929. Negative construction of Asians was reconfirmed under the national quota system. In terms of government function, immigration issues were transferred from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice in the 1940s, meaning that immigration began to be differently considered by politicians and policymakers as a public safety or legality issue rather than as a labor issue.

[18] Western Hemisphere countries exempted from the national quota system in this period included "the Dominion of Canada, Newfoundland, the Republic of Mexico, the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Canal Zone, or an independent country of Central or South America" (FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014, p. 105).

The policy response to Mexican immigration in this period is interesting. Mexicans were considered positively and were the most preferred noncitizens as temporary or seasonal workers, especially during the agricultural crisis in the 1920s, and they were actually exempted from the national quota system and allowed to openly cross the border[19]. However, public perspectives on Mexicans swiftly changed by the 1930s. Economic collapse in the 1930s during the Great Depression strengthened anti-Mexican sentiment, which considered them as opportunists taking American jobs, and the federal government, influenced by strong lobbying from the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and patriotic societies, pressed Mexicans to voluntarily return to their country or they would be deported (Chomsky, 2014; FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014; Tichenor, 2013; Vecchio, 2013). However, shortages in the domestic labor force throughout two world wars led to changes in the external and political atmosphere, and the federal government officially allowed Mexicans to cross the border and work as "cheap" or "emergency" labor forces through Public Laws 45 and 78. As a by-product of this agreement, the Bracero program was initiated and renewed over two decades (1942-1964). However, institutionalization of this program "deepened the structures and culture of migration, including extralegal migration" (Chomsky, 2014, p. 57), and brought about the increase of illegal immigration, detouring this program for using cheap labor. Such extralegal migration of Mexicans was possible through a "cozy triangle" coalition among related interests, including agribusinesses, politicians, and a lax immigration bureaucracy (Tichenor, 2013). The increasing number of illegal Mexicans was considered as a social concern by politicians and policymakers, and the response was a strong immigration

[19] According to Tichenor (2013), almost 75,000 Mexicans migrated to the United States between 1917 and 1921 as labor contract workers under the waiver plan of the 1917 immigration law.

enforcement action under the Eisenhower administration through Operation Wetback. Consequently, the social construction of Mexicans as "braceros" or "wetbacks" in this period was swiftly flipped from a positive to a negative one in the process of shaping U.S. immigration policy.

The outbreak of World War II changed the policy response to Japanese Americans residing in the United States. As nationals of countries belonging to Axis powers, German, Italian, and Japanese noncitizens who resided in the United States were negatively constructed as "potential traitors" or "enemy aliens" (FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014, p. 109) in terms of a national security perspective, and they were forcefully arrested and interned. Especially strong internment actions were made against Japanese Americans, so all West Coast Japanese residents and Japanese Americans were sent to relocation camps and lost their personal liberties and properties (Vecchio, 2013). Ironically but interestingly, Chinese immigrants who were severely punished and negatively constructed under the Chinese Exclusion Act, were now reconsidered as "good Asians" (Vecchio, 2013, p. 1493) or "allied friends" (FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014, p. 97) after China became an ally during World War II. This was connected with the passage of the 1943 Magnuson Act which repealed the previous Chinese-related exclusion and harsh enforcement actions.

The post-World War II atmosphere and the advent of the Cold War since the 1950s brought about a power struggle between communist and liberal democratic blocks. Based on such power conflict and changing foreign policy climate, how the federal government dealt with increasing numbers of political and economic refugees from Eastern Europe (i.e., Hungary and Yugoslavia) and Cuba was considered a key U.S.

immigration policy issue. Mixing a humanitarian perspective and political calculation, the previous national quota system for noncitizen admission and exclusion based on national origin was slightly moderated; quotas for Asians and eastern and southern Europeans were limitedly and symbolically set under the 1952 Immigration and Naturalization Act. In spite of situational changes on immigration policy, the racialized immigration policymaking and trend remained consistent (FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014).

2.2.3. Family Reunification and Getting Skillful Labor Forces (1960s - 1980s)

Changing domestic politics (increasing civil rights movement) and foreign policy environment (boat people from Cuba and Haiti, and the outbreak of the Vietnam War) between the 1960s and the 1980s pressed Congress and administrations to revise the previous racialized noncitizen admission and regulation policy to reflect the changing sociopolitical atmosphere. Moreover, increasing demand for high-skilled labor from other countries to fill "a domestic shortage of nurses, physicians, and engineers" (Moloney, 2012, p. 218) required revision of the previous national quota system. Passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 ended the discriminatory national quota system for immigration control that had lasted for four decades (1920s - 1960s).

The first impact of the1965 law was a change in the racial composition since the 1960s in the United States (Chomsky, 2014; Johnson, 2013; Koven & Götzke, 2010). Through the repeal of national quotas and setting of "hemispheric limits" for issuing visas[20] (Vecchio, 2013, p. 1498), the nonwhite groups targeted in the previous stages,

[20] Such hemispheric limits allowed noncitizens in Eastern Hemisphere countries, including eastern and southern Europe, Asia, and Africa, who were negatively constructed for immigration regulation and

especially Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans, gained considerable opportunities and expansion of immigration. However, western Europeans, the previous beneficiaries under the national quota system, lost their standing as the favored noncitizens.

The key immigration policy goals and priorities for noncitizen admission in this period were family reunification and preference for skilled and professional workers, which meant complicated consideration in a changing foreign policy environment under the Cold War, a healthy economy and lessening racial discrimination and prejudice (Johnson, 2013; Koven & Götzke, 2010; Vecchio, 2013). Increasing civil rights movements and their egalitarian viewpoint on sociopolitical opportunities in this period also influenced such changes of policy priorities on immigration. Following such policy preferences, many noncitizens who were previously not allowed to immigrate to the United States had the opportunity to legally enter the country and be granted citizenship. With the family reunification principle, family members, including spouses and children, and relatives of citizens regardless of race or ethnicity obtained benefits through a pattern of "chain migration" (Koven & Götzke, 2010, p. 139). In addition, Asians, especially Filipinos, Indians, and Koreans, entered the United States for occupational preferences for professionals under this 1965 law, and almost 250,000 noncitizens filled jobs in nursing, engineering, and medicine during the first 20 years (Moloney, 2012; Vecchio, 2013). A series of policy directions and preferences in this period gave rise to an enormous increase in immigration. According to Vecchio (2013, pp. 1498-99), the number of immigrants "doubled between 1965 and 1970 and doubled again between 1970 and 1990," so more than 15 million noncitizens were allowed to enter the United

control, to be granted opportunities for naturalization and citizenship. Under the 1965 law, Eastern Hemisphere countries (20,000 per country) got 170,000 visa slots for immigration (Vecchio, 2013).

States under the 1965 immigration policy direction and preferences. The Refugee Act of 1980 also contributed to an increasing flow of refugees from nonwhite countries including Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, and Cambodia.

The interesting noncitizen group facing ironic changes in this period was Latinos, especially Mexicans. Although the 1965 law did not explicitly target Mexicans for immigration control or regulation, one of the core provisions of that law included setting hemispheric limits for visa issuance. So, based on this principle, countries of the Western Hemisphere that had been exempted from immigration control and regulation policy under the national quota system now had their first numerical restrictions for visa issuance, a maximum of 120,000. This fundamentally changed the social, legal, and political construction of Mexicans on immigration policy by categorizing them as "immigrants," unlike the traditional social construction of Mexicans as "temporary migrants" and "seasonal workers" complementing American labor forces. The visa cap for Mexicans under the 1965 law was below the actual demand for cheap labor in the Southwest farming areas, and the end of the Bracero Program instigated illegal border crossing of many Mexicans and other Central Americans (Chomsky, 2014; Johnson, 2013; Tichenor, 2013).

The increase of Mexican unauthorized immigrants was raised as a serious social concern and problem by politicians and policymakers beginning in the 1970s, so how the federal government could effectively manage and control such increasing numbers of undocumented noncitizens from Latin America was the key immigration agenda (Chomsky, 2014; Newton, 2005). Based on recommendations from the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP), Congress passed the

Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) under the Reagan administration, which combined an "amnesty and enforcement approach" (Gerken, 2013, p. 1593). That is, IRCA oriented toward two tracks: (1) legalization of the undocumented who already resided in the United States and (2) prohibiting employers from hiring undocumented noncitizens as cheap labor (Newton, 2005). Therefore, the main target for immigration regulation under the IRCA was not immigrants per se but employers.

In spite of serious debate on the relevancy of amnesty, about three million undocumented noncitizens were legalized by the IRCA. However, employment sanctions were not successful due to the lack of a national identification system for "verifying employment eligibility" (Tichenor, 2013); rather, an industry manufacturing false documents for undocumented workers was in full swing, and it gave room for employers to exploit noncitizen workers. Eventually, immigration policy for controlling the undocumented in this period failed. Legalized Mexicans who had been granted amnesty under the IRCA moved into "the more marginalized sectors of the labor market" (Chomsky, 2014, p. 62), but labor-intensive sectors like agriculture still demanded a cheap immigrant labor force, which brought about a greater increase in the inflow of Mexican undocumented noncitizens.

2.2.4. The Undocumented Problems and Criminalization of Noncitizens (1990s)

The real policy result from IRCA was not welcomed. The number of the undocumented, especially Mexicans, was not reduced; rather it continued to soar after implementation of the IRCA and the resulting chain migration of the newly legalized. Few employers were sanctioned for knowingly hired the undocumented. Such a policy

failure in a previous stage was considered a lesson for policymakers and politicians, and those with strong anti-immigration sentiments came to consider stricter and stronger administrative and legal actions, as the only possible approach for preventing the repetition of such a policy failure. The typical arguments from anti-immigration groups in this period were similar to the current rhetoric from present-day anti-immigrant conservatives: the border is porous, the undocumented take Americans' jobs, and they violate laws, so public safety in the United States is seriously challenged. Some border states, especially Southwest states sharing the border with Mexico, expressed strong complaints to the federal government about the inability to control illegal border crossing by Mexican noncitizens, and began to pass local-level restrictive immigration policy. Starting with California's Proposition 187 in 1994, such local punitive and restrictive immigration policy voices got considerable attention from the public and media. Washington politicians and immigration policymakers swiftly followed in California's policy footsteps by passing back-to-back federal-level immigration legislation and administrative actions, including the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWOA), and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996 (Gerken, 2013; Koven & Götzke, 2010; Newton, 2005; Tichenor, 2013).

Under this series of federal immigration laws and systems, noncitizens were not considered deserving of socioeconomic development; rather, according to immigration policymakers in this period, immigrants, especially the undocumented, are "undesirable" in society (Gerken, 2013); the level of legal immigration, including naturalization and granting citizenship, should be strictly controlled (Newton, 2005); stricter enforcement-

oriented policy is the only solution to solve the current undocumented immigration conundrum; free public services are the key incentive for the undocumented to cross the border, and therefore the use of public programs or services by noncitizens should be banned (Tichenor, 2013). Based on this perspective on immigration, enforcement-oriented policy was the main direction of immigration policymaking at that time, through strict border control, increasing internal enforcement for punishment of noncitizens, strict control/reduction of the level of legal immigration through limiting the scope of possible family reunification-based visa issuances, stronger employment sanctions than the IRCA approach, and restriction of public services to noncitizens, especially the undocumented.

The main target groups under the 1996 immigration-related laws were Mexican and Latin American noncitizens who made up most of the undocumented. They were frequently named by politicians and policymakers as "law violators," "inherent criminals," or "felons" who intentionally and arbitrarily challenged the American legal system (Newton, 2005). Moreover, they were also described as "freeloaders" or "welfare queens" depending on public services with no sense of self-reliance. In response to the 1994 World Trade Center bombing and the 9/11 terrorist attack, noncitizens were even constructed and identified as "terrorists" or "extremists" (Gerken, 2013; Tichenor, 2013). The 1996 laws did not limit the target population to only the Mexican undocumented; under the IIRIRA and AEDPA, legal immigrants including permanent residents with green cards, refugees, and asylum seekers were also considered as criminals or dangerous classes if they committed any type of criminal act (including misdemeanors) or had evidence of past criminal or immigration violations. With extreme expansion of the scope of categories of enforcement and deportation (removal) of noncitizens, noncitizens

regardless of their legality became targets for punishment and enforcement under the "criminal aliens" rhetoric (Eagly, 2013).

2.3. Current Immigration Policy: Strengthening an "Enforcement-Only" Policy Regime and Direction Since the 2000s

Since the end of the 1990s, and specifically since the passage of the 1996 federal immigration laws under a Republican-controlled Congress, the direction of immigration policy has been dominated by a more punitive and restrictive turn. Few integrative immigration policy voices caught public attention, in spite of efforts of some policy entrepreneurs - such as former senator Edward Kennedy or President Bush - for expanding legal visa issuances or a guest worker program during comprehensive immigration reform efforts in 2006 and 2007. Therefore, immigration policy direction since the 2000s was full of an enforcement-focused policy stance institutionalizing mass detention and deportation of noncitizens who violated immigration and criminal laws (Ewing, 2014; Immigration Policy Center, 2013b).

2.3.1. Key Goals under Enforcement-Only Immigration Policy: Removal of Dangerous "Criminal" Noncitizens

Discourse on the "immigrant threat" or "problem" rapidly expanded in the United States with uncontrollable border crossings and related undocumented noncitizen issues, and immigration was finally connected with a national security perspective after the 9/11 terrorist attack (Holland, 2014; Messias, McEwen, & Boyle, 2015; Nicholls, 2014). National security concerns were connected with distrust of noncitizens and the spread of

nativism since the 1990s, and images of noncitizens in conservative media were repeatedly constructed and "demonized" as dangerous enemies crossing the border, trafficking migrants, arms, and drugs, or acting as criminals and terrorists (FitzGerald, 2014; Warner, 2005-06). Administratively, and with 9/11 as the momentum, organizational responsibility on immigration was transferred from the Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland Security. Deportation of noncitizens was rapidly and racially motivated and implemented against Mexicans and Central American immigrants, and Middle Eastern noncitizens became another target for enforcement in the aftermath of 9/11 (Moloney, 2012; Rivera, 2014). In this atmosphere, Congress passed back-to-back enforcement-focused immigration laws since the 2000s, from the PATRIOT Act of 2001, to the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, the Real ID Act of 2005, and the Secure Border Fence Act of 2006. These laws commonly include strengthening border security, strengthening internal enforcement of noncitizens who commit any type of criminal or immigration violation, limiting incarcerated noncitizens' opportunities for judicial review and legal protection, and broadening the scope of noncitizen criminality (Gerken, 2013; Gonzales, 2011; Newton, 2005, 2008; Tichenor, 2013).

With the legal foundation of restrictive and punitive 1996 laws, Washington politicians and policymakers also began to frame immigration as a criminal justice issue, heavily focusing on criminal punishment and administrative removal of noncitizens who violate immigration and criminal laws. This means that an intermingling trend between immigration law and criminal law was strengthened since the 1996 laws, and the consequent mixture of criminal law and the immigration enforcement system gave rise to

the criminalization of immigrants (Stumps, 2014a). That is, the system in which any noncitizens with immigration or criminal violations can be named as "criminals" was created, leading to a policy environment that could produce mass-deportation of noncitizens and "streamlining" of such removal processes (Anderson, Gibney, & Paoletti, 2011; Eagly, 2013; Stumpf, 2014a). Under such a crimmigration policy trend, the main target for noncitizen enforcement was not limited to the undocumented who were mainly considered the first and foremost subjects for punishment. Almost all noncitizens under the current crimmigration and enforcement-only policy trend can become a target in the name of "criminal aliens" or "immigrant criminality" (Palasz & Fennelly, 2013; Simers & Waters, 2013; Stumpf, 2014a). Enforcement-only policy in this period was mainly made with two key tracks: border enforcement and internal enforcement actions.

2.3.2. Border Security: Increasing Militarization of the Border and Mass Production of Criminal Noncitizens through Shift of Border Control Strategy ("Catch-and-Detain" Principle)

Since the 1990s, enhanced border control has been one of the key policy goals for immigration enforcement policy. An increasing inflow of undocumented noncitizens from the southwest border and federal inability to effectively control such noncitizens encouraged the federal government to set up tougher and more aggressive border control strategies and tactics beginning in the Clinton administration. Focusing on preventive enforcement actions against illegal border crossers through the "deterrence through prevention" tactic (Meissner, Kerwin, Chishti, & Bergeron, 2013), several operations such as Operation Gatekeeper (San Diego area) and Operation Hold the Line (El Paso

area) were implemented in the Southwest border regions in the 1990s (FitzGerald & Cook-Martín, 2014; National Immigration Forum, 2010). Such aggressive border control strategies led to enormous growth in enforcement resources, personnel, and technologies in the Southwest border area, which brought about the militarization of the border.



Source: U.S. Border Patrol and Protection statistics (http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/media-resources/stats)
Figure 2.1 U.S. Border Patrol Annual Budget and Agent Staffing Changes (FY 1990-2013)

As shown in Figure 2.1, the annual budget for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has increased considerably since the mid-1990s, doubling between fiscal years 2003 and 2013, from $5.9 billion to $11.9 billion. The number of border patrol agents working in border policy enforcement has also rapidly increased, from about 6,000 agents during the Clinton administration to more than 13,000 agents during the Bush administration, an increase of more than 200%. This trend has been maintained

during the Obama administration, with the number of agents exceeding 21,000 in fiscal year 2011, an increase of more than 60% compared to numbers under the Bush administration (Immigration Policy Center, 2014b). Physical and virtual fencing in the southwest border area has been installed, with more than 357 miles of fencing in place by the end of 2008. Moreover, various technologies for "systematic surveillance" of illegal border crossing, such as "the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, ground-based sensors, satellites, radar coverage, and cameras," have also been used for enforcement (Meissner, Kerwin, Chishti, & Bergeron, 2013, p. 30).

In addition to border militarization deterring the inflow of illegal border crossing in the southwest border areas, another key change in border enforcement policy since the 2000s is enforcement tactics. Until the Clinton administration, border enforcement action was based on "catch-and-release" tactics, in which illegal border crossers caught along the U.S.-Mexico border were dealt with in a simple enforcement process, including apprehension, the signing of voluntary return agreements, and immediate return across the border without formal removal proceedings (National Immigration Forum, 2010). However, in 2005, the Bush administration initiated a new and stepped-up border enforcement program called "Operation Streamline," legally constructing illegal border crossers in the southwest border areas as criminals and putting them first into the federal criminal justice system through mandatory detention and finally initiating deportation proceedings against them (Burridge, 2009; Meissner, Kerwin, Chishti, & Bergeron, 2013; National Immigration Forum, 2010; Robertson, Beaty, Atkinson, & Libal, 2012). With the "zero-tolerance" perspective toward illegal border crossers from Mexico and Latin America (National Immigration Forum, 2010, p. 8), border control policy since the Bush

administration shifted from “catch-and-release” to “catch-and-detain” tactics. With the government legally and administratively processing all illegal border crossers from the southwest border - including “illegal entry” and “illegal reentry” charges - as criminal violators, those who crossed illegally were put first in local immigration detention facilities or prisons, and then finally removed either through deportation proceedings in the immigration courts or administratively through non-judicial removal procedures such as expedited removal[21]. Under such a border enforcement scheme, a relatively small percentage of noncitizens were given the opportunity to sign voluntary return agreements, and the majority of noncitizen border crossers were removed through criminal prosecutions and convictions, as shown in Figure 2.2. Mass incarceration and criminalization of illegal border crossers brought about a large increase in federal criminal prosecutions for immigration offenses, exceeding more than half of total federal criminal prosecutions since the mid-2000s (National Immigration Forum, 2010; TRAC, 2013a).

[21] Expedited removals have a legal basis through the IIRIRA of 1996, and the Department of Homeland Security (and formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service) administratively processes this removal procedure. According to Rosenblum, Meissner, Bergeron, and Hipsman (2014), expedited removals have risen from 110,000 in FY2006 to 163,000 in FY2012, making up 39% of all removals.



Source: Internal ICE data (2013) obtained from the Freedom of Information Act request for *Crane v. Napolitano.*

Figure 2.2 Recent Monthly Formal Removals and Voluntary Departures/Returns[22]

This border enforcement policy change also strengthened federal-local cooperation on immigration enforcement policy and laid the foundation for the private sector, especially private prison businesses, to be deeply involved in the management and operation of such noncitizen detention facilities (Culp, 2011; Gilna, 2013; Greene & Mazón, 2012; Robertson, Beaty, Atkinson, & Libal, 2012; Rosenau, 2000). Militarization

[22] Under U.S. immigration law and policy, voluntary return and voluntary departures have slightly different processes and consequences, although they have been similarly used and identified. According to Gutierrez (2013), one big difference between these two terms is where such nonjudicial actions are made, and what public agencies can grant these actions. Voluntary returns take place at the border, and therefore only U.S. Customs and Border Protection which is responsible for border enforcement policy, has the right to process them. On the other hand, voluntary departures take place in any U.S. jurisdiction, and both federal immigration agencies, CBP and ICE, have the right to grant them. Compared to formal removal decisions, neither a voluntary return nor voluntary departure creates any legal harm or restrictions when noncitizens apply for a visa or green card in the future. Therefore, many noncitizens sentenced for immigration or criminal convictions tend to select these options to keep the opportunity of future reentry into the country, if possible.

of the border and criminalization of noncitizen border crossers, especially in the southwest area, led noncitizens to look at the more dangerous but isolated and less-controlled Arizona and eastern California border for crossing and brought about frequent migrant deaths during border crossing.[23] Moreover, the brutality of some border patrol agents caused serious social and human rights violations toward migrants (González, Ortega, & O'Dell, 2013; Ortega, 2013; Rodriguez & Paredes, 2014).

2.3.3. Strengthening Internal Enforcement Efforts as Another Enforcement Machine

The militarization of the border and criminalization of noncitizens crossing the border since the 1990s - based on enormous enforcement resources (including increasing budgets and personnel levels, as well as the rise of organizational status for DHS, ICE, and CBP) - led to declining border apprehensions. However, for organizational survival, federal immigration agencies need to maintain their level of enforcement performance so they do not lose public monies set by Congress for annual deportation and detention quotas (Selway & Newkirk, 2013). Under such a political and administrative context, declining border apprehensions caused federal immigration bureaucracies to turn their eyes to internal enforcement actions targeting noncitizens who already resided in the country.

With legal support from the IIRIRA of 1996, Congress paved the way for the federal internal immigration arm, ICE, to cooperate with local law enforcement agencies on immigration enforcement policy implementation (Davidson, 2007; Kirk, Papachristos,

[23] During a recent five-year period (2005-09), on average 430 noncitizen border crossers died per year in the process of crossing the Southwest border (Rosenblum, 2013).

Fagan, & Tyler, 2012; Provine & Lewis, 2014; Rosenblum, Meissner, Bergeron, & Hipsman, 2014; Stuesse & Coleman, 2014; Varsanyi, Lewis, Provine, & Decker, 2012a). Some localities, especially those in southwest border states, with increasing nativism and anti-immigration sentiments and an increasing inflow of the undocumented, have actively and willingly participated in such federal-local noncitizen enforcement policies and related administrative programs since the 2000s. Beginning at that time, several federal-local cooperative enforcement programs were created and implemented, from the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) to 287(g) partnerships, Secure Communities (S-Comm) program, and Fugitive Operations. Targeting "dangerous" noncitizens with criminal convictions at the community level based on enforcement priorities, these administrative programs screen noncitizens who have potential or reasonable law violation histories or prosecutions, and then such noncitizens are sent to ICE for enforcement actions including mandatory detention and final removal proceedings. One conflicting point with such internal noncitizen enforcement actions is that many targeted noncitizens very often have already resided in the United States for a considerable time and, unlike illegal border crossers, they have strong human and business ties (Buckinx & Filindra, 2015; Cardoso, Hamilton, Rodriguez, Eschbach, & Hagan, 2014; Coutin, 2015; Immigration Policy Center, 2013b; Kanstroom, 2012; Kubrin, 2014; Meissner, Kerwin, Chishti, & Bergeron, 2013; Stumpf, 2014a). The "human costs" of internal enforcement policy actions are often not considered; many noncitizens deported through internal enforcement policy do not adapt to their home country after deportation, and desperately cross the border again to return to their families and homes (Hagen, Rodriguez, & Castro, 2011; Kanstroom, 2012; Laredo, 2014). This means that current noncitizen enforcement policies do not

meet the policy goal of deterring the inflow of new undocumented and criminal noncitizens.

2.4. Summary

Through analyzing historical trends in the direction of U.S. immigration policy and transition of the social, legal, and political construction of noncitizens in terms of what noncitizen groups have mainly been targeted for punishment and differently constructed under immigration politics dynamics, I found that the federal government's immigration policy response has continuously crossed between borderline positive (integrative) and negative (restrictive or punitive) directions. Target noncitizen groups have also racially shifted from Chinese, to eastern and southern European, Asians, and Mexicans and Latin Americans, and their legal and social constructions have also re-shifted from risky and dangerous enemies to model minorities (i.e., Asians) or vice versa (i.e., Mexican noncitizens), through political and socioeconomic changes. One interesting point on U.S. immigration policy is that a racialized and racist policy trend in the process of immigration policy implementation has been maintained throughout history (FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014; Oliviero, 2013).

Another key working mechanism for targeting noncitizens for punishment - including exclusion, repatriation, enforcement, and deportation - has historically been related to how "illegality" and "criminality" are identified, interpreted, and implemented by policymakers and political elites in immigration politics. As Chomsky (2014), Menjívar and Kanstroom (2014), and Warner (2005-06) have argued, the meanings of these terms have been differently constructed socially and legally and have repeatedly

been changed in terms of what racial or ethnic groups can be included or excluded in shaping the "illegal" and "criminal aliens" discourse. For controlling and managing noncitizens of undesirable national origins, policymakers used a national quota system through the 1960s, but with changes in the domestic and foreign policy environment, such as the advent of the civil rights movement and the increasing numbers of refugees during the Cold War, family reunification became the key policy goal for immigration admission and regulation during the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Since the 1980s, the main discourse for shaping immigration policy has been how the undocumented, especially those from Mexico and Latin America, should be dealt with and under what working mechanisms. However, the failure of the IRCA of 1986, increasing the undocumented from the southwest border areas and providing ineffective employer sanction measures, created more punitive and restrictive immigration policy with the mix of the 9/11 attack as a national security concern and serious economic downturn since the 1990s. By radically expanding the scope of becoming "criminal aliens" through the 1996 laws and back-to-back immigration laws that followed, immigration policy since the 2000s has focused heavily on an enforcement-only stance with the combination of border militarization and various internal enforcement actions.

Focusing on immigrant illegality and criminality, an enforcement-only policy direction on immigration has been carried out at the intergovernmental level since the 2000s. However, complicated intergovernmental relations on immigration issues led localities to make different policy choices and brought about serious conflicts between levels of government in the implementation of S-Comm as one of the key immigration enforcement programs under the Obama administration. In the next chapter, I consider

what factors influence local immigration enforcement policy participation, and what S-Comm is and how this program has been carried out with what working logic to accomplish the policy goal.

CHAPTER 3[24]

IMMIGRATION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN TERMS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

The previous chapter examined changes in the goals and noncitizen targets of U.S. immigration policy from a historical perspective. Immigration policy since the 2000s has been dominated by an enforcement-only approach focusing on controlling and punishing noncitizens who have been socially and legally framed as illegal and criminals. Paying special attention to current immigration enforcement-only policy contexts - such as complicated intergovernmental relations on immigration and state and local immigration activism - and the administrative working mechanisms of the enforcement machine for mass-detention and deportation, this chapter first discusses local government involvement in immigration policing under the immigration federalism perspective. I then explore theoretically and contextually what factors lead localities to actively participate in immigration enforcement and control policy. Then specifically focusing on the Secure Communities (S-Comm) program as the key enforcement program under the Obama administration, this chapter also discusses what S-Comm is, why this program was implemented with what policy goals, and how this program has actually been implemented with the intergovernmental cooperative enforcement framework. Special emphasis is placed on two key interaction points between different levels of government: immigration detainer issuances and noncitizen deportation. Finally, paying attention to

[24] A portion of this chapter was previously prepared for an application for the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) Fellowship in August 2014. I appreciate Professors N. Joseph Cayer and Paul G. Lewis at Arizona State University and Professor Susan B. Long, a co-director of TRAC at Syracuse University for their detailed reviews and helpful comments.

the increasing prominence of the immigrant criminality framework, how immigration (immigrants) and public safety are theoretically related is discussed in policy contexts. This theoretical and contextual background on current immigration enforcement policy under the S-Comm framework is used for empirical analyses in the next three chapters (Chapters 4 - 6).

3.1. Local Immigration Policy Involvement under Complicated Intergovernmental Relations

With the repeated failures to create a comprehensive immigration framework under the Bush administration in the mid-2000s, localities began to express their policy voices in the process of implementing immigration-related public affairs. Vast federal-local differences in perspective about which government can create and implement immigration issues arose, as I briefly mentioned in the first chapter, and they have brought about serious intergovernmental conflicts. These debates and conflicts specifically came to the surface after local or state-level immigration laws were passed in localities from Hazleton, PA, in 2006 to Arizona's Senate Bill (SB) 1070 in 2010 and its copycat laws in 2011 and 2012. A series of unsolved conflicts eventually headed to the courts for legal battles, and most federal courts' decisions upheld the federal government's argument due to federal preemptive authority. However, the Supreme Court's 2012 decision in *Arizona v. United States* upheld the involvement of local law enforcement agents in immigration through immigration status checks during lawful stops of suspected noncitizens - sometimes known as the "show me your paper" provision - so intergovernmental debates on immigration policy implementation are still

ongoing (Tichenor & Filindra, 2012). In spite of such serious legal conflicts, the federal government has at the same time administratively encouraged localities to be involved in federal immigration enforcement actions, such as 287(g) partnerships or S-Comm, as an "administrative" partner or "force-multiplier" (Kobach, 2006; Provine, Varsanyi, Lewis, & Decker, 2012). Therefore, such complicated intergovernmental relations on immigration issues leave room for considerable ambiguity and confusion in the implementation of immigration policy in the United States.

3.1.1. Different Local Voices on Immigration Issues Under Immigration Policy Activism

Under the abovementioned intergovernmental conflicts on immigration policy, localities' policy voices on immigration vary geographically with stances that are very punitive and restrictive, immigrant-friendly, or noninterventionist. One interesting aspect of local immigration activism is that even localities within the same state sometimes have different policy stances on immigration on an issue-by-issue basis. For example, the city of Tucson, AZ, has followed an immigrant-friendly policy stance in spite of a longstanding punitive and restrictive state-level immigration stance.[25] In addition to differences between localities, immigration stances and tones in a certain locality or state have sometimes shifted over time and crossed the line between welcoming and restrictive. For example, Suffolk County, NY, passed an anti-immigration ordinance in

[25] In addition to the city of Tucson, AZ, there are multiple examples intra-state variations on immigration policy. For example, the city of Escondido, CA, passed a strong anti-immigration law in 2006 while many other California localities have consistently had immigrant-friendly policies and passed related laws; the cities of Bellaire and Mason/Springboro in Ohio passed local anti-immigration ordinances in 2007 limiting public services to the undocumented in their jurisdictions, while the city of Dayton in the same state consistently followed a pro-immigration stance with a "Welcome Dayton Plan" oriented toward more humane and equal treatment of noncitizens living there regardless of their documentation status (Fair Immigration Reform Movement data; Kelley, 2011).

2006 targeting the undocumented, but shifted toward a more welcoming policy by passing Executive Order 10 in 2012, providing limited-English residents in their jurisdiction with translation and interpretation services when they access public services (Altschuler & Oshrio, 2012). Prince William County, VA, which was considered a sanctuary locality in the 2000s, passed a local ordinance in 2007 deputizing local Police to implement immigration enforcement policy targeting the undocumented in the jurisdiction (Toussaint, 2013). As demonstrated with the examples here, localities have different or similar policy voices within or across the state level, and some localities have shifted their policy responses on immigration over time depending on various political, economic, and geographical contexts, and external or internal changes (Chavez & Provine, 2009; Hopkins, 2010; Ramakrishnan & Wong, 2010; Walker & Leitner, 2011).

3.1.2. Local Choices Under the Current Enforcement-only Policy Regime

Under such complicated and confusing intergovernmental relations and environments for dealing with immigration-related issues, localities have no choice but to be involved in the national immigration policy process directly or indirectly. In terms of the legal perspective, some localities actively express their political and policy voices on immigration-related issues through local immigration ordinances, resolutions or executive orders, which reflect local thoughts and calculations on how such immigration phenomena influence their jurisdictions. However, others might strongly resist local involvement in current immigration enforcement policy regimes, either because they cite immigration as being a role of the federal government or because their local contexts or traditions include a welcoming or integrative immigration policy stance. These localities

also express their policy responses through local immigration-related laws, ordinances, or executive orders reflecting immigrant-friendly stances. Interestingly, however, administratively localities cannot reflect their local situations in the process of internal immigration enforcement policymaking.[26]

3.1.3. Factors Influencing Local Immigration Enforcement Policy Participation[27]

Previous studies - specifically in the fields of urban policy, sociology, geography, and political science - have analyzed contextual factors shaping local immigration policy activism at the individual or local government level. Several contextual factors, such as demographic, political, economic, and geographical contexts, have theoretically and empirically been discussed, but studies have found mixed and sometimes different influences among these factors. In this dissertation, I discuss how these contextual factors shape local immigration policy direction, specifically local immigration enforcement policy participation.

Demographic factors have frequently been considered one of the key driving forces shaping local immigration enforcement policy. These factors include Hispanic or

[26] Under the current administrative system and programs for an enforcement-only policy frame, localities, regardless of their perspective on the legitimacy of the policy directions, are sometimes required to be involved in the internal immigration enforcement policy process because Congress has mandated a certain administrative program for noncitizen enforcement to be implemented across the country as a kind of mandatory program. Considering that ICE's current main strategy for internal enforcement policy has been broadly based on a framework of federal-local cooperation, localities must comply with certain mandatory enforcement programs - such as S-Comm or the Criminal Alien Program - even though these programs do not match the local perspective on immigration issues. However, in the case of voluntary enforcement programs targeting noncitizens, such as 287(g) partnerships, localities with a tradition of an integrative policy stance have the option of minimal involvement for activation of such administrative program; for example, they might not activate the program or might not even make a decision on local participation in the program.

[27] In addition to the political, economic, demographic, and geographical factors discussed here, previous studies have discussed multiple factors shaping local immigration policy direction. These include legislative professionalism (Monogan, 2013), and human capital (measured by the level of educational attainments, [Berg, 2015; Zamora-Kapoor, Kovincic, & Causey, 2013]).

foreign-born population shares at the local level (Chand & Schreckhise, 2014; Cox & Miles, 2013; Hopkins, 2010; Longazel, 2012; Marquez & Schraufnagel, 2013; Monogan, 2013; Stuesse & Coleman, 2014; Treyger, Chalfin, & Loeffler, 2014; Walker & Leitner, 2011) and recent changing noncitizen settlement rates or patterns at the local level (Williams, 2015). When a foreign-born population with a different race, ethnicity, language, and culture flows into a certain locality, the public tends to select one of two different signals: considering this population as an economic or national "threat/problem" or seeing opportunities for better dynamic nation-building, based on the "(inter-group) contact" hypothesis (Berg, 2015; Hawley, 2011). Using a threat hypothesis, Walker and Leitner (2011) and Hopkins (2010) have considered such "immigrant concentration," "new destinations," or "political place" dynamics as a factor increasing an anti-immigration policy perspective. Some scholars, including Berg (2015), Esbenshade (2007), and Hopkins (2010), have paid special attention to the changing rate (pace) of demographics (foreign-born/Hispanic populations) and the time in which the nation or localities emphasize immigration as an important policy issue as the key factor shaping and reshaping local punitive immigration perspectives (Marquez & Schraufnagel, 2013; Monogan, 2013; Walker & Leitner, 2011). According to contact theory, interracial and -ethnic conflicts decrease when interactions between different races and ethnicities increase and previous negative images and views of noncitizens tend to dissipate (Hawley, 2011). However, other studies found no relationship between local demography of noncitizens and increasing local restrictive and punitive immigration policy (Chavez & Provine, 2009; Ramakrishnan & Wong, 2010). Chavez and Provine (2009) found a rather

different relationship between these two factors: an increasing Hispanic population is associated with a more integrative immigration policy.

Political factors also tend to be critically considered as the key factor shaping local punitive immigration policy direction. A strong immigration enforcement policy direction tends to be associated with party affiliations, especially in Republican-leaning localities (Chand & Schreckhise, 2014; Hawley, 2011; Marquez & Schraufnagel, 2013; Wong, 2014b; Ramakrishnan & Wong, 2010; Suro, 2015; Treyger, Chalfin, & Loeffler, 2014). More conservative localities are more likely to select enforcement-focused immigration policy, a hypothesis that was supported by Lewis, Varsanyi, Provine, and Decker (2013b), Ramakrishnan and Wong (2010) and Chavez and Provine (2009). Using centennial data (1892-2010) on U.S. deportation at the national level, Wong (2014a) found that political partisanship (congressional representation with Republican majorities in both the House and the Senate) significantly influences an increase in enforcement outcome including deportations and returns of noncitizens, while economic and demographic contexts were not significantly related to immigration enforcement outcomes. Using data on state-level immigration legislation from a recent 5-year period (2008 - 2012), Marquez and Schraufnagel (2013) found that states with Democratic-controlled governments are less likely to pass restrictive immigration laws within their states, but the influence was not significant. However, using 7 years of data (2005-2011) on state level immigration policy, Monogan (2013) had a different result, finding that partisanship is not a significant factor to account for shaping local punitive immigration policy. Using a national voting result, Hawley (2011) argued that political partisanship

can account for a more restrictive immigration policy turn only when it is associated with localities with a quickly increasing rate of immigration or foreign-born population.

Immigration policy responses by the public and policymakers may also be shaped by national or local *economic situations* - frequently measured by unemployment or poverty level - in immigrant-receiving states. Based on economic or labor market competition theory, scholars assume a relationship between economic decline and punitive immigration policy direction (Berg, 2015; Zamora-Kapoor, Kovincic, & Causey, 2013). That is, when a state is having an economic boom, localities tend to have a more welcoming immigration policy to meet the increasing demand for labor. However, in times of economic decline or stagnation, when the job market seriously shrinks and there is stronger competition for jobs, the public, specifically those with low socioeconomic and education levels, considers noncitizens as unwelcome competitors for jobs (Palasz & Fennelly, 2013). During economic decline, politicians skillfully and strategically use noncitizens as scapegoats. As Wong (2014a) mentioned, immigration issues tend to appear on the surface only when economic conditions are in decline. Previous studies have considered the association between economic difficulties (i.e., rising unemployment or poverty level) and a restrictive and punitive immigration policy direction. In a state-level immigration policy shift, Monogan (2013) found that an economic factor (operationalized by state wealth, which was measured by per capita gross state product) significantly accounted for a shift toward a welcoming policy. However, there are also several studies showing a reverse or negligible relationship between the two factors. Empirically testing the "economic competition/marginality" hypothesis, Walker and Leitner (2011) found that those localities with high unemployment are likely to have an

inclusive immigration policy. Hawley (2011) also found in a county-level data analysis regarding 2004 national voting that an economic factor (unemployment rate) was not a significant factor in accounting for more restrictive immigration policy. Through an analysis of local police participation in federal immigration enforcement policy, Lewis and his colleagues (2013b) found that crime rates, and demographic factors have been insignificantly related to localities' punitive and restrictive immigration policy shifts. However, demographic factors (i.e., increasing shares of Hispanic population in small localities) were significantly related to decreasing immigration enforcement actions through increasing political power and capital from these immigrant groups.

Geographical patterns on local immigration policy have been observed from some previous studies. Previous studies have assumed that southwestern border states or localities, as the main route of influx of undocumented immigrants, have a more punitive immigration policy (Chand & Schreckhise, 2014; Walker, 2014). Some studies have paid attention to the relationship between the southern location and anti-immigration policy, but as Walker and Leitner (2011) mentioned, other factors associated with the southern location of residents are more likely to be involved in shaping restrictive immigration policy. According to Walker and Leitner (2011), with regard to analysis of the Baltimore-Washington region, suburban and rural areas tend to have more punitive and restrictive immigration perspectives, while central-city municipal areas with traditions of racial and economic diversity are likely to have a more inclusive immigration policy. Unlike Walker and Leitner's research on intra-locality immigration variations, Monogan (2013) found that spatial or neighboring effects on immigration policy direction can be made at the state level.

As in the abovementioned previous studies, the factors behind state and local involvement in immigration control and enforcement policy are still unclear, and multiple factors (e.g., political, economic, demographic, geographical) or combinations of factors might influence a local punitive turn on immigration policy. Based on these contextual factors influencing local immigration enforcement policy participation, I create the first research hypothesis as follows:

Hypothesis 1: There is a relationship between contextual factors (demographic, political, economic, and geographical contexts) and local immigration enforcement policy participation or a local punitive turn.

Hypothesis 1-1: Local immigration enforcement policy participation is shaped by a combination of contextual factors (e.g., demographic and political factors or geographical and economic factors).

3.2. Implementation of the Secure Communities Program: Intergovernmental Cooperation for Effective Immigration Enforcement Policy

Following the 9/11 attack and the consequent failure of effective communication and information sharing across public agencies for risk management, in 2002 Washington politicians required a strengthening of the coordination capacity between or among vertical (federal-local-private organizations) and horizontal (within federal or local agencies) governance through the creation of "fusion centers" (Reagan & Monahan, 2014). Besides, with the strengthening crimmigration trend and enforcement-only policy regime that is the legacy of post-1996 immigration politics, immigration policymakers

made efforts to create a master framework of protecting the nation and communities based on close intergovernmental cooperation and communication. Continuous criticism of previous internal enforcement programs, such as 287(g) partnerships, including racial or ethnic profiling in the process of program implementation, also caused politicians and policymakers to think it necessary to create an alternative noncitizen enforcement program (Ramos, 2012). With such awareness of political reality, the Secure Communities program (S-Comm) was initiated in 2008 under the Bush administration as a pilot program in a few localities, and thereafter rapidly expanded to more than 3,000 localities across the country under the Obama administration.

3.2.1. Working Mechanism of S-Comm: Biometric (Fingerprint) Data Sharing between Different Levels of Government, and Setting Enforcement Priority for Maximizing Enforcement (Deportation) Numbers

Orienting toward "smart[er] and effective immigration enforcement[28]" with limited government resources (Kanstroom, 2012; Kubrin, 2014; Lind, 2014), S-Comm has a policy goal of "making local communities safer" via effectively identifying, detaining, and finally removing dangerous noncitizens who have committed criminal violations. Although it was never clearly disclosed by ICE, the main program intention of federal

[28] "Smart" immigration enforcement policy discourse represents immigration control and enforcement actions under the current administration as focused on targeted noncitizen groups or categories - such as noncitizens with violent criminal convictions, frequently called "criminal aliens," - rather than all problematic noncitizens whose status has been debated by policymakers, including undocumented immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. This policy is a by-product of a practical approach from Washington policymakers and politicians with the recognition that removal of all 11 or 12 million undocumented noncitizens is almost impossible with the current limited public resources and personnel. It represents a departure from the immigration enforcement policy direction of the Bush administration, which oriented toward the removal of all 12 million undocumented immigrants under the *Operation Endgame* strategy (Inda, 2013).

immigration bureaucrats from S-Comm implementation - DHS/ICE - is to "maximize" deportation numbers through comprehensive intergovernmental enforcement data sharing and close interactions in the process of implementation of this program[29]. Maximizing deportation numbers was not possible before the implementation of S-Comm, because nationwide implementation of an immigration enforcement program is not easy[30]. Based on such logic that dangerous noncitizens with serious criminal violations - including violent crimes such as murder, rape, and aggravated felony - should be proactively identified, detained, and removed from local communities, the basic working mechanism for implementing S-Comm is an information-sharing process between intergovernmental interactions and communications in the process of enforcement policy. Local law enforcement agents (LEAs) initiate such enforcement actions by catching suspected noncitizens on the local streets and then detaining them in local jails or detention facilities. Under the conventional criminal justice system, LEAs send suspected noncitizens' fingerprints to the FBI for a criminal status check. However, under the S-Comm framework, the FBI should automatically forward these noncitizen fingerprints to ICE for an immigration status check. Then, if ICE's immigration database (called the "IDENT" database) has a match with these suspected noncitizens' fingerprints, ICE may

[29] An internal ICE document sent from a high-ranking ICE director to ICE field officers, which was released as a result of litigation from the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union), shows that (1) there have been "fixed" deportation goals within ICE in terms of criminal and noncriminal removals, and (2) considering the decreasing removal trends, ICE field agents should critically consider the "[a]gency goal of achieving 400,000 removals and returns overall without relaxing our [ICE's] increased efforts" (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2010).

[30] As another intergovernmental immigration enforcement program, the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) has a working mechanism similar to that of S-Comm. Both are jail-status-check programs to identify and remove criminal noncitizens. However, unlike S-Comm, CAP does not have any concrete interaction between different levels of government. In spite of a longer implementation history compared to S-Comm, CAP has received little public attention and little information has been released in terms of how this program has been operated and managed, and how localities and the federal immigration agencies have communicated with each other (Immigration Policy Center, 2013a).

or may not issue an immigration detainer (Form I-247) to localities for transporting noncitizens to ICE facilities, and deportation proceedings are made for final removal (Conley, 2013; Gill, 2013; ICE, 2011b; Jung, 2015a; Shebaya, 2013; TRAC, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d). Through mixing the previous criminal justice system and process with the immigration policing process, S-Comm makes it possible for federal immigration authorities to rapidly increase the possibility of identifying any noncitizens arrested and held in local jails or detention facilities through the sharing interoperability system, and to detain and finally remove them under the S-Comm framework (Cox & Miles, 2013; Miles & Cox, 2014).

Table 3.1. Secure Communities Levels and Offenses Categories (based on NCIC code*)

"Level 1"	**"Level 2"**	**"Level 3"**	**"Non-criminal"**
Most violent crimes/major drug	Most property crimes/misdemeanors/ minor drug	Less than three misdemeanors	
Homicide	Arson	Sovereignty	ICE fugitives
Kidnapping	Burglary	Military	Prior removals and returns
Sexual assault	Larceny	Immigration	EWI (Enter without Inspection)
Robbery	Stolen vehicles	Extortion	Visa violators and overstay
Assaults	Forgery	Damage property	
Threats	Fraud	Family offenses	
Extortion - threat to injure person	Embezzlement	Gambling	
		Traffic offenses	
Sex offenses	Stolen property	Commercialized sex offenses	
Cruelty toward child, wife	Damage property w/explosive	Liquor	
Resisting an officer	Traffic offenses	Obstructing the police	
Weapon	Smuggling	Bribery	
Hit and run	Money laundering	Health and safety	
Drugs (sentence > 1 year)	Drugs (sentence < 1 year)	Civil rights	
National security & sovereignty		Invasion of privacy	
		Election laws	
		Conservation	
		Public order crimes	

Source: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, *Secure Communities Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)*, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiesops93009.pdf
* National Crime Information Center of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Note: "Sovereignty"-related violations, according to NCIC code (0101 - 0199), include treason (0101), treason misprision (0102), espionage (0103), sabotage (0104), sedition (0105), selective service (0106), and sovereignty (0199). Most charges on sovereignty are related to "Level 1" criminal charges except selective service, which is related to a "Level 3" charge. Therefore, ICE's reports locate sovereignty-related violations in Level 1 or Level 3. "Traffic Offenses" in Level 3 convictions include driving under influence (DUI), stop sign violations, speeding violations, and driving without a valid driver's license. For more concrete information on ICE's decisions regarding criminality on noncitizens, see TRAC (2013e).

ICE has officially and clearly argued that, under limited public monies, S-Comm concentrates its enforcement energy and resources on catching and removing dangerous criminal aliens who pose a serious threat to public safety and national security. Targeting such dangerous noncitizens who have committed criminal violations, ICE sets enforcement priorities based on the "the severity of [their] crime," which consist of three levels of criminality or dangerousness (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, web site). When fingerprints of suspected noncitizens are forwarded from the FBI after being initially submitted by LEAs, the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) identifies the noncitizens' immigration status, and after that, when they are transferred to ICE facilities for removal proceedings, the LESC finally decides their deportability based on the severity of criminality from "level 1" (the most serious crimes) to "level 3" (mostly misdemeanor charges). In addition to removing those with criminal charges at these three levels, ICE also removes noncitizens in the "noncriminal" removal category, defined as those with immigration violations, such as prior removals or returns (noncitizens ordered for deportation but who still remain in U.S. territory), fugitives, border re-crossers and EWI (Enter Without Inspection), and visa overstays (ICE, 2009a). In 2009, in its internal data for a briefing to the state of New York, ICE clearly pointed out that, regarding

enforcement actions under S-Comm, "ICE will focus initially on identifying removable criminal aliens charged with or convicted of a Level 1 offense," and the Level 1 offenses for removal orders included "threats to national security, homicide, kidnapping, sexual offenses, robbery, assault, [and] drug offenses [with more than a 1 year sentence]." Therefore, ICE's enforcement actions under the S-Comm framework should focus on those noncitizens with Level 1 criminal convictions.[31] Table 3.1 indicates deportable categories based on the level of crimes under the current S-Comm framework.

3.2.2. Program Performance and Debates

According to monthly deportation performance (including enforcement outcomes through July 2014), a total of 369,218 noncitizens were removed during a period of 69 months by S-Comm implementation across the country. That means about 5,275 noncitizens were removed monthly, and about 178 noncitizens were removed daily under S-Comm. Considering the fact that 1,120 noncitizens were removed on a daily basis through all ICE enforcement programs in FY2012, S-Comm accounts for about 15.9% of daily removal performance under the current federal immigration enforcement policy. Regarding noncitizen fingerprint submission, about 34 million fingerprints were submitted from local law enforcement agencies as of November 2013, and submissions have expanded, with more than 41 million as of July 2014. Figure 3.1 (top) graphically shows monthly fingerprint submissions and percentage of fingerprint matches to the IDENT database at the national level. Fingerprint submissions from LEAs have steeply

[31] However, ICE never clearly mentions when and under what conditions ICE field agents can decide noncitizen deportability and removability when suspected noncitizens have Levels 2 or 3 convictions. ICE explicitly acknowledges that, in these situations, there is no choice but to allow ICE field agents considerable discretion.

increased since the implementation of S-Comm, but this is reasonable because the number of counties that have activated this program has proportionately increased as of January 2013. Those submissions reached at 964,653 in Aug. 2012, and thereafter oscillated up and down over time. In May 2013, fingerprint submissions surpassed 1 million per month for the first time from more than 3,000 counties, but thereafter the numbers slightly decreased, oscillating between 830,136 and 994,568. With regard to fingerprint matches, matching rates of more than 10% were made at the initial stage of the implementation of S-Comm nationally, but these rates have gradually decreased over time and have remained between 4% and 5% since 2011. On average, during a 69 month period (October 2008 - July 2014), 6.4% of noncitizen fingerprints (48,532 matches) were matched through immigration or criminal status checks, which means 6.4 out of 100 noncitizens across localities were identified by ICE as potentially having illegal or criminal violation histories or problems.

Considering deportation outcomes in terms of three levels of criminality, as seen in Figure 3.1 (bottom), different patterns per level of criminality were found. At the initial time, more than two thirds of noncitizens were removed with misdemeanor charges (Level 3) and noncriminal violations, but these deportations gradually decreased over time. Reversely, deportations with Level 1 as the key enforcement target were very low, almost 10% at the initial time, but they gradually increased over time. Of 369,218 noncitizens deported cumulatively during those 69 months, about 30.77% were removed with Level 1 criminal convictions while 19.82% were removed with noncriminal convictions such as immigration violations. However, interestingly, more than half of

noncitizen deportations (50.62%) were for noncriminal or misdemeanor (Level 3) charges.

In spite of the promise and boastful claims that S-Comm has contributed to removing dangerous noncitizens across the country, this program has been at the center of debate and conflict among policy actors, in terms of the relevancy of program implementation and the outcomes resulting from S-Comm. Enforcement results from the past several years indicate that many noncitizens convicted of low-level crimes (i.e., traffic violations and drug possession) or with non-criminal convictions (i.e., immigration violations) were deported (Motomura,2014; Semple, 2014; TRAC, 2010, 2013a, 2013b, 2014b; Vock, 2013). For example, according to 2010 data from ICE covering more than one year since the implementation of S-Comm, more than half of noncitizen deportations under S-Comm were of noncriminal noncitizens, and almost two-thirds of deportations were related to misdemeanor charges (level 3) and noncriminal convictions such as immigration violations (Feltz & Baksh, 2010).



Source: ICE's Monthly IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability statistis.

Figure 3.1. Implementation of Secure Communities at the National Level: Intergovernmental Interaction through Fingerprint Sharing (top) and Deportation Outcomes (bottom)

Note: Monthly % of fingerprint matches were calculated by: (= total number of noncitizen fingerprint matches per month / total numbers of fingerprint submissions per month) * 100. Monthly deportation rates per level of criminality were calculated by: (= total number of noncitizen deportations per level of criminality per month/ total number of deportations per month)* 100.

Enforcement outcomes vary considerably across localities. For example, according to Francis (2011), at the state level, 42% of noncitizen deportees in Florida

during the first two years (2009-10) had noncriminal convictions. Orange County, FL, had a noncriminal noncitizen deportation rate of 63% under the S-Comm program during the same years. Using recent Maryland enforcement data on S-Comm (2009-2013), Fritz (2014) found that more than 40% of deportations were of noncitizens without any criminal record, compared to a 12% rate of deportations of noncitizens with noncriminal convictions in Texas. Using 30 months of S-Comm enforcement data (October 2008 - April 2011), Chand and his colleagues (2014) focus on the influence of S-Comm in seven southern states (including Arkansas, Oklahoma, Missouri, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Texas), and they found that all these states have a strikingly higher number of noncitizen deportations without any criminal convictions. The same was true in the Massachusetts city of Boston, where in 2011, 313 noncitizens without any criminal convictions were deported under the S-Comm framework (Preston, 2011). Using 45 months of ICE enforcement data (October 2008 - July 2012), Cox and Miles (2013) and Miles and Cox (2014) also analyzed how S-Comm has been implemented. Considering community safety as the key outcome for this program, the authors attempted to determine the extent to which serious crimes have been decreased at the county level by activation of S-Comm. However, unlike the repeated advertising of DHS/ICE regarding S-Comm, they found "no meaningful reduction in the FBI index crime rate." Such different enforcement outcomes from S-Comm brought about serious intergovernmental conflict, and several localities resisted and decided not to comply with federal immigration enforcement program implementation[32] (Lind, 2014a; Semple & Preston, 2011).

[32] At the initial stage, DHS/ICE never clearly reminded and communicated with localities in terms of how

3.2.3. Hidden but Key Logic under S-Comm Implementation: Activation Orders of S-Comm and Geographical Consideration

One interesting but nuanced aspect of the implementation of S-Comm is ICE's activation and implementation strategy and ambiguous intergovernmental relations on activation decisions for this program at the local level. For the implementation of S-Comm, ICE did not select a simultaneous nationwide activation strategy but followed a selection and concentration strategy on deportation actions through a staggered rollout scheme at the county level (Jung, 2015a). As the National Immigration Law Center (2011) nicely touched on, little information and few concrete guidelines about S-Comm implementation between different levels of government existed during the first 3 years (2008 -2010), and as in the implementation of 287(g) partnerships, ICE advertised S-Comm to localities via interparty meetings, and finally encouraged localities to make a memorandum of agreement (MOA) for activation. Federal immigration bureaucrats repeatedly said as of 2010 that S-Comm was a voluntary enforcement program.

S-Comm works, what noncitizens are the main targets, and how noncitizens who were caught and transferred from localities were enforced (Lind, 2014a). ICE's management and implementation of S-Comm has been full of secrecy and unclear data and communication. A series of unexpected results from various localities gave rise to deep distrust between local noncitizens and their communities and local police. These results also brought about serious debate and conflicts between levels of government. Under this atmosphere, in 2011, three state governors from Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York (all Democrats) required that their states pull out of S-Comm, and several localities including Arlington (PA), Boston (MA), Dallas (TX), Chicago (IL), San Francisco, and Los Angeles (CA) also participated in this noncompliance with ICE's S-Comm implementation (Lind, 2014c). Then-director of ICE John Morton issued policy memos to address such local resistance and noncompliance, and made some minor modifications in S-Comm implementation through setting clearer priority for enforcement actions and giving broader administrative discretion to focus on targeted criminal noncitizens in the process of noncitizen enforcement policy. Strikingly, in August 2011, DHS/ICE rescinded all existing memorandums of agreement (MOA) on S-Comm, declaring that localities could not opt out because it is a mandatory program (Semple & Preston, 2011).

However, such intergovernmental enforcement partnerships based on MOAs did not follow the kind of mutual cooperation framework ICE mentioned. ICE has carried out the implementation of S-Comm "in complete secrecy, without a locality even being aware it had been imposed on the community" (National Law Immigration Center, 2011). ICE repeatedly but ironically changed arguments they made in the past - about a federal-local cooperative enforcement framework, management of the program by MOAs, its being a voluntary enforcement program in which localities would have the right to repeal or change the existing MOAs, and changing enforcement priorities over time - and local voices on the decisions about the activation or repealing of S-Comm have been thoroughly ignored. As Cox and Miles (2013) and Miles and Cox (2014) pointed out, even after 2011, some localities did not identify the activation of S-Comm after ICE activated the program in their jurisdictions without clear notifications or MOAs.[33] Under the current interoperability system on immigration data between and among multiple levels of government, ICE can get noncitizen-related data from any localities, even those that do not want to participate in such an immigration enforcement policy.

Under such an ironic and ambiguous intergovernmental immigration enforcement policy governance and regime, activation of S-Comm might strongly reflect the federal immigration agency's perspectives, in terms of what regions and categories (groups) of noncitizens are really targeted for enforcement actions. According to ICE's internal data on the date of S-Comm activation in jurisdictions at the community level, one interesting trend can be identified: many localities with early activation of S-Comm tend to be

[33] According to the National Immigration Law Center (2011) using documents that were released after Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, activation in Pennsylvania was made without "having the state sign an MOA."

located in southwest border areas - including the states of Arizona, California, Texas, and interestingly some of New Mexico - and southern areas, such as Florida, North Carolina, and some of Georgia. This staggered rollout strategy specifically focusing on border localities indicates that localities with early activation of S-Comm might be places for Washington politicians and policymakers to achieve more meaningful or maximized enforcement results under an enforcement-only regime (Jung, 2015a). Although ICE keeps silent about such political intentions, many localities with early activation of S-Comm have certain demographic characteristics such as a high Latino population, which is the main target group for current noncitizen enforcement policy (Cox & Miles, 2013; Jung, 2015a; Treyger, Chalfin, & Loeffler, 2014). Based on such contextual information on the activation strategy of S-Comm, I create the second hypothesis as follows:

Hypothesis 2: There is a correlation between some contextual factors and implementation outcome of S-Comm. That is, different activation orders and geographical considerations on the activation of S-Comm led to different enforcement outcomes in local jurisdictions.
Hypothesis 2-1: Counties with early activation of S-Comm are associated with higher noncitizen deportation numbers than those with late activation of this program.
Hypothesis 2-2: Counties located in southwest border jurisdictions are associated with higher noncitizen deportation numbers than those in non-border regions.

3.3. Secure Communities and Two Key Interaction Points under the Current Federal-Local Cooperative Immigration Enforcement Framework

For carrying out this program, intergovernmental enforcement cooperation is the key and an indispensable process under the S-Comm program. Therefore, ICE and LEAs have structurally organic and close communications during the whole process, from biometric data sharing on suspected noncitizens in local jails (LEAs → ICE), to deciding the level of criminality of incarcerated noncitizens in local jails (ICE → LEAs/ICE), detainer issuance for administratively booking these noncitizens to ICE facilities (ICE/LEAs → LEAs), and processing removal proceedings (ICE → LEAs). However, such a new trend on immigration policy created unsolved and conflicting viewpoints between policymakers, especially in terms of what roles, authorities, and responsibilities each level of government has in the process of implementing immigration enforcement policy, and whether localities, including states, have "inherent authority" on policing immigration in their jurisdictions (Franck, 2012). Therefore, such multiple interaction structures and points for noncitizen enforcement policy have left much room for both ICE and LEAs to execute discretionary power. Considering the current situation in which ICE remains resistant to releasing information about how S-Comm is carried out, specifically under an intergovernmental enforcement cooperation framework, it is almost impossible for the public to understand all the intergovernmental interactions. Therefore, in this study, I focus on how two key interaction points on noncitizen enforcement policy under S-Comm, detainer issuance and deportation outcomes, are carried out with the intergovernmental cooperation process.

3.3.1. Immigration (ICE) Detainer Issuance under the S-Comm

As an administrative document (Form I-247), the immigration detainer (sometimes called an "ICE hold") has been used as a tool for ICE to ask localities to hold suspected noncitizens in local detention facilities for up to 48 hours (excluding weekends and holidays) for transfer to ICE facilities for removal proceedings. Unlike a warrant for arrest, a detainer is just a "notification" from federal immigration agencies for enforcement actions (Franck, 2012; Lasch, 2013b; TRAC, 2013a, 2013b). Detainers have mainly been issued by federal immigration officers, but they can also be issued by local LEAs that have been deputized with immigration enforcement authority under 287(g) partnerships (Franck, 2012). According to TRAC (2013a, 2013b, 2014b), ICE has issued more than 200,000 detainers annually to localities for catching and transferring suspected noncitizens - 273,982 issuances in FY2012 and 213,325 in FY2013 - and from a monthly perspective, ICE has issued on average almost 20,000 detainers to localities, 22,832 per month in FY2012 and 17,777 per month in FY2013.

Historically, there have been few clear legal and administrative guidelines on what a detainer refers to, and how it should be used in immigration policy. ICE detainers should be issued to localities that have noncitizens with dangerous criminal convictions based on enforcement priorities (i.e., level of criminality) toward which the Obama administration has oriented. However, critics argue that ICE has issued detainers indiscriminately to catch and remove almost any noncitizens regardless of criminality (Manuel, 2014). For example, according to the TRAC data analysis (2013d) on ICE detainers, ICE issued about one million (949,126) immigration detainers nationally during a recent 50-month period (from FY2008 through the start of FY2012), but more

than two thirds of the total immigration detainers issued are related to those noncitizens without criminal records. This ironic result has been consistent in TRAC's back-to-back data analyses on immigration detainer statistics. Follow-up data analysis covering 16 months (from October 2011 through January 2013) from TRAC (2013b) also shows that "no more than 14 percent" of the recent ICE detainers issued during FY2012 through the first 4 months of FY2013 met the stated goal of ICE immigration enforcement policy, targeting risky and criminal noncitizens for improving public safety or national security. In spite of stricter new guidelines in December 2012 ("*policy change of detainer issuance*"), the result of detainer issuances in the first 6 months of 2013 (January- June) was similar (TRAC, 2013c). The problems regarding ICE detainer issuances do not end here; as mentioned in TRAC's in-depth analyses (2013a, 2013b, 2013c), a considerable number of "Level 1" crimes/offenses that ICE set for issuing detainers appear to be related to minor crimes or misdemeanors, such as "simple traffic violations and immigration violations" (i.e., illegal entry). Level 1 crimes, especially "aggravated felonies" charges, have been broadly and arbitrarily interpreted by ICE field agents, so any minor offenses - such as traffic violations, disorderly conduct, or marijuana possession - can be considered aggravated felonies and Level 1 charges.

One interesting point on detainers is that their issuance or lodging has strikingly increased since the implementation of S-Comm (Greene, 2012; Lasch, 2013b). Increasing volumes of detainer issuances are associated with serious debates and confusion among localities on the nature and authority of detainers. In spite of recent federal court decisions, many localities consider detainers as requests and mere notifications for cooperative administrative enforcement actions, while others still see detainers as

commands and federal regulations for compliance (Lasch, 2013a, 2013b). Such ambiguities on detainer issuance under the S-Comm framework might have considerable local variation on the volume of local immigration detainer issuance from ICE. With this background information and intergovernmental context on the issuance of detainers, I created the following research hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: There is a relationship between local responses/choices on immigration and ICE detainers issued to localities under the S-Comm program. That is, different local responses and perspectives on immigration result in different volumes of ICE detainers issued in those jurisdictions.

Hypothesis 3-1: Counties with strong enforcement participation are likely to accept more ICE detainers for stepping up enforcement actions.

Hypothesis 3-2: Counties with weak enforcement participation are likely to be resistant to complying with ICE hold requests on suspected noncitizens. That is, such counties selectively accept ICE's detainer issuance depending on the level of criminality (enforcement priorities).

3.3.2. Noncitizen Deportation under the S-Comm

Deportation in the immigration system and policy generally refers to a coercive and forceful administrative practice for removal and expulsion of noncitizens who are considered unfit by the immigration system or violate related laws (Buckinx & Filindra, 2015; Coutin, 2015; Drotbohm & Hasselberg, 2015; Kanstroom, 2012). However, in the history of U.S. immigration assimilation and deportation, deportation has also been a

process for selecting “deportable” and “unwanted” noncitizens out of all noncitizens who already live on American soil. The federal government has repeatedly argued that deportation is not a punishment but an administrative action for protecting national and public security (Anderson, Gibney, & Paoletti, 2011). However, in policy realities, specifically in local immigrant communities, deportation has been considered a direct and drastic punishment that is related to their lives. It has a social and economic impact in local communities from which deportees are removed, including collateral damages such as tearing families apart and putting many U.S.-born children with undocumented, deported parents into the foster care system. Therefore, under the strong interconnection between the criminal system and law and immigration counterparts, deportation is also considered a “criminal punishment” for the target noncitizens (Stump, 2014a, p. 95). Some scholars in the sociology, anthropology, and criminal justice fields consider a recent “deportation turn” under enforcement-focused immigration policy as a mechanism for “social control” or “regulation” via banishing such socially unwanted noncitizens. In liberal states, government deportation actions also draw the normative and legal contour of citizenship, and are considered a practice for setting a line between citizens and noncitizens and deserving and undeserving noncitizens (Anderson, Gibney, & Paoletti, 2011; Drotbohm & Hasselberg, 2015; Kanstroom, 2012).

Based on the program goal and enforcement priorities of S-Comm, the main target for punishment and deportation should be dangerous noncitizens who have committed criminal violations including violent crimes at the community level. Therefore, considering the current three levels of criminality for enforcement actions, noncitizens with Level 1 convictions should be the first and foremost target. However, how such

"dangerousness" can be interpreted and implemented in an immigration enforcement policy reality depends on the discretionary authority of ICE and LEAs. Considering unexpected enforcement outcomes under S-Comm from the first 6 years, as mentioned in the previous subchapter, and the increasing crimmigration trend, such scopes of dangerous criminal noncitizens have been arbitrarily interpreted and implemented by ICE, and the scope of such administratively "dangerous" noncitizens targeted for deportation has been likely to expand in the name of protecting communities against dangerous criminal aliens.

Considering the program mechanisms under the S-Comm framework based on close interactions between different levels of government at each enforcement step, I assume immigration detainer issuances are logically and technically connected with final deportation orders. That is, localities with different immigration policy perspectives tend to first have different volumes of immigration detainer issuances, which influences noncitizen deportation outcomes. Based on this logic, I created the fourth research hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: If immigration enforcement policy is relevantly carried out in compliance with the program goal of S-Comm, enforcement (deportation) actions from this program should focus thoroughly on removals of noncitizens with dangerous criminal convictions, which are administratively set by ICE's risk (criminality)-based enforcement approach.
Hypothesis 4-1: There is a relationship between local responses/choices on immigration and enforcement results under the S-Comm program. That is, different local responses and perspectives on immigration have different enforcement results in their jurisdiction.

Hypothesis 4-2: Counties with strong enforcement participation have high enforcement (deportation) of noncitizens

Hypothesis 4-3: Counties with weak enforcement participation have low enforcement performance.

Hypothesis 4-4: There is a relationship between immigration detainer issuances and noncitizen deportation outcomes. Localities with higher volumes of detainer issuances tend to have higher noncitizen deportations than localities with lower volumes of detainer issuances.

Hypothesis 4-5: Considering the enforcement mechanism under the S-Comm framework, there is an interrelationship between or among three factors: extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation, immigration detainer issuances, and noncitizen deportation outcomes.

3.4. Final Program Goal of S-Comm: Rhetoric of "Making Communities Safer" and "Immigrant-Crime Nexus" Hypothesis

As this program's name suggests, the final policy goal of S-Comm is to make communities safer. To accomplish this goal, the basic logic under S-Comm is simple: Dangerous noncitizens who already reside in local communities should be identified, punished, and finally removed through an effective and close intergovernmental communication structure. However, as I mentioned in the last subchapter, the administrative term of "dangerousness" and "removable" categories of noncitizens under the S-Comm framework is not clear and has been full of ambiguities and administrative discretion to maximize deportation numbers under enforcement-only hysteria. Although

ICE never clearly and explicitly mentions why and how this program was initiated and driven with the support of what policy actors and contexts, the one nuanced and hidden driving force behind this program is the "immigration-crime nexus," which has been strongly defended by immigration restrictionists (Jung, 2015a, 2015c; Kubrin, 2014; Simes & Waters, 2014). This nexus basically assumes that noncitizens with (non-) criminal violations can become a threat to public safety, and the expansion of the scope of their dangerousness could also be connected with national security. Paying serious attention to noncitizen criminality, this assumption argues that crime is rapidly increasing in areas with "growing immigration populations" (Martinez & Iwama, 2014, p.339). According to this assumption, areas with more immigrants, specifically more Latinos, are likely to have higher crime rates than those with fewer Latinos (Holland, 2014; Martinez & Iwama, 2014). Therefore, under this logic, localities with more immigrants should be the first target area for enforcement actions. Following such logic, the federal immigration bureaucracies selected a staggered rollout scheme for implementation of S-Comm (Cox & Miles, 2013; Miles & Cox, 2014), and the first focal localities for implementing this program were many jurisdictions with a high percentage of Hispanic population and with locations in the southwest border areas sharing the border with Mexico (Jung, 2015a; Treyger, Chalfin & Loeffler, 2014). This indicates that the main drive for ICE's implementation of S-Comm is associated with such demographic and geographic factors, assuming that the Hispanic population is the main target for crime prevention and immigration enforcement actions (Jung, 2015a; Holland, 2014).

There have been many studies about how noncitizen concentrations are related to public safety, especially at the local level. Studies have had mixed perspectives and

arguments on this relationship, but since the 1990s, many empirical studies have supported the idea that this nexus is not significant, and even if there is a relationship, it is negligible (Immigration Policy Center, 2011; Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012). An argument linking immigration and crime has been based on social disorganization theory, arguing that "places" matter for deciding this link. Immigrants with little socioeconomic capital and resources have no choice but to reside in disadvantaged areas like slums, and due to lack of economic opportunities, many immigrants rely on illegal activities, which are connected with crimes in the communities. Some scholars have also argued that demographics or racial or ethnic characteristics of immigrants might be connected with crimes because many immigrants tend to be "young, male, relatively poor, and uneducated" (Davies & Fagan, 2012, p. 102), so they tend to rely on crime as "an alternative avenue for advancement" (Davies & Fagan, 2012, p. 103).

However, counterarguments on such an immigration-crime nexus hypothesis have also been made. These arguments have paid attention to the "neutral" or "protective" effects on crime according to increasing immigrant populations (Carr, Lichter, & Kefalas, 2012; Emerick, Curry, Collins, & Rodriguez, 2014; Hagan, Rodriguez, & Castro, 2011; Koper, Guterbock, Woods, Taylor, & Carter, 2013; Kubrin, 2014; Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; Martinez & Iwama, 2014; Martinez & Stowell, 2012; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; Palasz & Fennelly, 2013; Rosenfield, 2014; Simers & Waters, 2013) or a consistent steep declining crime trend with increasing immigrant populations at the community level (Davies & Fagan, 2012; DiPietro & Bursik, 2012; Kirk, Papachristo, Fagan, & Tyler, 2012; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; Wadsworth, 2010). Using "selectivity theory," Kubrin and Ishizawa (2012) argued that immigrants are more likely to be self-selected and have

higher work and economic-enhancement motives, so they tend to abide by the law and are less likely to be involved in crime activities. Using a "healthy immigrant thesis," Wadsworth (2010) also argued that many immigrants are highly motivated individuals and entrepreneurs, so they are less likely to be involved in criminal activities. Rather, they revitalize communities and create "new forms of social organization and adaptive social structures" in spite of the economic decline and demographic heterogeneity of communities. Moreover, using ethnic enclaves or social ties within immigrant communities, immigrants create economic opportunities and contribute to communities' economic development. Therefore, the argument that an influx of immigrants increases crimes is baseless, according to this perspective.

Federal immigration policymakers appear to have followed an "immigrant-crime nexus" logic regarding the implementation of S-Comm, considering its program goal and staggered rollout strategy. However, such an assumption shows different outcomes in policy realities, as repeatedly confirmed by recent studies. For example, according to Cox and Miles (2013), Miles and Cox (2014), and Treyger and her colleagues (2014), the implementation of S-Comm during the last few years made no discernible impact on making communities safer. Using crime rate changes at the county and city level before and after the activation of S-Comm, researchers commonly found that no FBI index offenses were significantly decreased. There have also been previous studies analyzing the influence of local immigration enforcement policy participation on community safety. Their arguments brought mixed results, but many researchers found that local involvement in immigration control policy was negatively associated with community safety (Dreby, 2012; Kolodziej, 2013). Based on this series of previous studies and

different perspectives on the immigrant-crime nexus assumption, I created the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5: In terms of a policy implementation perspective, implementation of S-Comm is associated with public safety at the community level. If DHS/ICE's logic on an "immigrant-crime nexus" hypothesis is correct, active immigration enforcement policy participation at the community level under S-Comm implementation is associated with improving local community safety.

3.5. Summary

This chapter examined when and under what conditions localities are theoretically and contextually involved in immigration enforcement policy, and how S-Comm has been carried out since its initiation with what working mechanisms, logic, and policy goal. With regard to local immigration enforcement policy participation, (1) multiple contextual factors - including political, economic, demographic, geographical factors, and combinations of them - are likely to make localities get involved in local immigration enforcement actions legally and administratively. However, previous studies have shown mixed perspectives on the influences of these factors. Moreover, (2) considerable inter- and intralocality variations on immigration issues are also found.

Under the immigration criminality mentality and consequent enforcement-only policy hysteria since the mid-2000s, S-Comm was created in the name of protecting local communities from dangerous noncitizens. With the "immigrant-crime nexus" assumption, Washington politicians and immigration policymakers politically consider

noncitizens with criminal and immigration violations as subject to punishment and removal. Moreover, with advertisement of a "smarter" and effective enforcement program using biometric data sharing between and among federal agencies (FBI/ICE) and local law enforcement agencies, DHS/ICE boastfully argues that the implementation of S-Comm positively impacted local communities through proactively catching, detaining, and finally removing dangerous noncitizens at the community level. However, the S-Comm implementation process during the last 6 years has been full of secrecy, ambiguity, and inconsistency in terms of how this program is actually carried out, which noncitizens have been the real target, and whether ICE has faithfully followed the stated policy goal, removing dangerous and the "worst of the worst" noncitizens at the local level. Unintended policy outcomes - too many noncitizens with no criminal history or with immigration violations have been removed in the name of "criminal aliens" - brought about serious intergovernmental conflicts on the interpretation of enforcement outcomes. Under a close intergovernmental interaction framework for noncitizen enforcement actions, different levels of government have dynamically interacted with each other throughout S-Comm implementation. However, despite DHS/ICE's assertion of a "cooperative" enforcement implementation for S-Comm, localities actually found it impossible to raise their voices and make their own decisions under the S-Comm framework; localities were isolated from decisions to activate S-Comm, and even if they appealed the program's unintended and problematic processes, ICE barely responded to such local arguments. Localities under the S-Comm framework were not dealt with as "enforcement partners," but as "(mere) technical subordinates" under hierarchical power relations.

Based on this contextual and theoretical background on immigration policy implementation under intergovernmental relations, five research questions (hypotheses) were created. In the next three chapters, I empirically analyze these questions with noncitizen enforcement and related contextual data on S-Comm. The second hypothesis and the first part of the fourth hypothesis are discussed in Chapter 4, while the third hypothesis and the remaining part of the fourth hypothesis are analyzed in Chapter 5. The first and fifth hypotheses are discussed in Chapter 6.

CHAPTER 4[34]

ANALYZING THE PROGRAM OUTCOME OF THE SECURE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM: STATE AND LOCAL LEVEL

4.1. Introduction

This chapter systematically investigates whether S-Comm as the key enforcement program under the Obama administration has been faithfully implemented in compliance with the stated program goal of catching, detaining, and finally removing dangerous criminal noncitizens in local communities for public safety and security. The research questions and hypotheses are mentioned first, followed by descriptive and graphical analysis to critically analyze how S-Comm has been carried out at the state and local level, and whether localities have different (or similar) enforcement paths according to contextual factors on the implementation of S-Comm, such as activation order and geographical considerations. With these empirical analyses, interpretation and policy implications are made.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, this chapter first focuses on the implementation outcomes S-Comm has made during the past 4 years (2010 - 2013). How has S-Comm been carried out? Has this program followed the stated program goal of making communities safer through removing "dangerous" criminal noncitizens? How have contextual conditions on S-Comm implementation - such as the staggered rollout scheme

[34] The early version of this chapter was prepared in 2014 with the title of *Removal of* "*Worst of the Worst" Noncitizens from Communities: An Evaluation of Program Outcome of the Secure Communities Framework*. It was presented at the 2014 Southeastern Conference for Public Administration (SeCoPA), which was held in Atlanta, GA on September 17-20, 2014. This chapter is revised with comments and feedback from this conference. I appreciate the audience at the SeCoPA conference session for their comments. Also I appreciate Professors N. Joseph Cayer and Paul G. Lewis at Arizona State University.

and geographical considerations - influenced enforcement outcomes under the S-Comm framework? Based on the first question, this chapter also pays critical attention to local noncitizen enforcement results and their differences under S-Comm in terms of intra- and interlocality perspectives. How many noncitizens at the community level have been removed under S-Comm, and what categories of noncitizens were mainly caught and removed? In terms of the enforcement priorities (three levels of criminality) ICE set, have localities had different (or similar) enforcement outcomes? How have a certain locality's (county's) noncitizen deportation results under S-Comm changed (or remained stable) over time? As mentioned in Chapter 3, the second hypothesis (influence of two contextual factors on local immigration enforcement policy implementation) and the first part of the fourth hypothesis (noncitizen deportation rates at the community level in terms of three levels of criminality for analyzing the relevancy of policy implementation) are examined.

4.2. Data and Methodology

For analysis, this study used ICE's monthly "IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability statistics,"[35] which include the numbers of noncitizen deportations under S-Comm at the national, state, and local (county) level. Noncitizen deportations in these data are also subdivided by enforcement priorities. ICE did not release these data during the first two years in spite of strong requests from migrant rights groups, but as a result of lawsuits

[35] IDENT refers to "Automated Biometric Identification System" for suspected noncitizens' immigration status check by ICE, while IAFIS refers to "Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System" for suspected criminal status check by the FBI. With an interoperability system process that is both horizontal (FBI and ICE) and hierarchical (ICE and local law enforcement agencies), fingerprints as biometric information data are shared among these agencies (ICE, 2009a).

and a federal court decision in 2010, it began to release data on a monthly basis, starting with data from April 2010, more than 17 months after the launch of S-Comm in 2008. Considering such monthly data availability, I used the past 44 months of ICE enforcement data (April 2010 - November 2013) for analysis.[36]

The IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability statistics basically consist of three key pieces of information on monthly noncitizen enforcement processes under S-Comm: total numbers of noncitizen fingerprint submissions, IDENT matches per level of criminality, and deportation (removal) numbers per three levels of criminality. In addition to these criminality-based deportation numbers under S-Comm, these enforcement data also include "non-criminal" noncitizen deportation as an additional category, which is mostly related to immigration violations, so the data can be helpful for researchers to analyze deportation outcomes in terms of what noncitizen groups have been mainly targeted. These data include enforcement outcomes for 3,181 jurisdictions including U.S. territories, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the District of Columbia. After deleting some non-counties, I collected 3,169 data for county-level units (including some cities having independent enforcement outcomes under S-Comm) for analysis. For valid empirical analysis, I also differentiate localities into those with

[36] Logically, considering the current data structure and accessible data time points on S-Comm enforcement, I used 44 months of ICE data for analyzing local noncitizen enforcement results. However, one interesting but ironic aspect of ICE's data format on S-Comm is that these data are based on cumulative data structure although ICE clearly states that S-Comm data are based on "monthly" interoperability statistics. Therefore, each of ICE's monthly data releases on S-Comm is composed of cumulative enforcement information from the first activation month to that month. Considering April 2010 (almost two years after the initiation of the program) as the first month ICE began to release deportation-related data under S-Comm, I cannot calculate "pure" monthly data on S-Comm enforcement performance before April 2010. However, I can infer "lump-sum" enforcement data before April 2010 through the cumulative data format. Therefore, in Chapter 4, I sometimes used noncitizen deportation numbers from more than 44 months (61 months, from Oct. 2008 to Nov. 2013) in the cumulative format for understanding total enforcement outcomes at the state and local level.

"meaningful" enforcement outcomes (operationalized as localities with at least 1 noncitizen deportation per month) and those without. Through this process, I finally collected data on a total of 541 counties having meaningful monthly enforcement performance, so the sample size for this study is 541. The unit of analysis for this study is the locality (county)[37].

4.2.1. Dependent variable: Noncitizen Deportation Numbers & Rates in Terms of Three Levels of Criminality (Enforcement Priorities)

As the key outcome for this study, deportation numbers indicate how many noncitizens per month per locality are removed from local communities through the implementation of S-Comm. Numerical values on noncitizen deportation indirectly represent how strongly or weakly localities participate in immigration enforcement policy based on the current intergovernmental enforcement cooperation framework. However, such local deportation numbers cannot be compared directly because each locality has unique socioeconomic and demographic characteristics (e.g., unemployment rates and foreign-born population numbers). Therefore, deportation rates can be used for making local comparisons. For this study, monthly noncitizen deportation rates were calculated by locality, specifically in terms of three levels of criminality (Levels 1 and 3) and noncriminal (immigration) convictions. Considering the program goal of S-Comm - targeting and removing dangerous criminal noncitizens for public safety at the community level - the deportation rate of noncitizens who are considered "risky"

[37] Considering the fact that the main activation unit for S-Comm is at the county level, the unit of analysis for this study is the county. However, IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability statistics also include some cities (e.g., New York City; Saint Louis City, MO) that independently activated S-Comm for noncitizen enforcement policy. Therefore, I also included them for analysis.

criminals (e.g., noncitizens administratively constructed as “Level 1”criminal convictions by ICE) and are removed from localities can be a critical point for analyzing implementation results of this program. However, there is much room for ICE’s street-level immigration bureaucrats to execute discretionary power in the process of enforcement policy implementation, in particular deciding which noncitizens are considered Level 1 criminals and which are considered a different level of criminal for processing removal proceedings. With this limitation, I consider that certain localities follow the stated goal of S-Comm if they have a higher deportation rate of noncitizens with Level 1 charges. However, if some localities have a higher non-criminal noncitizen deportation rate or Level 3-related deportation rate (related to misdemeanor charges), these localities are considered to have biased enforcement performance. Many previous studies have followed this perspective to analyze whether S-Comm has been relevantly implemented (Chand, Deshommes, & Bektemirov, 2014; Chand & Schreckhise, 2014; Kanstroom, 2012; TRAC, 2014c; Treyger, Chalfin & Loeffler, 2014).

4.2.2. Independent Variables: Timing of Activation Orders & Geographical Considerations

As previous studies have repeatedly considered (Cox & Miles, 2013; Gutierrez, 2013; Jung, 2015a; Treyger, Chalfin, & Loeffler, 2014), activation orders under the S-Comm framework might include hidden logic about what political or policy outcomes policymakers intended. Under an enforcement-only policy direction, DHS/ICE made efforts to expand deportation numbers based on the enforcement quota - about 400,000 noncitizen deportations per year - that was set by Washington politicians and

policymakers[38] (Bennion, 2014; *Economist*, 2014; Hsu & Becker, 2010; Golash-Boza, 2014b; Shahshahani, 2014). In spite of an intergovernmental enforcement cooperative design, under S-Comm, localities had few rights and little or no say in the decision process behind the activation of this program in their jurisdictions (Jung, 2015a; Treyger, Chalfin, & Loeffler, 2014). Under this working logic, localities with early activation of S-Comm might be places for Washington politicians and policymakers to make more politically meaningful or maximized results on noncitizen enforcement policy under an enforcement-only regime. For this study, I operationalized "early" adopters of S-Comm as localities that activated S-Comm before October 2010, which marked the first 24 months (from November 2008 through October 2010) of S-Comm's rollout activation. "Late" adopters in this study are localities that activated S-Comm after October 2010.[39] Using such a binary locality differentiation, this study analyzes how localities with different activation orders have different (or similar) noncitizen deportation results over time.

Moreover, geographical considerations regarding the implementation and activation of S-Comm were also made by DHS/ICE to maximize noncitizen deportation numbers within a limited time. Considering the fact that the main target noncitizen group for enforcement under the current immigration policy is Hispanics, federal immigration bureaucrats have political and policy incentives to activate S-Comm preferentially in (1) the southwest border localities that are the main routes of entry for the Hispanic

[38] This quota was kept secret and only communicated with internal immigration agencies - DHS/ICE - but one 2010 internal document from ICE was released through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, and the public knew of the existence of such an enforcement quota.

[39] Previous studies used a similar distinction between early and late activation order of the implementation of S-Comm (Cox & Miles, 2013; Treyger, Chalfin, & Loeffler, 2014).

undocumented and (2) places where many Hispanics traditionally reside. Therefore, I sort localities into two groups based on geographical areas: border localities - southwest localities that are close to the U.S.-Mexico border, including those in the states of Arizona, California, Texas, and New Mexico - and non-border areas. Based on this classification, I also analyze how these two groups have different (or similar) noncitizen deportation results under S-Comm.

In addition to the two abovementioned contextual factors on the implementation of S-Comm, two additional factors - volumes of noncitizen fingerprint submissions and IDENT matches (matching rates of fingerprints submitted to ICE's immigration database) - can also be considered to find local differences on deportation outcomes.[40] However, these enforcement processes are carried out with close intergovernmental interactions, and considerable levels of discretionary power are likely to be used by each level of government: regarding fingerprint submissions to the federal immigration agency, LEAs

[40] As the initiation of S-Comm implementation, noncitizen fingerprints are submitted by local law enforcement agencies (LEAs), and therefore this biometric data sharing between LEAs and ICE indirectly indicates how actively (or inactively) localities participate in S-Comm for noncitizen enforcement actions. If certain localities are interested in local participation/intervention of noncitizen enforcement policy, they are likely to carry out more active enforcement actions in their jurisdiction through stepped-up arrests and detention of noncitizens as in the case of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office in Arizona. Therefore, the fingerprints of every suspected noncitizen in local jails or detention facilities in these localities are submitted without exception to the FBI for a criminal status check and to ICE for an immigration status check. On the other hand, in the case of localities that do not want to participate or are not interested in noncitizen enforcement policy, they might not have any obvious incentives to actively submit the fingerprints of suspected noncitizens caught and held in their local jails or detention facilities. Localities oriented toward community policing - such as the city of Chicago, Illinois, or the states of Rhode Island (House Bill 5237) and New Hampshire (House Bill 404) - strictly limit noncitizen arrests and cooperation with ICE on immigration issues, limiting such cooperation to dangerous criminal noncitizen cases like murders or sexual assaults.
When noncitizen fingerprints are submitted to the FBI for criminal status check and automatically forwarded to ICE for an immigration status check under the S-Comm framework, ICE's Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) checks these fingerprints against ICE's immigration database, and then finally decides the level of (non)criminality. Because ICE has not clearly disclosed how this series of administrative decisions of noncitizen criminality is made, it is almost impossible for the public to understand the concrete decision processes, specifically regarding when and under what conditions noncitizens are administratively set as "dangerous" criminals or just minor crime violators or noncriminal violators.

decide what fingerprints they should (or should not) send to ICE; regarding the decision of "administrative" criminality of suspected noncitizens whose fingerprints were submitted, ICE decides which noncitizens are dangerous criminal violators in Level 1, and which are mid-level or minor crime violators in Level 2 or 3. I did not use these factors as exploratory factors influencing local noncitizen deportation rates, but I add them in this study for comparing local differences regarding local deportations.

4.2.3. Methods

Considering current ICE enforcement data structure and limitations, I used descriptive and graphical analysis by tracing monthly noncitizen enforcement statistics per locality in terms of enforcement priorities to grasp how faithfully S-Comm has followed the stated program goal. Local enforcement results were also compared by activation orders of S-Comm and geographical characteristics (i.e., southwest border area vs. non-southwest border area). In terms of longitudinal perspective, this study also analyzes whether there have been inter- and intralocality differences on noncitizen deportations during 44 months (April 2010 - November 2013) under the implementation of S-Comm.

4.3. State-level Enforcement Results of S-Comm

First, I analyze how S-Comm has been implemented at the state level, in terms of monthly noncitizen enforcement performance (fingerprint submissions, IDENT matches, and removals) by state and by level of criminality (removal based on levels 1 to 3 and noncriminal convictions). According to Table 4.1, the states of California, Texas,

Arizona, and Florida account for more than two-thirds of cumulative total removal outcomes under the S-Comm framework. Considering that three of these "big four" states (California, Arizona, and Texas) are located in the U.S. - Mexico border area, we assume that current U.S. noncitizen enforcement policy including S-Comm has focused on Hispanic noncitizens who cross the southwest border areas and has targeted them through capture, detainment, and removal strategies and management. In terms of activation orders of S-Comm (as of November 2013), the activation period of S-Comm at the state level has ranged from a minimum 18 months (District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands) to a maximum 61 months (Massachusetts,[41] North Carolina, and Texas). The top 10 states having high enforcement results in Table 4.1 tend to have relatively early activation and thus longer activation periods compared to others; these states have more than 40 months of S-Comm implementation, except New York (35 months) and Colorado (34 months).

[41] Massachusetts is considered an "early" adopter of S-Comm (61 months) according to ICE data, but this is not an accurate classification because only one county in Massachusetts, Suffolk County, activated S-Comm very early, and the other 13 counties within the state have a very late activation order (19 months). Therefore, I argue that the current reporting of activation period of Massachusetts at the state level should be revised.

Table 4.1. Cumulative State-level Secure Communities Enforcement (Deportation) Results: Top 10 States

State	# of Counties activating S-Comm (activation period)	# of Early & late adopter of S-Comm* (county level)	# of Counties with strong enforcement activity** (%)	Monthly fingerprint submissions	Monthly IDENT matches	Monthly removal (% of total removals)	# of Counties with more than 50% **L1** deportation outcomes (%)	# of Counties with more than 50% **Noncriminal** deportation outcomes (%)	# of Counties with more than 50% **L3+ Noncriminal** deportation outcomes (%)
California	58 (54 months)	38 early & 20 late	45 (77.59%)	104,426.50	8,970.96	**2,004.13** (38.21%)	4 (6.90%)	1 (1.72%)	34 (58.62%)
Texas	254 (61 months)	254 early & 0 late	74 (29.13%)	57,095.67	4,047.39	**1,260.48** (24.03%)	21 (8.27%)	14 (5.51%)	128 (50.39%)
Arizona	15 (60 months)	11 early & 4 late	11 (73.33%)	27,616.28	2,090.38	**488.50** (9.31%)	1 (6.67%)	0 (0%)	8 (53.33%)
Florida	67 (59 months)	67 early & 0 late	38 (56.72%)	57,217.98	3,564.93	**300.39** (5.73%)	3 (4.48%)	6 (8.96%)	54 (80.60%)
Georgia	159 (49 months)	8 early & 151 late	30 (18.87%)	28,571.16	1,316.41	**212.84** (4.06%)	13 (8.18%)	11 (6.92%)	69 (43.40%)
North Carolina	100 (61 months)	59 early & 41 late	23 (23.0%)	15,398.93	608.79	**136.31** (2.60%)	10 (10.0%)	6 (6.0%)	56 (56.0%)
Virginia	129 (57 months)	129 early & 0 late	18 (13.95%)	17,670.96	737.70	**114.30** (2.18%)	24 (18.60%)	11 (8.53%)	44 (34.11%)
New York	58 (35 months)	0 early & 58 late	16 (27.59%)	37,449.14	2,841.91	**107.49** (2.05%)	8 (13.79%)	6 (10.34%)	20 (34.48%)
Colorado	64 (34 months)	0 early & 64 late	15 (23.44%)	13,104.29	636.0	**91.41** (1.74%)	3 (4.69%)	1 (1.56%)	8 (12.5%)
Tennessee	95 (42 months)	4 early & 91 late	18 (18.95%)	25,844.38	620.14	**90.48** (1.72%)	8 (8.42%)	8 (8.42%)	43 (45.26%)
Total	3,169 (61 months)	680 early & 2,489 late	541 (17.07%)	553,408.80	28,660.66	**5,245.61**	342 (10.79%)	229 (7.23%)	1,103 (34.81%)

Source: Author's analysis of Monthly IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability Statistics of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

*: To address the influence of activation period or orders on S-Comm implementation, based on the logic of research from Cox and Miles (2013) and Gutierrez (2013), I divided counties that have activated S-Comm into two dichotomous groups: "early" and "late" adopters. The cutoff point for differentiating between early and late activation of S-Comm was set as October 2010, which marked the first 24 months (from November 2008 through October 2010) of S-Comm's rollout activation. Counties that activated S-Comm before October 2010 are considered "early" adopters, while counties that activated after that point are considered "late" adopters. As in this table, many states have a mixed type of activation of S-Comm.
**: Level of strong "enforcement" activity is calculated by the number (percentage) of counties within a certain state that have had at least 1 noncitizen deportation per month during 44 months (April 2010 - November 2013). States with more counties that have higher numbers of deportations (removals) are considered to have stronger enforcement.

Many states, such as California or North Carolina, have a mix of activation types, with some counties having early S-Comm activation and others late activation, while some states such as Texas (early adopter), Florida (early adopter), Virginia (early adopter), and New York (late adopter), have only one type of activation period. Considering the level of "strong enforcement" as the number of counties within a certain state that have meaningful enforcement performance (at least 1 noncitizen deportation per month), California (77.6%), Arizona (73.3%), Delaware (66.7%), and New Jersey (66.7%) had the strongest enforcement results, while Alabama (17.9%), Arkansas (10.7%), Idaho (15.9%), Illinois (8.8%), Kansas (8.6%), and Kentucky (2.5%) had lower or weak enforcement performance on S-Comm implementation during the 44 month-period. Bivariate correlation between noncitizen fingerprint submissions and deportation outcomes under S-Comm was very high, $r = .88$, $p < .001$, which indicates that a higher volume of fingerprint submissions from localities is associated with more deportations under S-Comm. Bivariate correlation between IDENT matches and deportations has a very strong positive relation, indicating that the higher a state's immigration database matching rate is, the more noncitizen deportations are made, $r = .94$, $p < .001$. Regarding level of criminality, Utah had the highest level 1 deportation performance during 44 months, which means 31% of counties (9 out of a total of 29 counties) within the jurisdiction have more than 50% level 1 deportation outcomes. Pennsylvania (25.3%) and New Mexico (21.2%) had the next highest percentages of counties having more than 50% level 1 deportation performance. On the other hand, Massachusetts had the highest noncriminal deportation performance, which means 42.9% of counties (6 out of a total of

14 counties) within the jurisdiction have more than 50% noncriminal deportation performance. Following Massachusetts, Rhode Island (40%), New Jersey (38.1%), and Maryland (16.7%) show that a considerable number of counties within their jurisdictions have more than 50% noncriminal deportation performance. If the scope of noncitizen deportations under S-Comm is expanded to a combination of noncriminal convictions and Level 3 convictions (related to misdemeanor charges, such as traffic violations), the enforcement results during the last 44 months show a very different picture from the promise of DHS/ICE. In 15 states, more than half of the counties deported noncitizens with minor charges and noncriminal (immigration) violations. New Jersey (95.2%), Massachusetts (78.6%), Connecticut (75%), and Maryland (70.8%) were the top states with such unintended enforcement results. This result is similar to the arguments that many critics of S-Comm including migrant rights groups and liberal immigration research groups have consistently made (Cox & Miles, 2013; Miles & Cox, 2014; Francis, 2011; Fritz, 2014; Jung, 2015a; Kanstroom, 2012; TRAC, 2014b; Treyger, Chalfin, & Loeffler, 2014; Vock, 2013).

4.4. County-Level Enforcement Results of S-Comm

As the actual place in which noncitizens settle to live, localities have been the main target for federal immigration agencies to conduct noncitizen enforcement policy. Under the crimmigration trend and enforcement-only policy hysteria, implementation of S-Comm based on close intergovernmental enforcement cooperation made it possible for DHS/ICE to rapidly expand their enforcement capacity through an automatic

enforcement machine and system operations. That is why ICE's basic enforcement region was set at the county or community level. With this policy context in mind, I analyze how S-Comm has been implemented at the county level, focusing on whether this program has faithfully followed the stated goal of targeting and removing dangerous noncitizens administratively set as Level 1 criminals. Moreover, enforcement results at the inter- and intra-county level during the 44-month period are also discussed, as well as whether there have been local differences on enforcement results under the S-Comm framework.

Table 4.2 indicates county-level enforcement results under the S-Comm framework. Considering all 3,169 counties activating S-Comm, about 291 noncitizen fingerprints were submitted from LEAs on a monthly basis, and on average, about14 fingerprints (4.8%) per month were matched with ICE's immigration database including immigrants' legal status and criminal histories and information. Based on these intergovernmental enforcement actions, about 2.21 noncitizens have been deported on a monthly basis, and about 0.28 noncitizens per thousand foreign-born populations have been deported per month. In terms of enforcement priorities, one in five of these noncitizens were removed with Level 1 convictions per month, while one in three (33%) were removed with minor charges and noncriminal violations. When the focus was narrowed to the 541 counties having meaningful monthly noncitizen enforcement outcomes under S-Comm, strikingly increasing rates of enforcement actions were found. About 1,300 fingerprints were submitted to ICE from LEAs per month, and 74 fingerprints were matched with ICE's IDENT data (5.8%). About 12 noncitizens were finally deported per month, and adjusting for the size of foreign-born populations, 0.50

noncitizens per thousand foreign-born populations were deported per month during 61 months. In terms of levels of criminality, about 27% of noncitizens deported had Level 1 criminal convictions, while more than half of noncitizens deported (51%) were removed with minor charges and immigration violations. Compared to the total 3,169 localities, those 541 counties have 5 or 6 times more enforcement actions (fingerprint submissions and IDENT matches) and removal outcomes on a monthly basis.

Through the abovementioned enforcement results, I found that localities have various responses to this mandatory immigration enforcement program, which brought about huge local variations. Of the total 3,169 counties activating S-Comm, 1,026 localities (32.4%) have had no noncitizen deportation actions since the activation of this program. Moreover, 1,602 localities (50.6%) do have deportation outcomes, but it is very low, with less than 1 noncitizen deportation per month.[42] Of the total 3,169 counties, 541 localities (17.1%) have at least 1 noncitizen deportation performance per month, which means that about 80% of localities have no or very low noncitizen enforcement actions per month since the activation of S-Comm. Analysis of monthly IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability data indicates that 46 counties (1.5%) had no fingerprint submissions between federal (ICE) and local law enforcement agencies, no IDENT matches, and no (zero) deportation outcomes during activation of S-Comm. An additional 285 counties (9%) did submit fingerprints to ICE from localities, but had no fingerprint (IDENT) matches and no (zero) deportation performance. Therefore, under the current enforcement

[42] Using enforcement data from a 55 month-period (Oct. 2008 - May. 2013) under S-Comm, Chand and Schreckhise (2014) also found that there have been huge local deportation variations on enforcement results.

structure and local responses, these 541 localities, not all localities, have led noncitizen enforcement actions.

Table 4.2. County-level Noncitizen Enforcement Outcomes under Secure Communities

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation
All counties (***n*=3,169**) activating Secure Communities (S-Comm) Program		
Monthly fingerprints submissions (#)	291.33	1,133.57
Monthly IDENT matches (#)	13.77	106.86
Monthly deportation (removals, #)	**2.21**	17.89
Noncitizen removal rate (%) (=Monthly removal / foreign-born population*1000)	.28	.98
% of removals of noncitizens with "**Level 1"** charges (cumulative)	.19	.26
% of removals of noncitizens with "**Level 2"** charges (cumulative)	.16	.23
% of removals of noncitizens with "**Level 3"** charges (cumulative)	.19	.25
% of removals of noncitizens with "**Noncriminal"** charges (cumulative)	.13	.22
% of removals of noncitizens with "**Level 3 + Noncriminal**" charges (cumulative)	.33	.34
Counties (***n*=541**) with <u>at least</u> 1 noncitizen removal per month under S-Comm		
Monthly fingerprints submissions (#)	1,267.79	2,505.62
Monthly IDENT matches (#)	73.81	250.19
Monthly deportation (removals, #)	**12.23**	41.90
Noncitizen removal rate (%) (=Monthly removal / foreign-born population*1000)	.50	1.68
% of removals of noncitizens with "**Level 1"** charges (cumulative)	.27	.12
% of removals of noncitizens with "**Level 2"** charges (cumulative)	.22	.09
% of removals of noncitizens with "**Level 3"** charges (cumulative)	.30	.10
% of removals of noncitizens with "**Noncriminal"** charges	.21	.14

(cumulative)		
% of removals of noncitizens with "**Level 3 + Noncriminal**" charges (cumulative)	.51	.14

Note: These enforcement data include noncitizen enforcement performance during 61 months (October 2008 - November 2013) under S-Comm. I used "noncitizen removal rate," which refers to removal outcomes adjusted for counties' per thousand estimated foreign-born population (including those who are naturalized and non-naturalized), as Pedroza (2013) did in his study. For all 3,169 counties, the sum of deportation rates based on three levels of criminality (including noncriminal convictions) does not reach 1 because 1,026 counties provided zero deportation outcomes in their jurisdictions over a period of 61 months.

4.4.1. County-Level Noncitizen Deportations Considering Two Factors: Activation Orders and Geographical Considerations



Figure 4.1. Counties Activating S-Comm Based on the Staggered Rollout Scheme ("Early" vs. "Late" Adopters)

Note: This figure was created using ArcMap 10.1. Circles indicate counties with meaningful noncitizen enforcement performance (at least 1 noncitizen deportation performance) per month since the activation of S-Comm. Red circles indicate localities that were "early" adopters of S-Comm (activated before October 2010), and green circles indicate counties that were "late" adopters of S-Comm (activated after October 2010).

As hypothesized in the last subchapter, two contextual factors on the implementation of S-Comm - timing of activation orders of S-Comm and geographical context - were used for analyzing how they influence noncitizen deportation results. Figure 4.1 graphically shows how S-Comm has been rolled out across the country with what political or policy intentions. First, many of the 541 localities having meaningful monthly noncitizen enforcement outcomes (at least 1 noncitizen deportation) tend to be concentrated on the border area, including the northern (U.S.- Canada border), southwestern (U.S. - Mexico border), and southeastern area. In addition, a few midwest- and relatively many northeastern localities - especially counties within Michigan, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and Massachusetts - also have meaningful enforcement actions under S-Comm. Interestingly, however, of these 541 localities, most early adopters of S-Comm are likely to be located in the southwest and southern border regions, while some of them are in northwestern areas. This indicates that federal immigration bureaucrats and policymakers under the current deportation regime have targeted these localities for enforcement actions. These localities have some common characteristics on immigration: many are border counties along what has traditionally been the main route for migrants from Latin America, especially Mexicans, to enter and temporarily or permanently reside in the United States. Moreover, many of these counties are localities that have traditionally had an immigrant-receiving policy and culture - such as counties (mostly metropolitan) in New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, and California. According to Jung (2015a) on analyzing the S-Comm implementation outcomes during a recent 25 months (May 2011 - May 2013), counties with early

activation of S-Comm have larger total populations and also larger Hispanic populations than those with late activation of S-Comm during a recent 3 years (2011-2013): 498,715.97 total population and 130,835.64 Hispanic population for early adopters of S-Comm, but 283,917.03 total population and 36,587.14 Hispanic population for late adopters. This staggered rollout strategy and geographic patterns indirectly indicate that the target population for noncitizen enforcement policy under S-Comm has been Latin Americans, especially Mexican noncitizens, and local communities where these racial and ethnic groups mainly reside have also become the key target enforcement localities.

Table 4.3. Comparison of Noncitizen Enforcement Results in Terms of Two Key Factors: Activation Orders and Geographical Context (*n*= 541 localities)

Counties Activation Orders of S-Comm	"**Early adopter**" (282 counties) Mean	Standard Deviation	"**Late adopter**" (259 counties) Mean	Standard Deviation	*t*
Monthly fingerprints submissions (#)	1,548.20	2,680.85	962.48	2,265.65	-2.73**
Monthly IDENT matches (#)	97.29	257.77	48.24	239.55	-2.29*
Monthly deportation (removals, #)	19.98	56.68	3.80	6.17	-4.57**
Noncitizen removal rate (%) (=Monthly removal / foreign-born population*1000)	.4892	1.5707	.5092	1.7859	.14
% of removals of noncitizens with "**Level 1"** charges (cumulative)	.2811	.1003	.2579	.1409	-2.23*
% of removals of noncitizens with "**Noncriminal"** charges (cumulative)	.2189	.1179	.2095	.1527	-.80
% of removals of noncitizens with "**Level 3 + Noncriminal**" charges (cumulative)	.5138	.1209	.5093	.1660	-.37
Geographical Context (Whether localities are located in southwest border areas)	**"Border localities"** (136 counties) Mean	Standard Deviation	**"Non-border localities"** (405 counties) Mean	Standard Deviation	*t*
Monthly fingerprints submissions (#)	1,567.64	3,567.59	1,167.10	2,204.37	-1.62
Monthly IDENT matches (#)	125.55	340.92	56.43	208.86	-2.81**
Monthly deportation (removals, #)	31.09	79.22	5.90	9.48	-6.28**
Noncitizen removal rate (%) (=Monthly removal / foreign-born population*1000)	.9486	3.1689	.3484	.5534	-3.66**
% of removals of noncitizens with "**Level 1"** charges (cumulative)	.3000	.1029	.2599	.1261	-3.35**
% of removals of noncitizens with "**Noncriminal"** charges (cumulative)	.1830	.0996	.2250	.1443	3.15**
% of removals of noncitizens with "**Level 3 + Noncriminal**" charges (cumulative)	.4933	.1152	.5179	.1523	1.73

Note: Regarding locality activation orders of S-Comm, the cutoff point for differentiating early and late adaptors was set as October 2010, which marked the first 24 months (November 2008 - October 2010) of S-Comm's rollout activation. Concerning geographical context (southwest border localities), border localities include localities in the states of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas, which neighbor the U.S.- Mexico border region. A total of 541 localities, each having at least 1 noncitizen removal (deportation) enforcement per month, were selected for analysis.

Based on graphical analysis on the influence of two contextual factors (activation orders and geographical considerations) under the S-Comm framework, Table 4.3 compares the means of counties' enforcement outcomes and actions in terms of these variables using *t* tests. As I hypothesize, localities that were early adopters of S-Comm are likely to have stronger and high monthly enforcement results - more fingerprint submissions, IDENT matches, and deportation numbers - than localities that were late adopters. Independent *t*-test results on many, but not all, enforcement outcomes were significant for differences between the two groups. In terms of geographical characteristics, strong differences between southwest border localities and non-southwest border localities on S-Comm implementation and related enforcement outcomes were also found. Regarding the level of criminality, I could not find any clear group differences. Only Level 1 noncitizen deportations showed statistically significant differences considering both factors. About or less than one in three noncitizens of all four subgroups were removed with Level 1 convictions under this program. However, regardless of such subgroup classification, all groups have a high level of deportations of noncitizens with noncriminal and Level 3 convictions, approaching 50% for localities in southwest border regions and exceeding that threshold elsewhere. This is an identical result to the enforcement outcomes of the total 541 localities in Table 4.2.

4.4.2. Inter-locality Variations in Terms of S-Comm's Program Goal

This section analyzes interlocality variations on noncitizen enforcement results during the implementation of S-Comm, specifically focusing on which localities have

followed the program goal by having high Level 1 noncitizen deportation rates, and which localities have not followed the same goal by having high noncriminal or Level 3 deportation rates. After that, each locality group's geographical trend and related policy implications are also discussed.

Table 4.4 lists the top 20 counties having higher removal (deportation) numbers since the activation of S-Comm, focusing on monthly removal activity and the levels of criminality. Interestingly, 16 out of 20 localities (80%) with the highest deportation outcomes under the S-Comm framework are located in the southwest border areas as in Figure 4.1. Of the other four localities, two are in the south (Gwinnett County, GA, and Miami-Dade County, FL), one in the northeast (New York City), and one in the west (Clark County, NV). Such localities tend to be early adopters of S-Comm (and have a longer activation period) except New York City (19 months activation). Their monthly fingerprint submissions from LEAs were very dynamic from a minimum of 786 (Imperial County, CA) to a maximum of 31,619 (New York City), and IDENT matches ranged from about 5.3% (Walker County, TX) to 20% (El Paso County, TX). One interesting locality here is New York City. Of these 20 top localities having strong enforcement actions under S-Comm, New York City had the shortest activation period (19 months), which is 2 or 3 times shorter than other counties. However, in spite of such a short activation, New York City had strong local immigration enforcement actions with the highest numbers of fingerprint submissions and IDENT matches. In terms of levels of criminality, about 70% of the localities (14 out of 20) have higher (more than 50%) deportation outcomes of noncitizens with noncriminal and Level 3 convictions, a result

that does not match the stated goal of S-Comm. Imperial County, CA, (51%) and Walker County, TX, (59.4%) had the highest Level 1-based deportations as in the program goal.

Table 4.4. Top 20 Localities on Secure Communities Enforcement (Deportation) Results

State	County (3,169)	Activation date	Activation periods (months)	Monthly fingerprint submissions	Monthly LESC matches	Monthly removal	Cumulative noncitizen removals (deportations) in terms of criminality (L1-L3 & noncriminal convictions)				
							% L1	% L2	% L3	% non-criminals	% L3 + non-criminals
CA	Los Angeles	08/27/2009	51	29,745.45	3,031.61	**635.39**	38.8	18.5	21.9	20.8	42.7
AZ	Maricopa	01/16/2009	59	21,303.49	1,756.12	**397.76**	34.9	14.6	31.4	19.1	**50.5**
TX	Harris	10/27/2008	61	11,446.93	1,052.61	**353.36**	30.6	22.6	38.1	8.6	**46.7**
CA	San Diego	05/26/2009	54	10.520.22	974.98	**285.02**	31.6	12.2	33.0	23.2	**56.2**
CA	Orange	03/16/2010	45	8,641.87	1,218.73	**242.40**	42.4	25.2	19.5	12.9	32.4
TX	El Paso	06/17/2009	54	1,748.35	358.20	**169.69**	20.3	16.7	**52.5**	10.4	**63.0**
TX	Dallas	11/12/2008	61	6,047.13	477.13	**144.85**	28.5	17.6	34.2	19.8	**53.9**
TX	Hidalgo	06/10/2009	54	1,619.31	263.31	**108.39**	32.4	25.9	26.9	14.8	41.7
CA	San Bernardino	04/13/2010	44	7,938.73	455.34	**102.84**	32.6	15.4	23.7	28.2	**51.9**
CA	Riverside	05/11/2010	43	5,396.81	360.12	**88.09**	28.5	15.0	22.4	34.2	**56.6**
CA	Imperial	09/09/2009	51	786.24	182.90	**87.00**	**51.0**	22.2	18.6	8.2	26.8
TX	Travis	06/16/2009	54	3,163.31	222.59	**82.11**	29.6	22.2	34.9	13.3	48.2
CA	Kern	09/14/2010	39	5,914.08	389.77	**81.05**	29.3	19.6	34.9	16.2	**51.1**
FL	Miami-Dade	02/24/2009	58	8,490.12	1,488.95	**75.98**	27.2	10.9	16.8	**45.0**	**61.8**
TX	Walker	05/18/2009	55	6,008.00	328.60	**74.15**	**59.4**	26.2	13.8	0.6	14.4
NV	Clark	07/27/2010	40	6,069.18	429.03	**72.10**	29.0	12.8	21.8	36.4	**58.2**
NY	New York City	05/15/2012	19	**31,618.68**	**3,702.05**	**71.21**	25.0	14.8	21.3	39.0	**60.2**
GA	Gwinnett	11/17/2009	49	2,434.94	290.94	**67.16**	21.9	19.0	35.5	23.6	**59.1**
CA	Ventura	07/22/2009	53	2,578.09	232.85	**63.06**	25.4	15.7	32.0	26.9	**58.9**
AZ	Pima	11/17/2009	49	3,017.94	173.88	**56.98**	27.0	14.7	**44.4**	13.9	**58.3**

Source: Author's analysis of monthly IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability Statistics of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

Note 1. "Monthly" enforcement data was calculated by dividing each county's cumulative enforcement data during S-Comm implementation into activation periods. Localities used for analysis are all 3,169 counties that have activated S-Comm. This data includes enforcement information through November 2013.
Note 2. S-Comm activation periods vary by county, and can be at the beginning, middle, or end of a certain month. To clarify the calculation of S-Comm activation period, I set the following rule: If a county activated S-Comm at the end of a certain month (with less than 5 days in that month or after the 25th of that month), that month is not included as an activation period. For example, Perry County, MO, which activated S-Comm on January 25, 2011, has a 34-month activation period for S-Comm, excluding the first few days in January 2011.

Table 4.5. Top 20 Localities Having Highest "**Level 1**" Deportation Performance under Secure Communities Program

State	County (541)	Activation date	Activation periods (months)	Monthly fingerprint submissions	Monthly LESC matches	Monthly removal	Cumulative noncitizen removals (deportations) in terms of criminality (L1-L3 & noncriminal convictions)				
							% L1	**% L2**	**% L3**	**% non-criminals**	**% L3 + non-criminals**
CO	Fremont	05/22/2012	19	255.95	11.79	1.26	**95.8**	4.2	0	0	0
TX	Live Oak	06/15/2010	42	53.29	8.05	1.14	**81.3**	16.7	0	2.1	2.1
NY	Essex	06/01/2011	30	159.70	9.23	1.40	**81.0**	11.9	2.4	4.8	7.1
CA	Lassen	02/22/2011	34	192.41	12.74	1.15	**79.5**	7.7	7.7	5.1	12.8
LA	Grant Parish	05/01/2012	19	128.11	14.26	1.16	**77.3**	18.2	0	4.5	4.5
PA	Centre	05/30/2012	18	235.89	44.61	3.89	**77.1**	18.6	4.3	0	4.3
WA	Mason	04/03/2012	20	711.10	27.95	4.15	**75.9**	7.2	15.7	2.4	18.1
IN	Hendricks	06/01/2011	30	1,453.90	23.83	4.10	**66.7**	14.6	13.8	4.9	18.7
OH	Mahoning	07/12/2011	29	528.03	26.28	3.48	**65.3**	20.8	11.9	2.0	13.9
PA	Dauphin	05/30/2012	18	1,041.33	24.89	2.83	**64.7**	9.8	11.8	13.7	25.5
CA	Shasta	07/27/2010	40	908.25	10.78	2.50	**60.0**	10.0	17.0	13.0	30.0
TX	Walker	05/18/2009	55	**6,008.00**	**328.60**	**74.15**	**59.4**	26.2	13.8	0.6	14.4
OR	Clackamas	04/06/2010	44	1,419.11	53.61	8.05	**57.3**	12.4	13.6	16.7	30.2
NE	Lancaster	08/17/2010	40	576.38	21.35	2.40	**57.3**	16.7	20.8	5.2	26.0
GA	Charlton	12/06/2011	24	117.63	52.71	5.46	**57.3**	23.7	19.1	0	19.1
OR	Yamhill	09/27/2011	26	317.62	13.85	1.77	**56.5**	15.2	21.7	6.5	28.3
IA	Sioux	01/24/2012	23	33.57	3.43	1.04	**54.2**	20.8	8.3	16.7	25.0
UT	Washington	06/08/2010	42	333.21	10.81	3.62	**51.3**	22.4	19.7	6.6	26.3
CA	Imperial	09/09/2009	51	**786.24**	**182.90**	**87.00**	**51.0**	22.2	18.6	8.2	26.8
TX	Wise	08/03/2010	40	123.63	4.30	1.00	**50.0**	20.0	27.5	2.5	30.0

Source: Author's analysis of monthly IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability Statistics of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Note. Localities in this table are limited to those having at least 1 noncitizen deportation per month. A total of 541 localities were selected for analysis. This data includes enforcement information through November 2013, recently released by ICE.

Table 4.6. Top 20 Localities Having Highest "**Non-criminal**" Deportation Performance under Secure Communities Program

State	County (541)	Activation date	Activation periods (months)	Monthly fingerprint submissions	Monthly LESC matches	Monthly removal	Cumulative noncitizen removals (deportations) in terms of criminality (L1-L3 & noncriminal convictions)				
							% L1	**% L2**	**% L3**	**% non-criminals**	**% L3 + non-criminals**
NY	Ontario	04/19/2011	32	326.06	8.19	1.34	14.0	9.3	9.3	**67.4**	**76.7**
MA	Middlesex	05/15/2012	19	1,818.32	151.16	9.21	12.0	5.7	15.4	**66.9**	**82.3**
LA	Jefferson Parish	11/17/2009	49	3,054.22	108.39	19.55	9.4	8.2	18.5	**63.9**	**82.4**
MA	Worcester	05/15/2012	19	1,247.79	70.79	3.00	15.8	3.5	17.5	**63.2**	**80.7**
AL	Tuscaloosa	04/26/2011	31	856.68	10.77	2.39	6.8	8.1	25.7	**59.5**	**85.1**
NJ	Cumberland	02/21/2012	22	533.64	19.82	3.32	12.3	8.2	20.5	**58.9**	**79.5**
MO	St. Louis	09/21/2010	39	3,574.08	56.10	7.21	9.3	11.4	21.4	**58.0**	**79.4**
LA	Orleans Parish	05/11/2010	43	1,466.58	26.84	6.19	10.2	10.2	22.2	**57.5**	**79.7**
MA	Bristol	05/15/2012	19	1,328.32	41.68	1.79	29.4	8.8	5.9	**55.9**	**61.8**
MS	Hinds	07/26/2011	28	690.29	5.96	1.86	9.6	11.5	23.1	**55.8**	**78.9**
NJ	Essex	02/21/2012	22	2,152.68	91.68	3.86	23.5	9.4	11.8	**55.3**	**67.1**
NJ	Camden	02/21/2012	22	1,220.59	18.77	1.73	10.5	7.9	26.3	**55.3**	**81.6**
MS	Scott	07/26/2011	28	74.96	3.46	1.04	6.9	13.8	24.1	**55.2**	**79.3**
PA	Philadelphia	07/21/2009	53	4,561.51	98.66	10.75	24.0	7.0	14.6	**54.4**	**69.0**
MO	St. Charles	02/18/2011	34	1,045.35	16.35	1.97	14.9	9.0	23.9	**52.2**	**76.1**
MA	Essex	05/15/2012	19	1,592.05	115.79	7.37	25.0	8.6	15.0	**51.4**	**66.4**
MD	Prince George's	12/22/2009	48	2,030.65	121.83	16.08	22.4	9.5	16.8	**51.3**	**68.1**
NJ	Union	02/21/2012	22	801.27	65.91	3.05	20.9	11.9	16.4	**50.7**	**67.2**
MD	Frederick	04/06/2010	44	312.52	11.39	2.34	20.3	7.8	21.4	**50.5**	**71.8**
MA	Norfolk	05/15/2012	19	989.74	57.95	2.95	26.8	5.4	17.9	**50.0**	**67.9**

Source: Author's analysis of monthly IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability Statistics of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.



(a) Geographical distribution of top 20 counties having highest monthly removal outcomes under S-Comm (61 months: Oct. 2008 - Nov. 2013)



(b) Geographical distribution of top 20 counties having highest "**Level 1**" noncitizen removal outcomes under S-Comm (61 months: Oct. 2008 - Nov. 2013)



(c) Geographical distribution of top 20 counties having highest "**noncriminal**" noncitizen removal outcomes under S-Comm (61 months: Oct. 2008 - Nov. 2013)

Figure 4.2. Geographical Distribution of Counties on Noncitizen Deportation under S-Comm

Table 4.5 lists the top 20 localities following the program goal of S-Comm, with a higher Level 1 noncitizen deportation rate. As in (b) of Figure 4.2, geographically, counties are diversely distributed across the country, and few clear patterns or trends among these localities are found. Six out of 20 counties (30%) are border localities. Eight out of 20 localities (40%) are early adopters of S-Comm, and only two counties - Walker County, TX, and Imperial County, CA - tend to have a high level of monthly deportations since the activation of S-Comm. Compared to the top 20 localities in Table 4.4, these counties have relatively low numbers of monthly fingerprint submissions from LEAs,

low monthly IDENT matching rates (ranging from 1.6% to 23.3%), and low monthly deportation numbers (fewer than 10 noncitizens per county, except two outliers).

Table 4.6 and Figure 4.2 (c) list the top 20 localities having higher noncriminal noncitizen deportation outcomes since the activation of S-Comm, which has been the center of debate on this program. Interestingly, many localities, 14 out of 20 (70%) are located in the northeastern region, including New York, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. No southwest border localities fit in this group, but a few southern counties in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi did. Considering the past serious conflict and opt-out debates between localities (including states of New York, Massachusetts, the city of Arlington, Virginia, and Cook County, Illinois) and ICE on S-Comm implementation and the related enforcement result, such local distribution is very suggestive of current intergovernmental conflicts on noncitizen enforcement policy implementation. Five out of 20 localities (25%) are early adopters of S-Comm, and three localities - Jefferson Parish, LA; Philadelphia County, PA; and Prince George's County, MD - had relatively higher monthly deportation numbers (> 10 noncitizens) than others. More fingerprints in these counties are submitted on a monthly basis than in counties in Table 4.5, but IDENT matching rates are still low, ranging from 1.6% to 8.3%. All 20 counties have more than 50% of noncitizen deportation rates with noncriminal convictions. Expanding deportation rate into a combination of Level 3 and noncriminal violations, more than two thirds of noncitizens in these counties were removed with minor charges and immigration violations, which are not matched with ICE's enforcement priorities for enforcement actions.

4.4.3. Intra-locality Variations in Terms of S-Comm's Program Goal

In addition to interlocality variations on immigration enforcement policy under S-Comm, enforcement actions in a certain county might change over time, due to internal or external stimulus or interventions. Figures 4.3 - 4.5 address intra-locality variation of noncitizen enforcement changes over time under the S-Comm framework. In Figure 4.3, most localities with the highest deportation outcomes since the activation of S-Comm consistently indicate that each level of deportation in each locality (Levels 1 to 3 and noncriminal convictions) has dynamically shifted, repeating ups and downs over time. Enforcement of some localities - such as Harris and El Paso counties in Texas - appears to be stable compared to that of other localities, but also can have minor fluctuations on enforcement rates over time. Although it cannot be generalized, deportations based on Level 1 convictions were relatively low but have increased over time, while deportations based on Level 3 and noncriminal convictions have reverse trajectories - a very high deportation rate at the initial status, but declining over time.

Figures 4.4 and 4.5 indicate respectively how enforcement rates on level of criminality have changed over time. In Figure 4.4, only noncitizen deportation rates for Level 1 convictions tend to change dynamically, while other deportation rates for Level 3 and noncriminal convictions appear to be relatively stable. Vice versa, in Figure 4.5, deportation rates for noncitizens with Level 3 and noncriminal convictions are more likely to dynamically fluctuate over time than those for noncitizens with Level 1 charges. Figure 4.6 indicates some interesting counties having accelerated enforcement actions

over time in spite of few enforcement outcomes in the initial stage. As seen in some localities - such as Garza County, Reeves County, and Howard County in Texas - few enforcement outcomes were made at the initial level, but as time went on, enforcement actions, including monthly fingerprint submissions and numbers of deportations, rapidly increased. This figure nicely shows such dynamic changes over time, but future research needs to analyze what factors in certain localities caused such rapid and interesting fluctuation in such a longitudinal data structure.

Figure 4.3. Intra-locality Noncitizen Enforcement Outcome Change over Time under Secure Communities Program: Strong Enforcement Counties (Activation period: beginning of activation per locality through November 2013)

Los Angeles County, CA



Activation period: 51 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 29,745.45
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 3,031.61
Monthly average # of removal: 635.39

Maricopa County, AZ



Activation period: 59 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 21,303.49
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 1,756.12
Monthly average # of removal: 397.76

Harris County, TX



Activation period: 61 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 11,446.93
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 1,052.61
Monthly average # of removal: 353.36

San Diego County, CA



Activation period: 54 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 10,520.22
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 974.98
Monthly average # of removal: 285.02

Orange County, CA



Activation period: 45 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 8,641.87
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 1,218.73
Monthly average # of removal: 242.4

El Paso County, TX



Activation period: 54 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 1,748.35
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 358.20
Monthly average # of removal: 169.69

Note. I decomposed ICE's IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability Statistics from the original cumulative data format into a monthly format, and then calculated removal (deportation) rate of noncitizens by county under S-Comm in terms of removals of noncitizens with Level 1 (blue line), noncriminal (red line), and Level 3 + noncriminal (green line) convictions. The *y*-axis refers to deportation rate (%), and the *x*-axis refers to time (month) (Apr. 2010 - Nov. 2013).

Figure 4.4. Intra-locality Noncitizen Enforcement Outcome Change over Time under Secure Communities Program: Counties Having Highest "**Level 1**" Deportation Rates

Fremont County, CO



Activation period: 19 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 255.95
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 11.79
Monthly average # of removal: 1.26

Live Oak County, TX



Activation period: 42 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 53.29
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 8.05
Monthly average # of removal: 1.14

Essex County, NY



Activation period: 30 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 159.70
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 9.23
Monthly average # of removal: 1.40

Lasssen County, CA



Activation period: 34 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 192.41
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 12.74
Monthly average # of removal: 1.15

Grant Parish, LA



Activation period: 19 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 128.11
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 14.26
Monthly average # of removal: 1.16

Centre County, PA



Activation period: 18 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 235.89
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 44.61
Monthly average # of removal: 3.89

Figure 4.5. Intra-locality Noncitizen Enforcement Outcome Change over Time under Secure Communities Program: Counties Having Highest "**Non-criminal**" Deportation Rates

Ontario County, NY



Activation period: 32 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 326.06
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 8.19
Monthly average # of removal: 1.34

Middlesex County, MA



Activation period: 19 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 1,818.32
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 151.16
Monthly average # of removal: 9.21

Jefferson Parish, LA



Activation period: 49 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 3,054.22
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 108.39
Monthly average # of removal: 19.55

Worcester County, MA



Activation period: 19 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 1,247.79
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 70.79
Monthly average # of removal: 3.00

Tuscaloosa County, AL



Activation period: 31 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 856.68
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 10.77
Monthly average # of removal: 2.39

Cumberland County, NJ



Activation period: 22 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 533.64
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 19.82
Monthly average # of removal: 3.32

Figure 4.6. Intra-locality Noncitizen Enforcement Outcome Change over Time under Secure Communities Program: Counties with Low (few) Enforcement at the Initial Stage but Rapidly Increasing Enforcement over Time

Telfair County, GA



Activation period: 24 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 125.46
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 47.17
Monthly average # of removal: 5.38

Cook County, IL



Activation period: 11 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 14,563.45
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 1,012.45
Monthly average # of removal: 15.55

Garza County, TX



Activation period: 39 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 65.74
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 47.41
Monthly average # of removal: 16.05

Howard County, TX



Activation period: 40 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 221.85
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 89.08
Monthly average # of removal: 27.25

Limestone County, TX



Activation period: 41 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 83.63
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 8.27
Monthly average # of removal: 4.27

Reeves County, TX



Activation period: 41 months
Monthly average # of fingerprints submitted: 174.49
Monthly average # of IDENT matches: 130.68
Monthly average # of removal: 47.83

Note 1. Each graph consists of two lines tracking changes in noncitizen enforcement performance in a certain locality over time: the primary (left) axis is the total number of fingerprint (biometric data) submissions per month (blue line), while the secondary (right) axis is the total number of deportations per month (red line). Graphs are based on raw scores from ICE's IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability Statistics.
Note 2. X-axis in this table is based on monthly data, but ICE has sometimes, and with no explanation, not released data for certain months. Because this enforcement data is not an equally-spaced format, I calculated average monthly enforcement performance of these missing months and the following months; for example, the average monthly enforcement outcome for 3 months (from December 2010 to February 2011) or for 2 months (from October 2011 to November 2011).

4.5. Discussion

In this chapter, I empirically investigate how S-Comm has been implemented and whether this program has faithfully followed the stated goal of removing dangerous criminal noncitizens at the community level. Moreover, based on longitudinal policy implementation perspectives, this chapter also analyzes how localities' enforcement outcomes under S-Comm have been changed in terms of intra- and interlocality variations. Through analyses of ICE's S-Comm enforcement data, I confirmed the first part of Hypothesis 4 on the implementation of this program. During 61 months (Oct. 2008 - Nov. 2013), S-Comm has produced biased enforcement outcomes unlike their rosy promise, with more than half of noncitizens removed being those who commit misdemeanors and noncriminal convictions. Most noncriminal removals were related to immigration violations, and those with noncriminal convictions and misdemeanor charges fall into the trap of deportation under the language of "criminal" and "dangerous" noncitizens. Through descriptive statistics at the state and county level, I found that DHS/ICE has concentrated their enforcement energies under the implementation of S-Comm on some target areas, such as southwest border states and localities and southern localities, which brought about strikingly high enforcement actions in these areas - including fingerprint submissions, IDENT matches, and deportation numbers.

Hypothesis 2 on the two contextual factors on the implementation of S-Comm - timing of activation orders and geographical considerations - is also verified, meaning that these factors play a role in creating local variations on immigration enforcement outcomes. Based on a staggered rollout scheme, ICE targeted some counties that

neighbor the U.S.- Mexico border and those that are traditionally immigrant-receiving localities, specifically localities with significant populations of Hispanic residents, for enforcement actions. Of 541 localities, 282 counties (52.1%) with early activation of S-Comm have higher monthly noncitizen fingerprint submissions and IDENT matches, and more than 5 times higher monthly deportation numbers than those with late activation of this program. Moreover, of 541 localities, border counties (25.1%) tend to also have higher monthly noncitizen fingerprint submissions and IDENT matches, and more than 5 times higher monthly deportation numbers than those non-border counties. However, regardless of such policy contexts, in all counties roughly 50% of noncitizen deportations have been for minor charges and immigration violations during 61 months. Interestingly, counties having very high rates of noncitizen deportations with noncriminal convictions tend to be geographically located in the northeastern region, as in Figure 4.2. In addition to interlocality enforcement variation, intralocality enforcement changes over time are also found in Figures 4.3 to 4.6. In terms of level of criminality, deportations with Level 1 convictions were low initially but began to increase over time, while those with Level 3 and noncriminal convictions had the reverse trend, a very high level at the initial stage, but decreasing over time.

With grandiose visions and goals oriented toward promoting S-Comm as a "smart," "modernized," and "comprehensive" administrative tool for effectively identifying and removing dangerous noncitizens from the local communities (Menjívar & Kanstroom, 2014, p. 19), federal immigration bureaucrats and policymakers advertised that this program will improve public safety by effectively removing dangerous

noncitizens through a "technological interface between local jurisdictions and the federal government" (Pedroza, 2013, p. 45). However, during the last 5 years of implementation of this program, the public can witness that it has been full of conflicts, debates, and confusion in terms of what S-Comm orients toward, how this program works for carrying out the program goal, how intergovernmental cooperation for immigration enforcement policy has been made under the S-Comm framework, and whether this program has really made our communities safer. During the implementation of S-Comm, serious intergovernmental conflicts were found and expanded over time. ICE/DHS has tried to legitimate its huge enforcement (deportation) results on "noncriminal" noncitizen convictions, with the logic that this category of noncitizen is one of the key priorities for current noncitizen enforcement policy based on ICE's 2011 policy memo. However, S-Comm was launched in 2008 before this policy memo was made and institutionalized, and even if the target population for enforcement actions has been changed or expanded, such a policy shift or directional change should be carefully reviewed and needs widespread public agreement. Unfortunately, ICE's current noncitizen enforcement priority decision process and related strategies lack such public consent, and therefore they have become open to serious public debates and concerns.

In spite of critical analyses of the implementation of S-Comm, these analyses have limitations. Due to data limitations, I have no choice but to use only limited lists of data on S-Comm, including deportation numbers in terms of level of criminality and some contextual factors. In spite of repeated data requests from researchers and migrant rights groups, DHS/ICE has still been very resistant to releasing information on the

concrete working mechanisms and consequent enforcement outcomes of S-Comm. The public can find S-Comm deportation numbers, but there is no way for them to understand any specific information about the noncitizens deported, including exact noncitizen groups, age levels, and administrative and legal violations or charges for which noncitizens have been caught, detained, and finally removed under the current enforcement and deportation machines. Federal immigration agencies should release enforcement data and related outcomes without concealment, and based on these data, more in-depth research should be done in the future to understand how S-Comm has really been implemented and what policy outcomes have been made. In the next chapter, I will dig deeper into administrative processes on the implementation of S-Comm, specifically focusing on the connection between two intergovernmental interaction points - issuing immigration detainers and noncitizen deportation - and how these processes are related to local immigration enforcement policy participation.

CHAPTER 5[43]

LOCAL CLASSIFICATIONS IN TEMRS OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICY PARTICIPATION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ENFORCEMENT INTERACTIONS UNDER THE SECURE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM

5.1. Introduction

Through an analysis of how two key intergovernmental interactions under the implementation of S-Comm are interrelated, this chapter digs deep into the administrative working mechanism the current enforcement or deportation machines use for expanding the scope of noncitizen deportations. These two administrative actions on the intergovernmental cooperative enforcement structure are immigration (ICE) detainer issuances and noncitizen deportations. Moreover, with the increasing various local policy voices and perspectives on immigration - what Lewis and his colleagues consider a *multilayered jurisdictional patchwork* trend - local communities tend to have responded in one of three ways to such an enforcement machine and related system: active federal immigration enforcement policy participation as a partner or coworker; inactive (or passive) participation in a mandatory enforcement program or active resistance to involvement; or a noninterventionist perspective, following the argument that

[43] An early version of this chapter was prepared in 2015 with the title *How Current U.S. Immigration Enforcement Machine Has Been Carried Out Under Immigration Patchwork Trend: Analysis on the Relationship Between Issuing Immigration Detainers and Deportation Numbers Using Longitudinal Growth Curve Modeling*. It was presented at the 2015 Western Social Science Association Conference (WSSA), which was held in Portland, OR, on April 8-11, 2015. This chapter is revised with comments and feedback from this conference. I appreciate the audience at the WSSA conference session for their comments. I also appreciate Professors N. Joseph Cayer and Paul G. Lewis for their review and comments on the previous manuscript, and Professor Natalie Wilkens for her methodological comments and graduate classes on longitudinal modeling. I also appreciate TRAC and its co-director Susan B. Long for generously providing FOIA data on immigration detainer issuances from federal immigration agencies.

immigration policy is a responsibility of the federal government. With these complicated intergovernmental relations on immigration policy under enforcement hysteria in mind, this chapter finally investigates how three contextual factors on the current immigration enforcement policy - different levels (extents) of local immigration enforcement policy participation, and two intergovernmental interaction points under S-Comm - are interrelated. Additionally, I also analyze whether there are any patterns or characteristics counties have followed on the implementation of immigration enforcement policy over time. Figure 5.1 schematically indicates a conceptual framework showing the interrelationship among three contextual factors of the current U.S. immigration enforcement policy.

To answer these questions, I empirically test two hypotheses mentioned in Chapter 3. These are the second hypothesis (relationship between different local immigration enforcement policy participation and compliance with immigration detainer issuances) and the fourth hypothesis excepting the first part (relationship between different local immigration enforcement policy participation and the numbers of local noncitizen deportations, and the relationship between immigration detainer issuances and noncitizen deportations). Considering the working logic and processes of S-Comm, I assume that localities having different immigration perspectives are likely to follow different noncitizen enforcement outcomes (or trajectories) in the process of implementing S-Comm. Different levels of government have no choice but to interact with each other due to such mandatory cooperative enforcement logic, and these two enforcement mechanisms should also be linked. As an interim process for noncitizen

enforcement actions, I assume that detainer issuance per locality might also influence total number of deportations per locality as the final enforcement outcome.



Figure 5. 1. Conceptual framework for noncitizen enforcement policy under the Secure Communities Program

5.2. Data and Methodology

Following the logic of Chapter 4, noncitizen deportation data from ICE's IDENT-IAFIS interoperability statistics under S-Comm were selected and re-collected for 541 local communities having meaningful immigration enforcement outcomes. Multiple public data sources were used. Most data were publicly available through web searches, with the exception of immigration detainer issuances and deportation data from ICE's 287(g) partnerships as a voluntary enforcement program. I got detainer issuance data with the support of the TRAC at Syracuse University, which successfully got this data through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and lawsuits[44]. Regarding detainer issuance

[44] ICE detainer issuance data from TRAC, which was originally produced by ICE for FOIA requests and then had some contextual and geographical information added by TRAC, consists of more than 400,000 detainer-by-detainer records for 23 months (from Oct. 2011 to Aug. 2013, with 2 months missing in Feb.

and deportation numbers per locality under S-Comm, 5 monthly data points (Dec. 2011, Apr. 2012, Aug. 2012, Dec. 2012, and Jan. 2013) were respectively collected and revised for analysis, which cover a 13-month period (Dec. 2011 - Jan. 2013).[45] Regarding local immigration enforcement policy participation, multiple public sources were also used through web searches and FOIA requests submitted to ICE[46]. Data on local involvement in 287(g) partnerships and activation date of S-Comm are available on the ICE web site. There are few official statistics or data archives on local immigration-related ordinances or resolutions, so I reviewed previous studies, data archives of research institutes, and online newspapers on local immigration activism and legislative actions[47]. Through this series of data collection, I combined collected data, and finally created a new dataset for analysis. The data sources and measurement of variables are presented below.

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and Apr. 2013). It includes information about how many immigration detainers have been issued by ICE to local law enforcement agencies or detention facilities on a monthly basis. It also includes additional helpful information, including ICE program codes on detainer issuance, criminal convictions (level of criminality) of noncitizens who got detainers, their conviction date, and demographic data of noncitizens who got detainers at their localities. One problem on monthly detainer issuance data is there are many missing information points on detainer issuance, especially criminality of noncitizens who got detainers, so I did not use this information for analysis. Moreover, TRAC data was created based on the state level, while the unit of analysis for this study is localities (counties). Therefore, I revised the data structure from TRAC to the county-level through geocode (zip code) searches of every local law enforcement agency to which ICE detainers were issued.

[45] The reason I selected these 5 time (month) points for analysis was due to data accessibility and matching between two different data sources, including monthly immigration detainer issuances (Oct. 2011 - Aug. 2013, with 2 months missing in a 23-month period) and monthly noncitizen deportations (Apr. 2010 - Nov. 2013, with 7 months missing in a 44-month period). Both data sources have multiple missing months, and a total of 15 month-length data are commonly secured for analysis. Due to time limits for data re-coding and -collecting for this study, I finally selected 5 time points of these 15 months of data, covering about 2 years from immigration detainer issuance data.

[46] I made FOIA requests to ICE to get data on ICE's noncitizen enforcement actions, especially the 287(g) partnership program's annual deportation numbers per participating LEA (esp. FY2010 - FY2012). ICE's FOIA reference numbers for the requests were 2014FY2760 and 2014-ICFO-02026.

[47] Data regarding local immigration enforcement policy participation were from web site searches of the National Immigration Law Center, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE FOIA library), Catholic Legal Immigration Network Inc., Immigration Legal Resource Center, Center for Community Change, Center for Wisconsin Strategy, Center for Immigration Studies, and Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR).

5.2.1. Dependent Variable: Local Noncitizen Deportation Numbers[48] under S-Comm

Local deportation numbers refer to monthly total volume of noncitizens removed per jurisdiction through the implementation of S-Comm. In terms of immigration policy context, this indicates how a certain locality adopts a strong (or weak) immigration control policy toward noncitizens residing in its jurisdiction, specifically noncitizens who are legally and socioeconomically negatively constructed. Localities with high volumes of noncitizen deportations tend to consider noncitizens in their jurisdictions as the subject of control, punishment, and administrative removal. On the other hand, localities with weak (low) numbers of noncitizen deportations in their jurisdictions are likely to see noncitizens as the subject of integration, coexistence, and "quasi-citizens" (Moloney, 2012). For analysis, I used the monthly raw number of noncitizen deportations by jurisdiction, but raw noncitizen deportation numbers per locality consisting of 5 time (month) points were widely scattered, appearing to have two separate bell-shaped curves (SD ranges from a minimum of 35.18 through a maximum of 50.67). Therefore, I used log-transformed data for analysis to mitigate such a non-normality[49]. ICE's monthly deportation data under S-Comm have been released on their Web site as a cumulative format, so I revised them into a monthly deportation data format.

[48] To increase the validity of the research, deportation rate adjusting for per 1,000 total population or foreign-born population (i.e., per capita deportation rate) can be used. However, for this study, I used monthly deportation data under the S-Comm framework, and unfortunately, there are no public data regarding monthly total or foreign-born population at the national and local levels. Therefore, I used raw monthly deportation numbers that were log-transformed. Previous studies (Chand & Schreckhise, 2014) on S-Comm used raw deportation numbers as the DV.

[49] Raw noncitizen deportation number data include "zero" value (no deportation number for a certain month in a county), which does not take the log, so I used a log(x+1) data transformation technique as a special case of logarithm transformation.

5.2.2. Independent Variable: Local Immigration Enforcement Policy Participation

Local immigration perspectives and voices have been expressed through passing local ordinances or resolutions on immigration or implementing or participating in administrative programs influencing noncitizens' socioeconomic and political lives. Previous studies have considered such distinct levels of local involvement of federal immigration enforcement policy via 287(g) partnerships (Capps, Rosenblum, Rodriguez, & Chishti, 2011; Theodore, 2012) and federal-local cooperation under S-Comm (Cox & Miles, 2013; Jung, 2015a; Miles & Cox, 2014; Pedroza, 2013). Moreover, in terms of the legal angle, local immigration enforcement participation has been discussed with local and state immigration activism and policy diffusion effects across the country - for example, in the passage of the Hazleton immigration ordinance in 2006 and Arizona's SB1070 in 2010 - or the consequent multilayered jurisdictional patchwork trend (Varsanyi, 2010; Varsanyi, Lewis, Provine, & Decker, 2012a).

Following the directions of previous studies, I selected four items identifying the level (extent) of local immigration enforcement policy participation, which reflect local immigration politics and policy contexts. They include (1) participation in 287(g) partnerships (0= no, 1= yes), (2) adoption of S-Comm (0= late adopter, 1= early adopter, cutoff point = Oct. 2010), (3) local ordinances/resolutions on welcoming (integrative) immigrants move (0= no, 1= yes), and (4) local ordinances/resolutions on restrictive/punitive immigration policy (0= no, 1= yes). All items have a binary scale reflecting how actively (or inactively) localities have been involved in the federal or local immigration enforcement policies. Of the four items, the first, second, and fourth are

related to the strength of local restrictive (punitive) immigration enforcement policy participation, while the third deals with a more integrative and welcoming immigration policy.

5.2.3. Intervening or Confounding Variable: Immigration (ICE) Detainer Issuance to Localities

Detainer issuance should be made ahead of ICE's final removal orders for suspected noncitizens under the S-Comm framework. Under the current enforcement machine, immigration detainer issuance means that ICE "administratively" sets suspected noncitizens as "deportable" or "removable" after fingerprint matches with ICE's immigration database and decisions on levels of criminality, and requests that LEAs detaining these noncitizens in local jails or detention facilities "hold" them - even if their charges are cleared - for ICE to transfer these target noncitizens to ICE facilities for deportation proceedings. Therefore, as a midpoint-process for noncitizen deportations, issuance of immigration detainers is likely to be logically connected with final deportation actions. However, deportation orders are not always connected with detainer issuances because many deportations - for example, expedited removal orders by ICE - have previously been made without issuing a detainer. Moreover, the recent policy shift focusing on border enforcement might be connected with less use of ICE detainers, while maintaining or increasing deportation rates (Noferi, 2014a).

TRAC's detainer issuance data, acquired from ICE through multiple FOIA requests and lawsuits, consists of 102,138 detainer-by-detainer records including the date

detainers were issued to local law enforcement agencies, jails, or detention facilities, as well as additional geographical, demographic, and contextual information on noncitizens issued detainers. In terms of dates detainers were issued, this data covers 23 months (Oct. 2011 - Aug. 2013), and includes immigration detainer issuances sent to 3,900 local jails and detention facilities across 50 states and U.S. territories. This study focuses on enforcement outcomes in 541 counties under S-Comm, following the logic of Chapter 4, with 5 time points covering a 13-month period (Dec. 2011 - Jan. 2013). Therefore, of a total of 102,138 detainer-by-detainer records from the previous TRAC data, I selected 71,777 detainer issuance records on 541 localities for this study. Thereafter, I first calculated a total number of detainer issuances per county per month. Then I restructured the existing data with a wide format for longitudinal data analysis. TRAC data include lists of ICE programs through which detainers have been issued, including the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) under ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), 287(g) partnerships, Fugitive operations, the Joint Criminal Alien Response Team, the Violent Criminal Alien Section, and Detention and Deportation. However, one serious problem for this study is that there is no identification of how many ICE detainers have been issued by the S-Comm program, although previous studies have paid special attention to the connection between an increasing number of ICE detainer issuances and the implementation of S-Comm (Lasch, 2013b; Manuel, 2014; TRAC, 2013b, 2014b, 2014c). With such limitations on access to data, I recalculated the total number of detainer issuances by the ERO's CAP out of total detainer issuances; CAP has the largest share of detainer issuances and also has a working logic similar to S-Comm under the current U.S.

immigration enforcement system. With this revised number, I used it as a proxy volume of detainer issuances per locality on S-Comm implementation.[50] As in deportation numbers, raw detainer issuance numbers per county varied widely (SD ranges from a minimum of 54.33 through a maximum of 73.23), so I used log-transformed data for analysis to mitigate such a non-normality.

5.3. Modeling strategy

I undertook two quantitative analyses for understanding the interrelationship between and among three contextual variables on current U.S. immigration enforcement policy. First, regarding the independent variable, I needed to categorize or classify the total 541 localities into sub-groups or -classes having distinct characteristics. That is, considering contextually the existence of *multilayered jurisdictional patchwork* trend and local variations on immigration-related issues, it statistically indicates that there are likely to be "hidden" or "unobserved" sub-groups or -categories within a single population. To identify statistically significant numbers of subgroups in 541 localities that have activated S-Comm, this study used latent class analysis (LCA) as a method.

5.3.1. Latent Class Analysis (LCA) for Local Classifications

[50] I contacted ICE in November 2014 to ask why S-Comm has had no records on immigration detainer issuances, in spite of clear evidence from previous studies and ICE's administrative detention-related data. ICE did not reply, however, and finally rejected my questions, saying that I had not submitted them with proper official documents. Therefore, on January 15, 2015, I officially submitted a FOIA request to ICE requesting detainer-by-detainer issuance records on ICE detainer issuances under S-Comm since the initiation of this program (Oct. 2008 - Dec. 2014). As of the beginning of May, 2015, my FOIA request is still pending. This FOIA request's reference number is 2015 - ICFO - 61957.

LCA is a quantitative method for "identifying unobserved groups based on categorical data" (Samuelson & Dayton, 2010, p. 173) or for classifying research units into statistically reliable numbers of latent (unobserved) classes/subgroups based on data (response) patterns (Finch & Bronk, 2011; Flaherty & Kiff, 2012; Geiser, 2013). Based on item response theory (IRT), LCA considers that the "relationships between items are explained by the presence of a priori unknown subpopulations, or latent classes," (Geiser, 2013, p. 232), although this membership is probabilistic, not deterministic (Samuelson & Dayton, 2010). Methodologically, LCA has similar logic to exploratory factor analysis (EFA), considering both approaches identify latent constructs based on data reduction of manifest variables (Geiser, 2013; Oser, Hooghe, & Marien, 2013; Samuelson & Dayton, 2010). However, one big difference between these two approaches is the scale of the newly-created latent construct: while EFA creates continuous latent classes from continuous variables, LCA identifies categorical latent classes from categorical manifest variables. Under the LCA perspective, exploratory and confirmatory approaches both can be used for analysis, and what approach the researcher selects depends on the existence of "well-developed" substantive theories (Finch & Bronk, 2011), but exploratory LCA has been frequently used due to its flexibility.

For identifying local variations on immigration enforcement policy participation, I used an exploratory LCA. As I mentioned in the independent variables subsection 5.2.2., I collected four items on local immigration enforcement policy directions in terms of administrative and legal perspectives, which are all binary scales, and also assuming that there is a latent categorical construct *Y,* and the following LCA model is created:

$$\pi_{ijklt}^{X1\,X2\,X3\,X4\,Y} = \pi_t^Y\ \pi_{it}^{X1|Y} \pi_{jt}^{X2|Y}\ \pi_{kt}^{X3|Y}\ \pi_{lt}^{X4|Y} \quad (1)$$ [51]

Where

π_t^Y = Probability that a randomly selected county (as a unit of analysis) will be in latent class *t* of latent variable *Y*
$\pi_{it}^{X1|Y}$ = Probability that a member of latent class *t* will provide a response of *i* for observed variable *X* 1 (participation in 287(g) partnerships)
$\pi_{jt}^{X2|Y}$ = Probability that a member of latent class *t* will provide a response of *j* for observed variable *X* 2 (timing of activation of S-Comm)
$\pi_{kt}^{X3|Y}$ = Probability that a member of latent class *t* will provide a response of *k* for observed variable *X* 3 (passage of integrative/welcoming local immigration ordinances)
$\pi_{lt}^{X4|Y}$ = Probability that a member of latent class *t* will provide a response of *l* for observed variable *X* 4 (passage of punitive/restrictive local immigration ordinances)

In (1) representing an equation of LCA, four items indicating the extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation are *X* 1, *X* 2, *X* 3, and *X* 4 respectively. As I mentioned, *Y* refers to a latent categorical construct representing local immigration enforcement policy participation, and *t* refers to numbers of subclasses or -groups within *Y*. *I, J, K,* and *L* in the equation (1) refer to the number of categories in each of four items. Because these four items are a binary scale as I already mentioned, *I, J, K,* and *L* are 2 (0 = no, 1 = yes). Under the logic of LCA, each of four observed items is "conditionally independent" given that latent class membership is known (Finch & Bronk, 2011; Samuelson & Dayton, 2010). For example, suppose a certain county of 541 localities has the following probability values for the three-class solutions: π_1^Y= .07, π_{21}^Y= .25, and π_3^Y=

[51] For model building in LCA, previous studies used various mathematical expressions and equations, but general readers sometimes find it hard to understand their logic. For purposes of simplicity and clarification, here I followed Finch and Bronk's mathematical explanations (2011, pp. 133-134) to account for LCA.

.05. Then this county is likely to be in Class 1 of a latent construct *Y*, with a 1/4 chance of being in Class 2 and less than a 1/18 chance of being in Class 3. A value for $\pi_{yes\_1}^{X1|Y}$ refers to a county in the first class in *Y* that would be likely to activate (coded as "yes") 287(g) partnerships with the federal immigration agency (regarding *X*1).

For exploratory LCA, I specified models with two- through four-class solutions using four items reflecting extents of local immigration enforcement policy. Then I compared what model had the best model fits (including absolute and relative model fits) and estimates based on standard structural equation modeling (SEM) procedures. Choice of the best model under LCA should not exclusively rely on model fits or estimates. Multiple points - such as not only statistical model fits and estimates, but also theoretical and substantive justification, the interpretability of the solution - should be considered simultaneously (Flaherty & Kiff, 2012; Geiser, 2013; Ram & Grimm, 2009).

5.3.2. Longitudinal Growth Curve Modeling for Analyzing Immigration Enforcement Trajectories Under the S-Comm Framework

The second analysis used is longitudinal latent growth curve modeling (LGM), which is a modeling of "change" or "the form of change" (Duncan & Duncan, 2009; Duncan, Duncan & Strycker, 2010; Eggum-Wilkens, 2014; Flora, Khoo, & Chassin, 2007; Geiser, 2013; Preacher, 2010) in the same repeatedly measured variable over time. As "a special case of structural equation modeling (SEM),"[52] LGM follows most of the

[52] For specifying and fitting LGM, two different methods - structural equation modeling (SEM) and multilevel modeling framework (MLM) - have been used. These frameworks have different perspectives and logic to estimate growth trajectories of repeated observed measurements, but they tend to have similar outcomes (Eggum-Wilkens, 2014; Grimm, Ram, & Estabrook, 2014). Therefore, the type of LGMs

methodological logic of SEM to assess dynamic aspects of individual change - intra- and interunit change perspectives - as "random effects*"* (Preacher, 2010, p. 189). These random effects can be expressed with "means, variances, and covariances of individual differences in intercepts and slopes" (Preacher, 2010, p. 185). Based on developmental studies and theory of change (called "growth" under LGM logic), LGM makes it possible for researchers to grasp individual changes - including growths and declines - over time by estimating their growth trajectory (Bollen & Curran, 2006; Davidov, Thörner, Schmidt, Gosen, & Wolf, 2011; Jung & Wickrama, 2008; Soest & Hagtvet, 2011). Unlike traditional approaches for measuring change - such as analysis of variance (ANOVA) or regression-based analyses - mainly focusing on mean-level changes and considering individual differences as merely "error variance," one of the key arguments from LGM is that such error variance includes important information on changes of a repeatedly measured variable (Duncan & Duncan, 2009).

Each growth (change) trajectory of certain repeated observed measurements can be described by its two latent constructs under the logic of LGM, labeled intercept and slope factors, and the covariance of these two factors. Intercept factor refers to the initial status of repeated measurements, and it is constant for any individual across time, so factor loadings for intercept factor are fixed at 1. Slope factor refers to slope or rate of change (growth or decline) over a period of repeated measurements, so factor loadings are changed reflecting the time metric.[53] Moreover, these two factors are allowed to

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selected for analysis - whether based on MLM or SEM framework - is the researcher's choice. LGM based on SEM is more flexible in situations involving complex models (Eggum-Wilkens, 2014; Preacher, 2010).

[53] For model identification, at least two factor loadings of the slope factor under LGM (e.g, 0, 1…) should be fixed, although what numbers on the loadings are used depends on the scale of time. For more concrete

covary in the process of growth trajectories of certain repeated measurements. This logic under LGM can be schematically expressed in the following path diagrams:



Figure 5.2. Basic (Typical) LGMs for one repeated-measured variable Y_k (k = time point) with four occasions of measurement (k=1, 2, 3, 4). Examples of a linear LGM (left) and a quadratic LGM (right)

Note: Under SEM framework, rectangles are observed or manifest variables (repeated measures here) while circles are unobserved or latent variables; single-headed arrows are path coefficients, while double-headed arrows are variance or covariances. ε refers to time-specific residuals or disturbances. Factor loadings for intercept factor are fixed at 1 because they equally influence each repeated measure, while those for slope factor are set by several options (e.g., 0, 1, 2, 3 for a linear LGM and 0, 1,4, 9 for fixing the values of linear loadings squared). Various forms of growth curve models can be selected (e.g., linear, quadratic, and cubic), and which shape (form) of model is selected depends on theory or data.

For this study, I first estimated two respective individual enforcement trajectories - immigration detainer issuances and noncitizen deportations - during 5 time points, covering a 13-month period under the S-Comm framework as unconditional (no predictors) LGMs.[54]

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setting and interpretation of numerical values for factor loadings under LGM, see Chapter 8 of Little (2013).

[54] Under the SEM-based framework, LGM follows a two-step process for estimating trajectories of a certain repeatedly measured variable: first an "unconditional" model, which has no predictor and focuses on estimation of "the growth portion of the model"; then a "conditional" model with predictors that might

$$Detainer_{it} = \alpha_i + \lambda_t\beta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (i = 1, 2,\ldots 541,\ t = 0, 1,\ldots 4) \tag{2}$$

$$Detainer_{it} = \alpha_i + \lambda_t\beta_{1i} + \lambda_t^2\beta_{2i} + \varepsilon_{it} \ (i = 1, 2,\ldots 541,\ t = 0, 1,\ldots 4) \tag{3}$$

In equation (2), $Detainer_{it}$ refers to a "linear" immigration detainer issuance trajectory for county *i* at time *t*; in equation (3), it is expressed with a nonlinear or quadratic immigration detainer issuance trajectory for county *i* at time *t;* In equations (2) and (3), α_i indicates the random intercept for every county *i;* β_i represents the random slope for every county *i*; λ_t represents the value of trend variable for time *t*; and ε_{it} indicates disturbance of immigration detainer issuance trajectory for county *i* at time *t*. In equation (3) regarding a nonlinear LGM, β_{1i} refers to the random linear slope for every county *i*, while β_{2i} indicates the random quadratic slope for every county *i.*

In equation (2), the intercept and slope factors can also be expressed as functions of means and county-specific disturbances away from those means.

$$\alpha_i = \mu_\alpha + \zeta_{\alpha i} \tag{4}$$

$$\beta_i = \mu_\beta + \zeta_{\beta i} \tag{5}$$

For example, the random intercept, α_i, consists of the mean intercept across all counties (μ_α) and county-specific disturbance or error term for intercept ($\zeta_{\alpha i}$). Likewise, slope factor, β_i, is subdivided into the mean slope across all counties (μ_β) and county-

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influence growth or decline of the previous unconditional growth model (Keith, 2015, p. 497). Following this logic, this study also first made unconditional models for the two respective immigration enforcement actions under S-Comm, and then made conditional models with a predictor.

specific disturbance for slope ($\zeta_{\beta i}$). Therefore, the following equation (6) can be made by inserting equations (4) and (5) into equation (2):

$$Detainer_{it} = (\mu_\alpha + \lambda_t \mu_\beta) + (\zeta_{\alpha i} + \lambda_t \zeta_{\beta i} + \varepsilon_{it}) \quad (6)$$

In equation (6), a linear detainer issuance trajectory during 5 time points consists of two parts: the first bracket for a fixed component representing mean structure of all 541 counties and the second one for a random component representing county-specific variability. This is the first model for unconditional LGM in this chapter. Turning the intercept and slope factors under a quadratic LGM in equation (3), they can be expressed with the following slightly complicated form:

$$\alpha_i = \mu_\alpha + \zeta_{\alpha i} \quad (4)$$

$$\beta_{1i} = \mu_{\beta 1} + \zeta_{\beta 1 i} \quad (7)$$

$$\beta_{2i} = \mu_{\beta 2} + \zeta_{\beta 2 i} \quad (8)$$

Compared with the first model, the linear LGM on detainer issuance trajectory, the slope factors under the quadratic LGM are subdivided into linear and quadratic slopes β_{1i} and β_{2i} respectively, and they can also be expressed as functions of means and county-specific disturbances away from those means. Through inserting equations (4), (7), and (8) into equation (3), the following equation (9) is finally made for a quadratic LGM:

$$Detainer_{it} = (\mu_\alpha + \lambda_t\mu_{\beta 1} + \lambda_t^2\mu_{\beta 2}) + (\zeta_{\alpha i} + \lambda_t\zeta_{\beta 1 i} + \lambda_t^2\zeta_{\beta 2 i} + \varepsilon_{it}) \quad (9)$$

As in the linear LGM in equation (6), here the quadratic LGM consists of two components: the first bracket for a fixed component representing mean structure of all 541 counties and the second one for a random component representing county-specific variability. As in the process of immigration detainer issuance trajectory, the following equations are created for the second enforcement action, noncitizen deportation trajectory during 5 time points under S-Comm, and this is expressed for linear (equation 10) and quadratic LGM (equation 11) respectively.

$$Deportation_{it} = (\mu_\alpha + \lambda_t\mu_\beta) + (\zeta_{\alpha i} + \lambda_t\,\zeta_{\beta i} + \varepsilon_{it}) \quad (10)$$

$$Deportation_{it} = (\mu_\alpha + \lambda_t\mu_{\beta 1} + \lambda_t^2\mu_{\beta 2}) + (\zeta_{\alpha i} + \lambda_t\zeta_{\beta 1 i} + \lambda_t^2\zeta_{\beta 2 i} + \varepsilon_{it}) \quad (11)$$

Based on the abovementioned unconditional LGMs for two enforcement actions, the next step is to create conditional LGMs for them. For linear conditional LGMs, new intercept and slope factors with predictors - local distinct immigration enforcement policy participation - can be applied to equation (2):

$$\alpha_i = \mu_\alpha + \gamma_{\alpha 1}x_{1i} + \gamma_{\alpha 2}x_{2i} + \ldots + \gamma_{\alpha n}x_{ni} + \zeta_{\alpha i} \quad (12)$$

$$\beta_i = \mu_\beta + \gamma_{\beta 1}x_{1i} + \gamma_{\beta 2}x_{2i} + \ldots + \gamma_{\beta n}x_{ni} + \zeta_{\beta i} \quad (13)$$

Where

the random intercept, α_i, and the random slope, β_i, basically consist of the mean intercept (slope) across all counties (μ_α/ μ_β) and county-specific disturbance or error term for intercept ($\zeta_{\alpha i}$) or slope ($\zeta_{\beta i}$) as in the previous unconditional LGMs. However, with the addition of predictors or covariates, x_1 , x_2,… x_n, equations (12) and (13) include county-specific value of predictors ($x_{1,2,\ldots n}$) and predictors' coefficients for the intercept factor ($\gamma_{\alpha 1,\alpha 2,\ldots \alpha n}$) and slope factor ($\gamma_{\beta 1,\beta 2,\ldots \beta n}$) respectively. Through inserting equations (12) and (13) into equation (2), the third and fourth models for conditional LGMs for two enforcement actions, equations (14) and (15) are made:

$$Detainer_{it} = (\mu_\alpha + \lambda_t \mu_\beta) + (\gamma_{\alpha 1} + \lambda_t \gamma_{\beta 1})\, x_{1i} + \ldots + (\gamma_{\alpha n} + \lambda_t \gamma_{\beta n})\, x_{ni} + (\zeta_{\alpha i} + \lambda_t\, \zeta_{\beta i} + \varepsilon_{it}) \quad \text{(the number of predictors or covariates = 1, 2,….}n\text{)} \quad (14)$$

$$Deportation_{it} = (\mu_\alpha + \lambda_t \mu_\beta) + (\gamma_{\alpha 1} + \lambda_t \gamma_{\beta 1})\, x_{1i} + \ldots + (\gamma_{\alpha n} + \lambda_t \gamma_{\beta n})\, x_{ni} + (\zeta_{\alpha i} + \lambda_t\, \zeta_{\beta i} + \varepsilon_{it}) \quad \text{(the number of predictors or covariates = 1, 2,….}n\text{)} \quad (15)$$

With the abovementioned four unconditional and conditional LGMs for two enforcement actions under S-Comm, next, two separated enforcement trajectories were connected using parallel-process LGMs as the fifth model. In this model, I analyze how these two enforcement trajectories are related using correlation. As an extension of the fifth model, the sixth model adds regression paths between these two enforcement trajectories. Finally, using all three variables on the current immigration enforcement policy under S-Comm - extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation, immigration detainer issuance, and noncitizen deportations - longitudinal mediation

analysis is made. For the final model, a longitudinal mediation model is parameterized with the following two equations using Figure 5.1:

M (detainer issuance trajectory) = $i_1 + a_1 D_1 + a_2 D_2 + \ldots + a_{k-1} D_{k-1} + e_m$ (16)

Y (deportation trajectory) = $i_2 + c'_1 D_1 + c'_2 D_2 + \ldots + c'_{k-1} D_{k-1} + bM + e_y$ (17)

(i = constant, a,b, and c' = direct/indirect effects in Figure 5.1., D = predictor with a multicategorical scale, M = mediator variable, and e = error term under SEM framework)[55]

Based on a series of equations on three contextual factors on the implementation of S-Comm, Figure 5.3 presents a path diagram representing the relationship between the hypothesized growth trajectories for two enforcement mechanisms. Figure 5.3 consists of three parts: a growth trajectory for detainer issuance (at the top) across five time (month) points, a growth trajectory for noncitizen removals (at the bottom) across five time points, and influence of extents of local immigration enforcement policy participation to these two enforcement change trajectories (in the middle, between two growth trajectories over time). Five time points - 1 (Dec. 2011), 4 (Apr. 2012), 8 (Aug. 2012), 12 (Dec. 2012), and 13 months (Jan. 2013) - were commonly measured for two enforcement actions, but these times were not equally-spaced. These five time points were coded as 0 (the first month for analysis, Dec. 2011), .31 (the 4th of 13 months, =4/13), .62 (the 8th of 13 months, =8/13), .92 (the 12th of 13 months, =12/13), and 1 (the 13th of 13 months, =13/13) respectively.

[55] I followed Hayes and Preacher's study (2014) analyzing statistical mediation analysis with a predictor based on a multicategorical scale for creating related equations here.



Figure 5. 3. A path diagram representing the hypothesized parallel-process latent growth curve model for detainer issuance and noncitizen deportations under the Secure Communities program

Note: To avoid complexity, I do not include covariance between intercept and slope factors here. Through fitting two univariate LGMs, a quadratic model for detainer issuances and a linear model for noncitizen deportation have the best model fits and estimates. For the two models, factor loadings for intercept were fixed at 1, factor loadings for linear slope were rescaled 0, .31, .62, .92, 1, and factor loadings for quadratic slope were fixed at the values of the linear loadings squared, 0, .1, .38, .85, 1.

For doing LGM, each single growth model is specified to identify what form of change (linear vs. nonlinear) over time has the best model fits and estimates with various conditions (residual variances constraints vs. free). Then I connected two growth models for detainer issuance and noncitizen deportation through specifying a parallel process LGM for analyzing the relationship between two univariate LGMs without covariates. Finally, I created a longitudinal mediation model interrelating three variables, and analyzed how different extents of local immigration enforcement policy participation influence two enforcement actions - detainer issuances and noncitizen deportations - under the S-Comm framework.

5. 4. Local Classifications in Terms of Extent of Local Immigration Enforcement Policy Participation

Table 5.1 presents a series of classifications of 541 localities based on exploratory LCA model fits. I ran two through four-class solutions for model selection, and considering the entropy reflecting the quality of the classification under LCA, the two-class solution might be considered. However, most relative model fit indexes show that the three-class solution becomes the best model reflecting the characteristics of the data structure consisting of four items on local immigration enforcement policy participation. Considering average latent class probabilities for localities, each of the three classes on local involvement in immigration enforcement policy has a very high certainty and reliability of the classification (.897 for Class 1, .979 for Class 2, and .867 for Class 3). Localities of Class 3 also have a relatively high average probability of belonging to Class

1 (.121), which means there is a possibility of a certain degree of overlap between these two classes, but the quality of this classification can still be statistically satisfactory. Moreover, previous studies (Pham & Pham, 2014; Varsanyi, 2010; Wong, 2014a) have tended to follow local immigration activism in terms of dichotomous ("integrative"/"welcoming" vs. "restrictive"/"punitive" immigration policy) or a small number of local perspectives ("active," "inactive," and "noninterventionist" immigration policy), so the three-class solution can be a theoretically justifiable and feasible option for an empirical analysis. The best log likelihood value for this model for the three-class solution was -1,055.404. For overcoming the local maxima problem[56] under the LCA framework, this model was rerun several times, and this model was well-defined and there was no convergence or identification problem. Estimation was based on maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors (MLR).[57]

[56] For LCA, the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation is used for producing the best solution with "the largest possible log-likelihood value" (Geiser, 2013, p. 238). That is, if the best log-likelihood value is found, replication of log-likelihood across random start values should have the same log-likelihood value. However, researchers sometimes find replication of log-likelihood across random start values produces different log likelihood values. This is because an iterative estimation process terminated without finding the best log-likelihood value. It is called *local likelihood maximum*. To prevent this local maxima problem, various strategies are recommended, such as increasing sufficient numbers of random starts, using a sufficient number of initial stage iterations, using fewer latent classes, and using a tight convergence criterion (Eggum-Wilkens, 2014; Geiser, 2013).

[57] For exploratory LCA, the log-likelihood values were extracted from a total of 1,000 sets of start values showing the largest log likelihood values after using the initial 10,000 random sets of starting values.

Table 5. 1. Exploratory latent class analysis (LCA) model fit statistics on local immigration enforcement policy participation

	2-Class	**3-Class**	4-Class
Sample size			
1st class (%)	31 (5.73%)	88 (16.3%)	28 (5.18%)
2nd class (%)	510 (94.2%)	34 (6.3%)	254 (46.95%)
3rd class (%)		419 (77.4%)	35 (6.47%)
4th class (%)			224 (41.41%)
Absolute Model Fit			
# of parameters	9	14	19
Likelihood Ratio	40.018	4.136	Non-
Pearson χ	$\chi(6)$ =37.78	$\chi(1)$ =4.309	identified
(*p*-value)	(<.0001)	(.0038)	Non-
Relative Model Fit			identified
			Non-
			identified
AIC	2,164.69	**2,138.81**	2,145.13
BIC	2,203.33	**2,198.92**	2,226.70
aBIC	2,174.76	2,154.47	2,166.39
Entropy	.951	.723	.973
Vuong-Lo-Mendell-Rubin LRT *p*-	<.0001	.0011	
value	<.0001	.0013	
Lo-Mendell-Rubin adjusted LRT	<.0001	<.0001	
p-value			
Parametric bootstrap LRT *p*-value			

Note: Class membership with two to four-class solutions of 541 localities under LCA was based on estimated counts based on the posterior probabilities. Local maxima problem was found in the four-class solutions. The four-class solution also failed to be identified due to the lack of df. AIC refers to Akaike's information criteria, BIC refers to Bayesian information criteria, and aBIC refers to sample-size adjusted BIC. Lower relative model fit (AIC and BIC) reflects better model fit under LCA (Geiser, 2013).

With the three-class solution strategy, 541 localities were classified, with one large class and two relatively small classes. Of the three sub-classes on local immigration enforcement policy participation, Class 2 - operationalized as localities with "active"

noncitizen enforcement policy - has a size of approximately 6.3% (*n*= 34 counties). Localities in Class 2 tend to very actively participate in federal-local immigration enforcement policy programs, by voluntarily participating in 287(g) partnerships (65%) and activating S-Comm very early (100%). Nine out of 10 localities in this class passed restrictive or punitive local immigration ordinances or resolutions through 2013, while almost 40% of localities in this class also passed integrative local immigration legislation. Classes 1 and 3 represent localities with inactive local immigration enforcement policy participation compared to localities in Class 2, but they have a slightly different direction on noncitizen enforcement actions. The 88 localities in Class 1 (16.3%) of the total 541 localities, have inactively participated in noncitizen enforcement policy by having little participation in 287(g) agreements (< 4%) and a low rate of early activation of S-Comm (17%). However, more than 60% of localities in this class passed local punitive or restrictive immigration ordinances through 2013, so they are operationalized as localities that are "administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning" on immigration issues. Like Class 1, localities in Class 3 tend to inactively participate in noncitizen enforcement policy, by having little participation in 287(g) partnerships (5.9%), and by not passing local punitive immigration ordinances. However, one big difference of this class compared to Class 1 is that Class 3 localities appear to have a mixed perspective on immigration; they tend to have early activation of S-Comm (58.5%) for administrative enforcement actions, while some of them (22%) have a welcoming immigrant perspective, evidenced by passage of integrative local immigration ordinances. More than two thirds of localities in the United States (77.4%) follow this Class 3 perspective.

Therefore, I operationalized localities in Class 3 as those with an "inactive but mixed perspective" on immigration issues. With this classification strategy, I analyze how localities under a strong trend of local immigration variation respond to federal immigration enforcement policy implementation, especially S-Comm.

5. 5. Analyzing Two Key Noncitizen Enforcement Change Trajectories Using Longitudinal Latent Growth Curve Modeling

Table 5.2 indicates how many immigration (ICE) detainers have been issued on average to local LEAs, and how many consequent noncitizen deportations have been made during a 13-month period under the current federal-local immigration cooperative enforcement system. As seen in this table, two immigration enforcement numbers have continuously changed over time, with dynamic variations. Detainer issuances increased during the first two time (month) points, but began to steeply decrease after that. In the case of noncitizen deportations, there have been no clear change trends, but a pattern of repeated up-and-down oscillations over time.

Considering local immigration activism and the consequent immigration patchwork trend since the 2000s, Table 5.2 also includes how three classes of localities, based on the statistical classification from LCA, respond to administrative immigration enforcement actions. Localities with active noncitizen enforcement policy participation, in spite of their small numbers, have actually led the federal enforcement-only policy direction by having a very high volume of detainer issuances and high deportation numbers during the 13-month period, compared to the other two classes. Considering the

raw numbers in this table, such active localities, on average, had enforcement outcomes 4 to 10 times higher than those of inactive localities. Interestingly, Class 1 counties (operationalized as *administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning*) had lower enforcement outcomes, including both detainer issuances and deportations, than Class 3 counterparts, counties with *inactive-but-mixed perspectives* on immigration. Therefore, hypothesis 2 and hypotheses 4-1 through 4-3 are partially verified; counties with active immigration enforcement policy participation have tended to have higher detainer issuances and noncitizen deportation outcomes than other counties. These hypotheses are empirically tested using LGMs in Table 5.3.

Figure 5.4 graphically indicates how 541 localities have actually carried out immigration enforcement policy under the S-Comm framework. In the two graphs in this figure using 100 randomly selected counties, each thin gray line represents the growth (change) trajectory of a single locality for detainer issuances and noncitizen deportations during the 13-month period, and the thick black line represents the mean change (trajectory) of all 541 localities over time. Considering the dynamic forms of changes seen in the thin lines, both graphs indicate that each locality has a distinct form of detainer issuance and deportation trends over time. In other words, they have various enforcement numbers on detainer issuances and deportations at the first month, December 2011 - some localities having a very high level of enforcement numbers, while others have a very low level - and in terms of rate of change of such enforcement actions, there is huge variability over time. Therefore, few clear trends - upward or downward - are found for both enforcement actions during 13 months. In terms of mean trajectories, a

growth trajectory for detainer issuances appears to have a curvilinear form, while that for noncitizen deportations has no clear change pattern; it rather has a zigzag form, oscillating up and down over time.

Table.5.2. Descriptive statistics on local immigration enforcement policy measured with 5 months (*n*= 541, unit of analysis = county, standard deviation in parentheses on averaged monthly detainer issuances and deportation numbers)

	December 2011	April 2012	August 2012	December 2012	January 2013
Detainer issuance					
Total # of detainer issuances (# of detainers on ERO CAP)	18,624 (15,237)	19,948 (16,556)	19,139 (15,810)	14,805 (12,081)	14,921 (12,036)
Averaged total monthly detainer issuances	28.16 (71.79)	30.60 (73.23)	29.22 (70.20)	22.33 (54.33)	22.25 (57.81)
Active localities (34 localities)	95.15 (218.66)	107.62 (210.21)	102.21 (202.24)	79.91 (151.43)	79.71 (164.90)
Administratively-Inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning localities (88 localities)	14.32 (18.56)	13.92 (17.43)	13.11 (18.59)	10.89 (13.96)	9.58 (13.20)
Inactive-but-mixed localities (419 localities)	25.64 (48.99)	27.86 (53.18)	26.69 (50.71)	20.06 (40.75)	20.25 (42.76)
Deportations (removals)					
Total # of deportations (removals) from 3,184 localities under S-Comm	6,828	6,507	7,549	5,988	6,869
Monthly total deportations (removals) from 541 localities under S-Comm	15.14 (50.67)	12.96 (46.17)	14.03 (50.11)	11.13 (35.18)	12.70 (41.13)
Active localities (34 localities)	85.12 (156.79)	80.12 (151.21)	89.68 (166.74)	67.87 (111.08)	74.71 (125.63)
Administratively-Inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning localities (88 localities)	4.45 (6.26)	4.20 (5.46)	4.62 (6.19)	3.72 (4.83)	4.60 (5.10)
Inactive-but-mixed	9.42	8.61	9.79	8.03	9.37

localities (419 localities)	(21.77)	(19.44)	(22.87)	(18.15)	(24.43)

Note: Localities (counties) for analysis were classified into three subclasses based on the result of exploratory latent class analysis. *Active* localities are those with relatively active (strong) noncitizen enforcement policy participation and local restrictive/welcoming immigration-related ordinances, while *administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning* localities are those with relatively weak (inactive) administrative noncitizen enforcement policy involvement but that have passed strong local restrictive immigration ordinances/resolutions in their jurisdictions. *Inactive-but-mixed* localities are those that have little involvement in 287(g) partnerships but were relatively early adopters of S-Comm, and interestingly, 1 in 4 localities of them expressed an immigrant integrative perspective by passing local welcoming ordinances/resolutions in their jurisdictions. For detainer issuances, I used the total number of detainer issuances on the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) under ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) as a proxy volume for those numbers issued under the Secure Communities program. There are no missing data on detainer issuances, while 90, 39, 3, 3, 0 missing data were made on removal numbers during the five time points (Dec. 2011 - Jan. 2013). Means and standard deviation estimates are estimates using full information maximum likelihood methods to adjust for missing data.



Figure 5.4. Longitudinal growth (change) plots for 100 randomly selected localities on immigration enforcement policy actions, immigration detainer issuances (top) and noncitizen deportations (bottom) during a 13-month period (n=541).

Note: The x-axis indicates time (month) points during 13 months from December 2011 to January 2013. These 13 months were rescaled from 0 (Dec. 2011) to 1 (Jan. 2013). The y-axis refers to log-transformed total number of detainers issued per month (top) and total number of noncitizen deportations per month (bottom).

With such graphical change of two noncitizen enforcement actions during the 13-month-period, LGM was used for analyzing how the two enforcement actions have changed over time. Prior to fitting a model for the simultaneous changes of two immigration enforcement mechanisms under S-Comm, I first analyzed what functional form for growth (change) trajectories are appropriate for each of the two enforcement actions separately. The best functional forms of models for each enforcement action were finally selected through comparing χ^2 difference test and model fit indexes including RMSEA, SRMR, and CFI/TLI.[58] For detainer issuances and noncitizen deportations, I compared model fits of linear and quadratic forms with the conditions of freely estimating or constrained residual variances respectively. χ^2 difference tests indicate that a quadratic form of growth (change) trajectory with constrained residual variances for detainer issuance and a linear form of growth (change) trajectory with freely estimating residual variances for noncitizen deportations fit the data well[59]. The graphical results in

[58] Under LGM logic based on structural equation modeling (SEM) framework, various functional forms of LGMs are hierarchically related (nested), and therefore they can be statistically compared by the chi-square (χ^2) difference test. This test compares the model-implied means and covariances and the model-observed means and covariances. Significant values for this test indicate that the more parsimonious model (having fewer df) represents the data well to some degree and leads to selection of the final model (Cole & Ciesla, 2012; Eggum-Wilkins, 2014).

[59] Reflecting the nonlinear mean trend (like a "zigzag" form) for noncitizen deportation under the S-Comm program, I fitted various functional forms of models - linear, quadratic, and cubic LGMs fixing the time scores and freely estimating time scores - but few forms of change clearly would not adequately explain such deportation change trajectories, including the sign of poor fits or misfits of the models (i.e., estimation of negative factor variances). Of these functional forms, a quadratic model with freely estimating residual variances (but time scores should be freely estimated) had the best model fit, but a quadratic variance should be fixed at zero to maintain this model fit. Considering the local heterogeneity in Figure 5.4, this model might not be a good choice, even though the quadratic model shows a better fit. Therefore, I finally selected a linear model with freely estimating residual variances as the second best model considering the model fits indexes and estimations. The concrete χ^2 difference tests among various shapes of noncitizen enforcement trajectories (e.g., linear, quadratic, and cubic) are included in the appendix.

Figure 5.4 support a nonlinear form of change trajectory for detainer issuances, while a linear form of change trajectory for noncitizen deportations is a rather unexpected result.

Table 5.3. Parameter Estimates for Noncitizen Enforcement Policy under the Secure Communities Program using Latent Growth Curve Modeling (including parallel process growth curve models and a longitudinal mediation analysis)

	(Model 1) Immigration detainer issuance trajectory (unconditional)	**(Model 2)** Immigration detainer issuance trajectory with a covariate (conditional)	**(Model 3)** Noncitizen deportation trajectory (unconditional)	**(Model 4)** Noncitizen deportation trajectory with a covariate (conditional)	**(Model 5)** Interrelation between detainer issuance & deportation trajectories	**(Model 6)** Interrelation between detainer issuance & deportation trajectories: adding regression paths	**(Model 7)** Longitudinal mediation analysis: interrelationship among three enforcement variables
The first month **(detainer)**							
Mean/intercept	2.455***	2.468***			2.453***	2.453***	2.469***
Variance	1.414***				1.441***	1.407***	
Residual variance		1.393***					1.369***
"Active" localities		.427*					.428
"inactive/punitive leaning" localities		-.247*					-.249*
The first month **(deportation)**							
Mean/intercept			1.600***	1.533***	1.590***	.125	1.466***
Variance			1.292***		1.290***	.551***	
Residual variance				1.079***			.846***
"Active" localities				1.790***			1.438***
"inactive/punitive leaning" localities				-.284**			-.271*
Growth rate (**Linear - detainer**)							
Mean/intercept	.411***	.482***			.393***	.397***	.480***
Variance	.898***				1.418***	.432*	

Residual variance		.871**					
"Active" localities		-.651*					-.655*
"inactive/punitive leaning" localities		-.182					-.173
Growth rate (**Linear - deportation**)							
Mean/intercept			.020	.028	.033	.113	.028
Variance			.114***		.084**	.013	
Residual variance				.111***			.111**
"Active" localities				-.201*			-.200**
"inactive/punitive leaning" localities				.034			.033
Growth rate (**Quadratic-detainer**)							
Mean	-.684***	-.746***			-.664***	-.668***	-.744***
Variance	.884***				1.327***	.316**	
Residual variance		.849**					.151***
"Active" localities		.767**					.771**
"inactive/punitive leaning" localities		.081					.074
Regression path							
I2 ← I1						.796***	.141***
I2←L1						.183	
I2←Q1						.839**	.375***
S2 ← I1						-.097**	
S2 ← L1						.400**	
χ^2(df)	10.79 (10)	14.98 (14)	40.18 (10)***	43.77 (16)**	58.78 (32)**	60.85 (37)**	126.56 (50)**
	p = .374	*p* = .379	*p* <.001	*p* <.001	*p* =.003	*p* =.008	*p* <.001
CFI	1.000	1.000	.990	.991	.996	.997	.989
TLI	1.000	1.000	.999	.989	.995	.996	.986
RMSEA	.012	.011	.075	.057	.039	.035	.053

	(90% CI: .00, .05)	(90% CI: .00, .04)	(90% CI: .05, .10)	(90% CI: .04, .08)	(90% CI: .02, .06)	(90% CI: .02, .05)	(90% CI: .04, .07)
SRMR	.011	.009	.021	.017	.016	.016	.026

Note: *N*= 541. Standard errors are not included in this table due to space limitations; these can be provided on request. As a multi-categorical scale, extent of local immigration participation consists of three categories, and localities with *inactive-but-mixed* enforcement policy participation were set as the reference/omitted category for group differences. For detainer issuances, the quadratic model with constrained residual variances, and for noncitizen deportations, the linear model with freely estimating residual variances were finally selected for analysis. I followed a stepwise model specification process as in previous studies (Eggum-Wilkens, 2014; Flora, Khoo, & Chassin, 2007), from estimating the unconditional model (Models 1 and 3) for two immigration enforcement actions, estimating the conditional (adding the predictor) model (Models 2 and 4), fitting the parallel-processes growth curve model and the extension of this model (Models 5 and 6), to a longitudinal mediation model among the key variables. Means and (co)variances of the latent intercept and slope were calculated for the unconditional LGMs, while intercepts and residual (co)variances of the latent intercept and slope were calculated for the conditional LGMs because the intercept and slope factors are endogenous in this model. Full information maximum likelihood method was used as an estimation option to adjust for missing data. Regarding global model fit indexes, CFI = comparative fit index, TLI = Tucker-Lewis index, RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation, and SRMR = standardized root mean square residual. The CFI and TLI values greater than .95 represent good fits, while RMSEA and SRMR close to zero (or at least less than .060) generally suggest a good fit (Cole & Ciesla, 2012). I1, L1, and Q1 refer to intercept, linear slope, and quadratic slope for detainer issuances, while I2 and S2 refer to intercept and linear slope for noncitizen deportation. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 5.3 indicates parameter estimates for a nonlinear (quadratic) model for detainer issuances and a linear model for noncitizen deportation, in Models 1 and 3 as unconditional LGMs. Models 2 and 4 fit conditional models adding the extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation as a predictor to unconditional Models 1 and 3. Moreover, based on univariate or separated LGMs for the two enforcement actions in Models 1 through 4, this table also fits models for concurrent (statistically "parallel-process" or "multivariate") growth (change) trajectories of these two immigration enforcement mechanisms in Models 5 and 6. Model 7 is a longitudinal mediation analysis combing three key variables - the two noncitizen enforcement actions and local immigration enforcement policy participation - for analyzing interrelations among them.

Models 1 and 3 fit univariate unconditional (no predictor) LGMs for detainer issuances and noncitizen deportations. For detainer issuances, the mean of the latent linear slope factor was positive and significantly different from zero, indicating that, on average, the rate of instantaneous change of localities' detainer issuances at the first month (Dec. 2011) was increasing. However, the mean of the latent quadratic slope factor was negative and significantly different from zero, indicating the amount of change in the slope of localities' detainer issuances for a one-unit change in time (month) was decreasing. On average, the slope decreased .684 (.982 in raw numbers) every month, considering the fact that I used a log(x+1) data transformation technique. With regard to the random effects, there was significant local variation on detainer issuances in the latent factors for the intercept, linear slope, and quadratic slope. There were local differences in values of detainer issuances at the first month. Moreover, there was local variability in

the rate of instantaneous change in detainer issuances at the first month, and there was also similar local variability in the amount of change in detainer issuances in the slope that occurred per one-unit change in time (month). For noncitizen deportations, negative and significant covariance between the latent intercept factor and the slope factor was found, $r = -.17$, $p < .001$, although it was not reported in this table. This indicates that localities that had higher noncitizen deportation numbers at the first/baseline month had a lower rate of growth (change) in deportation numbers over time, or vice versa. Regarding the fixed effects (mean changes), the mean of the slope was positive but not significant. This means that on average, localities' deportation numbers did not significantly change over time. Thus, deportation intercept factor, not the slope factor, would serve as an outcome for other follow-up models, especially the longitudinal mediation analysis in Model 7 as the final model. Concerning the random effects (individual variability), the intercept variance was significantly different from zero, indicating that there were local differences in deportation numbers at the first month. The linear slope variance was significantly different from zero, suggesting that there were local differences in rate of change in deportation number over time. This model also had significant residual variances at each of five time points representing time-specific variation and measurement error variation.

Next, Models 2 and 4 fit univariate LGMs separately for detainer issuances and noncitizen deportations conditioned on extents of local immigration enforcement policy participation.[60] For detainer issuances LGM, the extent of local immigration enforcement

[60] As the predictor, extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation has a multi-categorical scale, consisting of three categories, created as the result of exploratory LCA. Localities with

policy participation was a significant predictor of the volume of detainer issuances at the first month, such that localities with active immigration enforcement policy participation had 53.3%[61] higher detainer issuances at the first month than localities with inactive-but-mixed enforcement policy participation as the reference locality. However, localities with administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning enforcement policy participation had 21.9% lower detainer issuances at the first month than the reference localities. Considering the rate of change (slope factors) in detainer issuances over time, localities with active immigration enforcement policy participation had a significant and steep rate of instantaneous decrease (52.2%) in detainer issuances at the first month, but this decrease strongly rebounds over time, indicating a 115.3% increase in the slope of detainer issuances over time in comparison to the localities with inactive-but-mixed enforcement policy. The extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation was not significantly different between the two types of localities labeled inactive. These results indicate that detainer issuance trajectories partially verified hypothesis 3; using LGM, I found that different classes of counties have different volumes of detainer issuances over time. In terms of initial status, Class 2 counties having active immigration enforcement policy participation have much higher detainer issuances than other counties, but in terms of rate of change, detainer issuance trajectories followed a

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administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning enforcement policy participation were coded 1, while localities with *active* immigration enforcement policy participation were coded 2. Localities with *inactive-but-mixed* enforcement policy participation were coded 3. For group difference, localities with *inactive-but-mixed* enforcement policy participation were set as the reference/omitted group (category).

[61] I used the log-transformed values for two enforcement actions for this study so as to mitigate non-normality of the data. These log-transformed values can be expressed by exponential values for interpretation (percentage change by one-unit change). The log-transformed value .427 for detainer issuance for localities with active immigration enforcement policy was transformed 0.5326 ($=e^{.427}$ -1) for percentage interpretation.

curvilinear form; detainer issuances of counties with active immigration enforcement policy participation have decreased instantaneously compared to other classes, but over time the rate of detainer issuances rebounded and increased more steeply than other localities. On the other hand, there have been fewer significant differences in the volumes of detainer issuances between counties in Classes 1 and 3 having inactive immigration enforcement participation.

In Model 4, the intercept and slope factor was regressed on the extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation for noncitizen deportations under the S-Comm program. The extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation was also a significant predictor of noncitizen deportation at the first month, such that localities with active immigration enforcement policy participation had 498.9% higher noncitizen deportation numbers then than the reference localities. On the other hand, localities with administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning enforcement policy had 24.7% lower noncitizen deportation numbers at the first month than the reference localities. Interestingly, the active localities significantly decreased their deportation rate over time by 18.2% more than localities with inactive-but-mixed enforcement policy. There was no significant rate of noncitizen deportation change between localities with inactive immigration enforcement policies. Through this result, I found that hypothesis 4-1 was verified; there have been huge local variations on noncitizen deportation outcomes under S-Comm during a 13-month period. Counties with active immigration enforcement policy participation tended to have strikingly higher deportation numbers than other counties at the initial status. However, rate of deportation change in Class 1 counties has

been significantly lower than in counties of other classes. There are also fewer differences between counties (Classes 1 and 3) with inactive immigration enforcement policy participation, in terms of deportation change rate. Therefore, hypotheses 4-2 and 4-3 are partially verified.

Through Models 1 through 4 fitting unconditional and conditional two univariate LGMs, I found that the 541 localities under the implementation of S-Comm had dynamic initial status and considerable local heterogeneity in immigration enforcement actions during the 13-month period. Moreover, considerable locality differences on the level of immigration enforcement policy participation were also found, especially between localities with active enforcement policy participation and those without. Extending these results, Models 5 and 6 fit LGMs for two immigration enforcement actions simultaneously as the parallel-process models. In Model 5, I examined an interrelationship between two enforcement changes (growth) through covariance of two growth factors, and in Model 6, this interrelationship was also analyzed through creating direct regression paths between two enforcement growth factors, paying special attention to how the volumes of immigration detainer issuances at the local communities influence noncitizen deportation outcomes under S-Comm. In Model 5, there were few changes in the directions and effect sizes of the fixed and random effects for two immigration enforcement actions under S-Comm, compared to the previous models. Regarding covariance between two enforcement actions, the intercepts of noncitizen deportations and detainer issuances under S-Comm had a positive and significant relation, r =.93, p <.001. However, the slope of noncitizen deportations and the intercept of detainer

issuances had a negative and significant covariance, r = -.08, p=.02, indicating that localities with higher detainer issuances at the first month tended to have less of an increase (lower slope) in noncitizen deportation numbers under S-Comm over time. The slope of noncitizen deportations and the linear slope of detainer issuances under S-Comm had a positive and significant covariance, r = .14, p=.02, indicating that localities with steeper increases of detainer issuances tended to have steeper increases in noncitizen deportation numbers.

In Model 6 adding regression paths to investigate direct effects between the two enforcement growth factors, this interrelationship was confirmed in that the relations between the initial status of the two enforcement actions or between their rate of change (growth) were positively related, but the interrelation between the initial status and rate of change for the two enforcement actions appeared to be negatively associated over time. According to regression paths between two growth factors, a 10% increase in detainer issuances at the first month is associated with 7.6% ($.0758 \approx e^{=.796*\log(1.1)}$) increase of noncitizen deportations at the first month. However, due to a nonlinear form of detainer issuance growth trajectory, the direction between the two enforcement actions changed over time and in terms of rate of changes. For example, a 10% increase of detainer issuances at the first month reduces the rate of change (growth) of noncitizen deportation numbers over time by 0.92% ($.0092 \approx e^{= -.097*\log(1.1)}$). Interestingly, a 10% increase of instantaneous change of detainer issuances at the first month is associated with a 3.8% increase of noncitizen deportation numbers over time under S-Comm. Therefore, hypothesis 4-4 is partially verified; two enforcement actions under S-Comm have been

positively interrelated with each other during 13 months in terms of status factor, but the relationship between status factor and growth factor was negative.

The final model (7) is a longitudinal mediation analysis regarding interrelationships among all three key variables on immigration enforcement policy. The extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation was used as the predictor, and a noncitizen deportation trajectory was used for the dependent variable. Detainer issuance trajectory was used for the intervening or mediator for this model. In this model, both status (initial status) and growth (change) factors of detainer issuances mediate the relationship between extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation and only the status factor, not growth factor, of noncitizen deportation numbers under the S-Comm program, because growth (rate of change) factor of noncitizen deportations was not significant in the univariate LGM. I also did not consider the linear slope of detainer issuances as the mediator in this longitudinal mediation analysis because it was not significant in Model 6. To examine whether detainer issuances mediate the relationship between locality immigration enforcement policy participation and noncitizen deportation numbers under S-Comm, the intercept deportation factor at the first month was regressed on the intercept detainer issuance factor at the first month, and was also regressed on the quadratic change in detainer issuance over time. Additionally, all intercept and slope factors (including the linear and quadratic) for the two enforcement actions were each regressed on the two different classes on local immigration enforcement policy participation.

The model estimation results in Figure 5.5 indicate that as with the univariate LGMs, extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation was a significant predictor of detainer issuance trajectory over time. For localities with active immigration enforcement policy participation, their instantaneous change rate of detainer issuances is declining at the first month, but over time, their amount of detainer issuances rate tends to increase more than those of localities with inactive immigration enforcement policy participation. Localities with administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning enforcement policy participation were 28.3% less likely to issue immigration detainers than localities with inactive-but-mixed enforcement policy participation as the reference group at the first month, but slope factors representing rate of change in detainer issuances were not significant. Detainer issuances intercept and quadratic slope factors were significant predictors of noncitizen deportations under the S-Comm framework, suggesting that higher levels of detainer issuances at the first month and a steeper increase of detainer issuances over time led to higher noncitizen deportation numbers at the first month (b=.141, *standard error* =.035, p <.001 for detainer intercept factor, b=.375, *se* = .142, p <.001 for detainer quadratic slope factor). Extent of local immigration enforcement participation as the predictor remained a significant factor of noncitizen deportations at the first month, controlling for the detainer issuance trajectory (including the intercept and slope factors). The above-mentioned results preliminarily indicate evidence that detainer issuance trajectories mediate the relationship between distinct local immigration enforcement policy participation and noncitizen deportation trajectories. To test whether this preliminary result was really reliable, a Sobel test and

bootstrapped mediation effects were analyzed using biased-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals[62]. I found that the intercept detainer issuance factor significantly mediated the relationship between localities with inactive-but-punitive-leaning immigration enforcement policy and deportation intercept factor (*ab* = -.031, *95% CI* = -.089, -.003). Moreover, quadratic slope detainer issuance factor significantly mediated the relationship between localities with active immigration enforcement policy participation and deportation intercept factor (*ab* = .255, *95% CI* = .019, .781).[63] Therefore, hypothesis 4-5 is verified.

[62] The use of conventional significance tests produce biased and problematic indirect effects because they are the product of two or more regression coefficients, which brings about a nonnormal distribution (Flora, Khoo, & Chassin, 2007; Geiser, 2013). Bootstrapping is an alternative method using asymmetric confidence intervals for significance testing of indirect effects, and under *Mplus* program for latent variable analysis the biased-corrected bootstrapping method estimates alternative confidence intervals based on 10,000 bootstrap samples.

[63] The indirect effect for the mediation analysis was expressed as *ab* in Figure 5.1, referring to the product of the relationship between the predictor and the mediator (*a*) and the relationship between the mediator and the outcome (*b*).



Figure 5.5. The structural part of parallel process latent growth curve model for the mediating effect of detainer issuances on noncitizen deportation numbers under the Secure Communities program

Note: This figure shows only the structural part of the model in Figure 5.3 to prevent model complications. In this figure, one-sided arrows refer to the regression path between variables. Bold arrows represent significant regression paths, while dashed arrows represent non-significant paths. The strongest bold lines represent mediating effects (paths) between the predictor and the dependent variable. Based on structural equation modeling (SEM) framework, the rectangles indicate manifest or observed variables, while the circles indicate latent or unobserved variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard error in parentheses.

5.6. Discussion

This chapter empirically analyzes how the current immigration enforcement-only policy drive under the S-Comm framework and immigration patchwork trend has been carried out, especially focusing on the interrelationship between detainer issuances and noncitizen deportations. Using exploratory LCA, three classes of localities having distinct

policy perspectives on immigration issues were extracted based on local immigration policy contexts, and they have different immigration enforcement trajectories over a 13-month period under the implementation of the S-Comm program. Longitudinal LGMs - including parallel process LGMs and a longitudinal mediation analysis - confirmed there were considerable dynamic noncitizen enforcement trajectories and local heterogeneity over time in terms of the status, growth (change) factors, and their covariances. Regarding detainer issuances, a nonlinear (curvilinear) change trend was found over time, while for deportation numbers, there was no clear trend, and it appeared to be oscillating up and down over time. Two noncitizen enforcement trajectories were positively related over time, but their status factor (initial status) and growth factor (rate of change over time) tend to be negatively associated with each other, so counties that have higher detainer issuance at the first month tend to have less of an increase in noncitizen deportation numbers over time, or vice versa. Finally, detainer issuance trajectories mediated the relationship between distinct local level of immigration enforcement policy participation and noncitizen deportation numbers (rates) under the S-Comm framework, suggesting that distinct local policy contexts on immigration enforcement actions predict the volume of detainer issuances at the initial month and over time, which in turn predicts noncitizen deportation trajectories at the initial status.

This study has implications for the current enforcement-only immigration policy direction and related program implementation. The first implication is related to the recognition of some localities leading the current immigration enforcement policy direction. As statistically found from the result of LCA in this chapter, counties in Class 2

- in spite of making up a small number of the more than 3,000 localities - have led the current strong punitive and restrictive immigration policy locally and nationally. Most localities in this class are metropolitan areas and also have on average a considerable (more than 400,000) Hispanic population in their jurisdictions. As this chapter confirms, localities in this class have the highest detainer issuances and monthly deportation numbers, 80 - 110 monthly detainer issuances and a consequent 70 - 90 monthly noncitizen deportation outcomes, which is 4 to more than 10 times higher than deportation outcomes for counties with inactive immigration policy participation. These 34 active localities - including Maricopa County, Arizona; Harris County, Texas; and Los Angeles County, California - make up 6.3% of the total 541 localities for this study, and just 1.1% of total of the 3,181 localities that have activated S-Comm across the country. In spite of their marginal share of the total number of localities, their political power and voices toward a more punitive and enforcement-oriented policy drive has been enormous. As in the experience of passage of Arizona's SB1070 and consequent strong anti-immigration policy diffusion across the country since the mid 2000s, these localities have played a role as moral or punitive immigration policy entrepreneurs. More than 90% of localities inactively participate in immigration enforcement-only policy. In this study, I found 419 localities (77.4%) have an inactive-but-mixed enforcement policy stance, indicating that more than three fourths of localities in the United States have mixed or conflicting perspectives on immigration-related issues.

The second implication is the necessity of reconsidering the current enforcement-only immigration policy direction. This study explicitly analyzes how current

immigration enforcement actions have been carried out under the S-Comm framework through two key enforcement tools, but also implicitly touches on the working mechanism of the current "enforcement machine," and how such a machine has been stepped up over time. Strong punitive and restrictive perspectives on immigration from Washington politicians since the 1990s led federal immigration administrators to create and implement enforcement-only systems. With successful construction of rhetoric about an immigration-crime nexus and the convergence of the federal immigration system and criminal justice system through back-to-back federal anti-immigration legislation, DHS/ICE's main goal was to have higher "numbers" of noncitizen captures, detentions, and deportations in the name of public safety and national security. Under the current enforcement machine, monthly and yearly enforcement quotas have been set by Washington, and ICE must create and provide more enforcement numbers to get public resources from Congress. Such an enforcement machine has skillfully been connected with private-sector interests, especially the privatization of immigration detention as an industry, through enormous lobbying powers, and has faithfully reflected the private sector's perspective on increasing immigration enforcement to maximize their profits (Ackerman & Furman, 2013; Krisberg, Marchionna, & Harteny, 2014). In spite of significant public concerns and criticisms of the current enforcement machines and their working mechanism immersed in maximizing enforcement numbers, noncitizen enforcement actions and related administrative programs have become increasingly automated and sophisticated with a view to expanding enforcement numbers, in spite of

multiple policy malfunctions and related signals as I pointed out in Chapter 4 on the biased enforcement outcomes from the implementation of S-Comm.

In spite of such implications, this chapter has limitations on the data analysis. As I mentioned, ICE has been strongly resistant to releasing noncitizen enforcement data, especially on deportations and detainer issuances, under the S-Comm program. Due to such strong resistance, monthly detainer issuance data for this study is based on that of the Criminal Alien Program under ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations as proxy data. The inability to access concrete and reliable enforcement data on S-Comm and the resultant use of proxy data might produce bias in the process of empirical data analyses.

Based on the results of Chapter 4 (descriptive and graphical analysis of monthly noncitizen deportation outcomes under the implementation S-Comm during the last 61 months) and Chapter 5 (analysis of enforcement mechanisms under the current enforcement machine and related system, focusing on two key enforcement actions under S-Comm and distinct local immigration enforcement policy participation), the next chapter creates a more "comprehensive map" to account for the current complicated U.S. immigration enforcement policy process, by adding contextual factors representing local political, economic, geographic, and demographic perspectives. Moreover, based on the main goal of S-Comm - *making communities safer* by removing "dangerous" noncitizens - the next chapter analyzes whether the implementation of S-Comm really increased community safety in localities as this program boastfully promised.

CHAPTER 6[64]

FACTORS SHAPING LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND EVALUATION OF PROGRAM OUTCOMES UNDER THE SECURE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM

6.1. Introduction

This chapter offers a comprehensive perspective of current immigration enforcement policy through an examination of contextual factors shaping local immigration policy choices and an evaluation of how effective the implementation of S-Comm during the last 5 years has been at making local communities safer as DHS/ICE have argued. The following questions are discussed in this chapter: What factors make local communities follow a more restrictive and punitive approach to immigration policy? What factors make localities actively participate in immigration enforcement policy under the current intergovernmental cooperation framework? Under the current enforcement machine system immersed in maximizing detention and deportation numbers, how well has the implementation of S-Comm, as the key immigration enforcement program under the Obama administration, accomplished the intended program goal? That is, has S-Comm secured our local communities?

[64] Some parts of this chapter were presented as a paper at the *Blurring the Border* conference at the University of California at Merced, April 17-18, 2015, and published in *Politics of Color* with the title *Has "Secure Communities" Really Secured Our Communities?* I appreciate Professor Tanya Golash-Boza, who hosted a research conference for discussing U.S. deportation policy with an interdisciplinary perspective. Also I appreciate the audiences' valuable comments from this conference. Finally, I appreciate Professors N. Joseph Cayer and Paul G. Lewis for detailed reviews and comments on the previous draft.

To answer these research questions, two hypotheses were set in Chapter 3: the first hypothesis (relationship between contextual factors - demographic, political, economic, and geographical contexts - and local immigration enforcement policy participation) and the fifth hypothesis (association between the implementation of S-Comm and local public or community safety). As an extension of Chapter 5 focusing on analysis of the intergovernmental immigration enforcement mechanism under the S-Comm framework, specifically the association between three factors, this chapter creates a more comprehensive framework to discuss the abovementioned research questions. Figure 6.1 schematically indicates a more expanded conceptual framework compared to the previous chapter.



Figure 6.1. Conceptual framework for understanding contextual factors shaping local immigration enforcement policy participation and evaluating implementation results from the Secure Communities program

Note: The dotted circle in this figure refers to the administrative immigration enforcement working mechanism under S-Comm based on intergovernmental enforcement cooperative framework. Empirical analyses in Chapter 5 were predominantly presented in this circle.

6.2. Data and Methodology

For analysis, this chapter used multiple data sources on current U.S. immigration enforcement policy implementation and local political, socioeconomic, and geographical contexts. Three variables that were already used for analysis in Chapter 5 - extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation based on three classifications, as well as monthly immigration detainer issuances and monthly noncitizen deportations per locality

under the S-Comm framework - are also used in this chapter, so I will not repeat them here. Most data collected regarding local communities cover multiple years (from 2010 to 2012 or 2013), specifically reflecting the periods in which S-Comm has been initiated and implemented up to recently. With the same samples used for analysis in Chapter 5, 541 counties having meaningful monthly immigration deportation outcomes under the S-Comm framework (> at least 1 noncitizen removal per month) are used with 5 time (month) points covering a 13-month period (Dec. 2011 - Jan. 2013).

6.2.1. Dependent Variable: Local Community Safety[65]

In Figure 6.1, the outcome variable is local community safety as the implementation result of S-Comm. DHS/ICE's main logic for doing stepped-up internal enforcement actions based on intergovernmental cooperation is the "immigrant-crime nexus" assumption; therefore, according to the argument from federal immigration agencies, the implementation of S-Comm at the local level should improve community safety through proactively catching and removing dangerous noncitizens. Many previous studies have tended to use local crime rates and their change as indicators for public or community safety (Cox & Miles, 2013; Koper, Guterbock, Woods, Taylor, & Carter, 2013; Treyger, Chalfin, & Loeffler, 2014). Various types of crime numbers or rates used for measuring community safety from the previous studies include the number of offenses reported, violent and property crime rates, crime victims as a percent of

[65] Community safety can be defined and considered by various operationalizations, but generally, scholars consider community safety as "the freedom from crime and violence as well as the fear of crime and violence" (Whitzman & Zhang, 2006). Broadly, the community safety issue tends to be connected with social wellbeing and economic and environmental sustainability issues. However, most studies consider community safety in terms of "crime, security, and injury prevention" (Clare & Plecas, 2012).

population, and public perspective on the feeling of community safety via survey or interview. Following those previous studies, I used local (county) *Crime Rate Changes Per 100,000 Population* during a recent 4 years (2010 - 2013)[66], which cover a 13-month period under S-Comm that this chapter uses.

Data for county-level crime numbers and rates were basically collected from web site searches of 45 states' law enforcement agencies or criminal justice information centers.[67] Web sites of some states did not provide statistics of county-level crimes, so I contacted the related states' LEAs and requested county-level crime data via an official state data request format per state.[68] Twenty counties did not respond to the data request, so their crime data have been omitted, thus crime data covering 4 years were collected

[66] I used crime rate changes at the county level during a recent 4 years, not averaged crime rates at the county level during the same period, because crime rate changes reflect more clearly the changing rates and directions of crime level. Previous studies (Cox & Miles, 2013; Miles & Cox, 2014; Treyger, Chalfin, & Loeffler, 2014) on the program effectiveness and relevancy of S-Comm selected crime rate changes at a longitudinal perspective.

[67] The 541 counties for this study do not include localities within six states and U.S. territories that did not have meaningful noncitizen deportation outcomes during the last 5 years (2008 - 2013), including counties in Alaska, Maine, Montana, North Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Puerto Rico. Most previous studies tend to use the FBI's crime statistics for county-level criminal actions (Chand & Schreckhise, 2014; Cox & Miles, 2013), but I did not use these statistics because FBI crime data at the county level do not include total crimes; according to FBI crime statistics at the county level (http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-10/table-10-pieces/table_10_offenses_known_to_law_enforcement_by_alabama_by_metropolitan_and_nonmetropolitan_counties_2013.xls), it clearly says that "the data shown in this table do not reflect county totals, but are the number of offenses reported by the sheriff's office or county police department." Therefore, FBI crime statistics are likely to underreport the numbers of crimes at the county level. On the other hand, each state's law enforcement agency releases county-level crime data, which includes sheriff's offices and city-level crime data within that county. That is why I used each state's own data on crimes. The list of state LEAs and their Web links I accessed for data on crime statistics at the county level is in the appendix.

[68] The Web sites of five states - Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana (some counties), Massachusetts, and Mississippi - did not provide county-level crime statistics per year. So I contacted these states' LEAs to get the data. However, only Colorado provided reliable data, so crime data from the other states were dealt with as missing data.

from a total of 521 counties. Based on the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) format, crime data were collected in terms of total, violent, and property crimes.[69]

6.2.2. Explanatory Variables: Local Contextual Factors

Multiple demographic, political, economic, and geographical factors at the county level were collected from public data sources. Based on previous studies, *Percentage of Hispanic Population* during a recent 5 years (2009 - 2013), and *Percentage Change of Hispanic Population* during a recent 5 years (2008 - 2012) were used to reflect the demographic situations at the county level. As a proxy variable for Hispanic population, *Percentage of Foreign-Born Population* (2009-2013) and *Percentage Change of Foreign-Born Population* (2008 - 2012) during a recent 5 years were also collected. All of these data were obtained from the American Community Survey (ACS) from the U.S. Census Bureau.

As political factors, presidential election data at the county level were used. Many previous studies used these data as one of the key political variables on immigration perspectives at the local level (Chand & Schreckhise, 2014; Lewis, Varsanyi, Provine & Decker, 2013b; Wong, 2014a). *Republican-leaning Counties* from two previous presidential voting results (Obama vs. McCain in the 2008 election and Obama vs. Romney in the 2012 election) were collected and calculated from average Republican voting percentage (the percentage of voters who voted for Republican candidates).

[69] In compliance with the FBI's UCR format, violent crimes consist of four subcategories (homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault), and property crimes consist of three subcategories (burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft). Total crimes refer to the combination of violent and property crimes, and consist of seven individual crime categories. Crime rates were calculated by dividing the number of reported crimes by the total population, and then this result is finally multiplied by 100,000 as general population size.

Election data were obtained from Wolf's data archive (2013) regarding election data from states, counties, and districts since 2000. Moreover, with special attention to the connection between increasing immigration enforcement hysteria since the 2000s and the role of the business sector, specifically private prison businesses, to expand punitive and enforcement-based local and federal immigration policy, I add *Private Prison Company* as another political or contextual factor shaping local participation in immigration enforcement policy.[70] As repeatedly pointed out from many previous studies - specifically from human- and migrant-rights groups and the social justice field - private prison businesses have considerably influenced the direction of local immigration politics and policy through aggressive lobbying powers and secret public-private partnerships, such as the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC),[71] and by contracting out immigrant detention services[72] for deportation proceedings in local jurisdictions

[70] There have been multiple private prison companies involving immigrant detention services in the United States, and little information has been released on exactly how many of them have been involved in immigration enforcement policy with federal or local governments via public-private partnerships. Of these multiple companies, two big private prison companies, Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and the Geo Group, Inc., have been famous for detaining immigrants through various forms of detention contracts with federal or local governments. CCA has owned and managed 44 facilities in the United States with an additional 21 facilities (owned by federal or local governments but run by CCA) for immigration detainment, which include spaces for 91,000 inmates. As the second-largest prison company, Geo Group is currently operating 65 corrections and detention facilities in the United States. The Management & Training Corporation is the third-largest private prison company with the capacity to house 29,000 inmates at 22 facilities nationwide (Ackerman & Furman, 2013; Brown, 2012; Doty & Wheatley, 2013; National People's Action & Public Accountability Initiative, 2012). The list of counties and private prison companies in their jurisdictions on immigration detainment and operations is in the appendix.

[71] ALEC has officially been known as an organization for organic public-private network or partnership. However, it has also been famous for a secret and shadowy public-private combination for sharing and shaping conservative policy ideas at the local and federal level. As a "right-wing organization," ALEC has oriented toward pro-market and small-government views while institutionally combining and connecting the public, policymakers, politicians and private-sector interest or pressure groups (Stuart, 2011a, 2011b). Private prison companies have been a high-profile private-sector member participating in creating model bills and sponsoring conferences and meetings among members including lodging, dining, and other costs.

[72] The structure of immigration detention since the increasing enforcement-only policy drive has been more and more complicated, and actually little information is available about how the public and private sectors have been involved in immigration detention services financially and operationally. TRAC, through FOIA

(Ackerman & Furman, 2013; Doty & Wheatley, 2013; Gottschalk, 2014; National Public Radio, 2009). For analysis, I dichotomize counties into two groups: counties with detention facilities that are run or owned by private prison companies in their jurisdictions under a government contract (coded 1) and counties without (coded 0). Related data on private prison companies' connection with the immigration detention business were collected from TRAC, the detention facility locator on ICE's web site, facility location and client (contractor) searches on two big private prison companies' web sites, and references from previous studies.

Regarding economic factors reflecting local economic conditions, *Unemployment Rate* and *Unemployment Rate Change* per county during a recent 3 years (2010 - 2012, not seasonally adjusted) were collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor. As a proxy variable for unemployment rate and unemployment rate change, *Poverty Rate* and *Poverty Rate Change* per county during the same recent 3 years (all ages, 2010 - 2012)[73] were also collected from the U.S. Census Bureau's Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) program.

Geographical factors, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, have been closely associated with choices of more punitive and restrictive immigration perspectives and related policies in local jurisdictions. Following the logic of previous chapters, *Southwest Border Localities (Counties)* geographically neighboring U.S. - Mexico border areas,

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requests, nicely classifies such current complicated immigrant detainments and facility operations into 7 types, including ICE's own management ("ICE service processing center"), public-private contract, and intergovernmental service agreement (IGSA) facility. For more information on the complicated structure of immigrant detention and facility operation, see TRAC, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/222/

[73] According to the U.S. Census Bureau, poverty rate is basically measured by "the percentage of people whose income fell below the poverty threshold" (Bishaw & Fontenot, 2014).

including counties within the states of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas, were selected to reflect a geographical context on local immigration policy choice. Related data were collected from web searches and previous studies on the border states or localities. Table 6.1 lists all variables and sources used for analysis.

Table 6.1. Variables Used for Analysis

Variable	Source
Demographic Variables	
Hispanic population (%, 2009-13)	
Hispanic population change rate (%, 2008-12)	American Community Survey, U.S.
Foreign-born population (%, 2009-13, including naturalized & non-US citizens)	Census Bureau
Foreign-born population change rate (%, 2008-12)	
Economic Variables	
Unemployment rate (%, 2010-12)	Bureau of Labor Statistics
Unemployment rate change (%, 2010-12)	
Poverty rate (%, 2010-12)	Small Area Income and Poverty
Poverty rate change (%, 2010-12)	Estimates (SAIPE)
Geographical Variable	
Border (Southwest) counties	Web search & referring to previous studies
Political & Contextual Variables	
Republican-leaning localities (averaged % during two presidential elections, 2008-12)	Election data at the county level (Wolf, 2013)
Private prison complex detaining noncitizens for deportation proceedings	TRAC ICE's detention facility locator search Private prison companies' (CCA & Geo Group) facility search on immigration detention Media search & previous studies on private prison business on immigration enforcement
Local ordinances/resolutions on welcoming/restrictive immigrants	Public/nonprofit groups' data & Web search
Crime rates per 100,000 population (including	Each state's law enforcment agency

violent and property crimes)	or criminal justice information center
Administrative Variables	
Monthly immigration detainer issuance	TRAC ICE (Freedom of Information Act [FOIA] request)
Monthly immigrant deportation numbers	ICE (FOIA library on the web site)
287(g) partnerships at the local level	ICE (FOIA requests & FOIA library on the web site)
Adoption of Secure Communities program at the local level	ICE (FOIA library on the web site)

Note: Administrative and some political variables (local ordinances on welcoming/restrictive immigration) are not explained in this chapter because they were already discussed in Chapter 5. Some administrative variables in this table - monthly immigration detainer issuance and monthly immigrant deportation numbers - were longitudinal variables with five repeated measurements over time, while others were fixed (including time-variant and -invariant) variables which were measured only one time.

6.3. Modeling Strategy

For this chapter, three modeling strategies were used for analysis. As in Figure 6.1, the circled area dealing with the interrelationship between and among three contextual factors on immigration enforcement actions under S-Comm was already analyzed in Chapter 5, and new explanatory variables (left side) shaping local choices on immigration policy and outcome variable (right side) are added. Therefore, the first model focuses on the relationship between IVs and local immigration enforcement policy participation, and analyzes how various local political, economic, demographic, and geographical factors influence localities' immigration enforcement policymaking. The second model focuses on the relationship between noncitizen deportation numbers under the implementation of S-Comm and community safety at the county level. According to logic from DHS/ICE for legitimating the implementation of S-Comm, intergovernmental enforcement cooperation under S-Comm and proactive removals of dangerous

noncitizens at the county level make local communities safer through decreasing the rates of crimes committed by risky noncitizens. If these two variables are significantly and negatively associated (e.g., increasing deportation numbers at the county level is significantly related to decreasing crime rates during a recent 4 years), the implementation of S-Comm has followed the direction federal immigration bureaucrats intended. The final model includes all variables in Figure 6.1, and as a combined model, I analyze how current immigration enforcement policy has been carried out, and as the second model, whether S-Comm has faithfully followed the stated goal of making communities safer.

6.3.1. The First Model: Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis Between Local Contextual Factors and Distinct Local Immigration Enforcement Policy Participation

For the first model, I used a multinomial logistic regression model considering the fact that the DV in this model, extent of local immigration enforcement policy participation, has an (unordered) multicategorical scale, which was statistically extracted as three subclasses or -groups from LCA in Chapter 5. Of three subclasses on the DV in this model, I set Class 3 counties, counties with *inactive-but-mixed* immigration enforcement policy participation, as the reference group for group comparisons, and the following basic equation is used for analysis:

$$\log \frac{Pr\,(Y=Class\ 1\ counties)}{Pr(Y=Class\ 3\ counties)} = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \ldots + \beta_k X_k$$

$$\log \frac{Pr\,(Y=Class\ 2\ counties)}{Pr(Y=Class\ 3\ counties)} = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \ldots + \beta_k X_k \quad (1)$$

In equation (1), this model is basically composed of two logit models because each of two classes (Classes 1 and 2) should be compared with the reference group, Class 3 counties. As the explanatory variables, I set four different contextual factors influencing the DV: demographic, political, economic, and geographical factors. Therefore, these factors can be inserted into the equation as follows:

$$\log \frac{Pr\ (Y=Class\ 1\ counties)}{Pr(Y=Class\ 3\ counties)} = \alpha + \beta_1 demographic + \beta_2 political + \beta_3 economic + \beta_4 geographical + \varepsilon$$

$$\log \frac{Pr\ (Y=Class\ 2\ counties)}{Pr(Y=Class\ 3\ counties)} = \alpha + \beta_1 demographic + \beta_2 political + \beta_3 economic + \beta_4 geographical + \varepsilon \quad (2)$$

Equation (2) shows the full model including all four contextual factors, but there are multiple scenarios modeling the relationships between IVs and the DV, including using some of the IVs, but not all four, or adding the interaction effects between IVs. Multiple research scenarios for multinomial logistic regression are discussed in the results section.

6.3.2. The Second Model: Addition of Local Crime Rate Changes as the Outcome into Noncitizen Deportation Trajectory under LGM

The second model is to analyze program implementation through the relationship between deportation outcomes under the implementation of S-Comm during a recent 13-month period (Dec. 2011 - Jan. 2013) and consequent crime rate changes at the county level during a recent 4 years (2010 - 2013). In Chapter 4 using descriptive and graphical

analyses, I already found that S-Comm has been implemented unlike the program goal (which is to catch and remove noncitizens with dangerous criminal violations) and at the county level more than half of noncitizens removed during the last 5 years have been with minor charges and immigration violations in the name of "criminal aliens." While Chapter 4 analyzes the implementation of S-Comm with enforcement numbers and the level of criminality based on ICE's enforcement priorities, this chapter analyzes this program with a slightly different angle, specifically correspondence between the program goal - making communities safer - and implementation result of S-Comm via community safety level. In the previous chapter, the noncitizen deportation trajectory during a 13-month period was considered the DV, but as in Figure 6.1, it was used as the predictor influencing community safety at the local level. Figure 6.2 indicates a path diagram showing the relationship between variables.



Figure 6.2. A path diagram representing the relationship between noncitizen deportation trajectory during a 13-month period under the implementation of S-Comm and community crime rate changes during a recent 4 years (2010 - 2013)

Note: Based on the result of a univariate noncitizen deportation LGM in Chapter 5, a linear model for noncitizen deportation has the best model fit and estimate.

Using equation (10) in Chapter 5 for noncitizen deportation LGM, the following regression equation can be made for the second model:

$$Deportation_{it} = (\mu_\alpha + \lambda_t \mu_\beta) + (\zeta_{\alpha i} + \lambda_t \zeta_{\beta i} + \varepsilon_{it}) \quad (3)^{74}$$

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Deportation_{it} + error\ term \quad (4)$$

6.3.3. The Third Model: A Combined Model Including All Variables

Based on the first and second models in the previous section, the third model comprehensively analyzes enforcement actions and logic under the current immigration enforcement policy, including local choices on immigration enforcement policy participation, interrelationships between and among intergovernmental enforcement actions, and the implementation result of S-Comm. The main analytic point for this combined model is still the implementation result of S-Comm, focusing on whether this program has really secured local communities' safety through decreasing crime rates over time. Other parts, such as local choices and administrative interrelationships between enforcement actions, are also discussed, with special attention given to whether effect size and directions of path coefficients in Figure 6.1 are changed. Graphical analyses are also included to critically analyze the relationship between noncitizen deportation trajectories and crime rate changes at the county level.

6.4. Descriptive Statistics

Table 6.2 shows descriptive statistics on variables regarding IVs and the DV in Figure 6.1. For understanding local differences, this table subdivides the 541 counties used for analysis into three classes statistically extracted from LCA in the previous

[74] Equation (3) here is the same as equation (10) in Chapter 5 referring to a univariate LGM for noncitizen deportation trajectory under the implementation of S-Comm.

chapter, and then analyzes differences in their local political, economic, and demographic conditions. Four contextual factors shaping local extent of immigration enforcement policy participation show interesting trends or characteristics between counties. Counties with strong immigration enforcement policy ("Class 2") have traditionally and relatively large shares of Hispanic (20.76%) and foreign-born population (15.15%, naturalized and non-U.S. citizens combined) compared to other localities. Moreover, many counties in this class, more than one third, tend to be located in the southwest (US - Mexico) border area, and about 1 in 4 counties in Class 2 made contracts with private prison companies to detain immigrants caught in their jurisdictions, which is between 3 and 10 times more than in other counties.

Considering Hispanic population change rates during a recent 5 years (2008-12), however, Class 1 counties with *administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive* immigration policy participation tend to have a faster increasing rate (38.24%) than other counties. However, with regard to foreign-born population change during the same years, counties with *inactive-but-mixed* immigration enforcement policy participation (Class 3) had the fastest increasing trend among all other localities (17.86%). This result indicates that counties have different shares and speeds of Hispanic and foreign-born population changes in their jurisdictions. Many Class 2 counties, as immigrant-gateway localities, traditionally have large Hispanic and foreign-born populations, while Classes 1 and 3 have a faster rate of change of these population groups than Class 2 counties.

Politically, all 541 counties had higher rates of supporting Republicans than Democrats during the last two presidential elections, averaging 57.3%. Of the three

classes, interestingly, Class 1 counties had the highest Republican-preferred tendencies (69.32%) during the last two presidential elections. In terms of economic situations, few differences were found among the counties, but counties orienting toward administratively restrictive (Class 1) and active immigration enforcement policy (Class 2) tend to have experienced more serious economic declines than Class 3 localities.

Table 6.2. Descriptive Statistics on Variables Shaping the Direction of Local Immigration Enforcement Policy Participation and Local Crime Rate Changes

Variables	**Total Counties**	**Class 1 Counties**	**Class 2 Counties**	**Class 3 Counties**
N	541	88	34	419
Demographic factors				
Hispanic population (%, 2009-13)	17.53 (.171)	10.08 (.102)	20.76 (.148)	18.84 (.180)
Hispanic population change rate (%, 2008-12)	26.27 (.187)	38.24 (.255)	15.56 (.134)	24.82 (.161)
Foreign-born population (%, 2009-13, including naturalized & non-U.S. citizens)	11.03 (.077)	7.47 (.052)	15.15 (.081)	11.45 (.079)
Foreign-born population change (%, 2008-12)	16.67 (1.33)	16.74 (.390)	4.83 (.220)	17.86 (1.52)
Economic factors				
Unemployment rate (%, 2010-12)	8.79 (2.81)	9.15 (2.48)	9.29 (3.52)	8.68 (2.81)
Unemployment rate change (%, 2010-12)	-1.46 (.939)	-1.48 (1.04)	-1.87 (.91)	-1.43 (.91)
Poverty rate (%, 2010-12)	16.26 (5.88)	17.09 (6.68)	15.62 (4.07)	16.14 (5.83)
Poverty rate change (%, 2010-12)	.51 (1.75)	.78 (1.87)	.54 (1.28)	.46 (1.75)
Geographical factors				
Border (southwest) localities (%)	25.14 (136 counties)	9.09 (8 counties)	32.35 (11 counties)	27.92 (117 counties)
Political & contextual factors				

Republican-preferred counties (%, averaged from two [2008 & 2012] presidential turnout rates)	57.30 (310 counties)	69.32 (61 counties)	55.88 (19 counties)	54.89 (230 counties)
Localities with private prison complex detaining noncitizens for deportation proceedings (%)	7.02 (38 counties)	2.27 (2 counties)	20.59 (7 counties)	6.92 (29 counties)
Crime rates per 100,000 population (%, 2010-2013)		(77 counties)	(34 counties)	(409 counties)
Violent crime rates	395.15	360.63	400.23	401.22
	(270.27)	(258.02)	(230.15)	(275.62)
Property crime rates	2,860.32	3,098.34	3,026.93	2,801.65
	(1,177.09)	(1,263.71)	(1,092.57)	(1,162.76)
Total crime rates	3,255.46	3,458.97	3,427.17	3,202.88
	(1,365.85)	(1,444.18)	(1,272.88)	(1,356.64)
Crime rates change (%, 2010-2013)				
Violent crime rates change	-.055	-.043	-.081	-.055
	(.314)	(.322)	(.128)	(.323)
Property crime rates change	-.063	-.082	-.083	-.058
	(.189)	(.170)	(.097)	(.197)
Total crime rates change	-.065	-.082	-.085	-.060
	(.190)	(.167)	(.090)	(.200)

Note: In the first row, there are three groups of counties. Those in Classes 1 and 3 were categorized by latent class analysis in the previous chapter. Class 1 refers to counties with *administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive* immigration enforcement policy participation; Class 2 refers to localities with *active* immigration enforcement policy participation; and Class 3 refers to localities with *inactive-but-mixed* immigration enforcement policy participation. Regarding crime rates, there are missing data for two of the locality classes: 11 for Class 1, and 10 for Class 3. Crime rate data were collected in compliance with the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) format. Based on the UCR format, violent crime includes four offenses (homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault), and property crime includes three offenses (burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft). Total crime combines violent and property crimes. Standard deviations in parentheses except geographical and political and contextual variables.

As the outcome variable, total crime rate of 541 localities activating S-Comm during a recent 4 years (2010-13) was 3,255.46 per 100,000 population, which is slightly higher than the U.S. national level (3,249.33) during the same period. There are some variations on crime rates among the three classes, but localities (Classes 1 and 2) having a rather (administratively) punitive immigration stance and active immigration enforcement policy participation tend to have higher total crime rates than Class 3 counties. All

counties regardless of class tend to have a slightly decreasing crime trend during a recent 4 years (2010 - 2013), but interestingly, counties with active immigration enforcement policy participation have higher and faster decreasing crime trends than other counties. Based on these descriptive statistics, I found that counties with active immigration enforcement policy participation have had more Hispanic and foreign-born populations than other counties, and have been the main target areas for the implementation of S-Comm. It is partially supported by strikingly large shares of involvement of private prison businesses in Class 2 counties. However, interestingly but ironically, crime rates in Class 2 counties have decreased faster over time than counties in other classes. This indicates that the "immigrant-crime" hypothesis that immigration restrictionists have argued is not supported. Table 6.3 represents a correlation matrix regarding the interrelationship between and among four contextual predictors consisting of 11 individual variables. According to this correlation matrix, Hispanic population and foreign-born population at the county level have a strong positive relation, which is a sign of some possible overlap between them. Moreover, a moderate positive relation between Hispanic population at the county level and southwest border counties was found.

Table 6.3. Correlation Matrix of the Independent Variables (values 0.5 and higher in bold)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
1. Hispanic population (%)	1.00										
2. Hispanic population change (%)	**-0.54**	1.00									
3. Foreign-born population (%)	**0.74**	-0.45	1.00								
4. Foreign-born population change (%)	-0.10	0.13	-0.10	1.00							
5. Unemployment rate (%)	0.36	-0.28	0.22	-0.06	1.00						
6. Unemployment rate change (%)	0.02	0.22	0.03	0.08	-0.31	1.00					
7. Poverty rate (%)	0.18	-0.05	-0.07	0.04	0.43	-0.09	1.00				
8. Poverty rate change (%)	-0.00	-0.09	0.01	-0.13	0.17	0.01	0.11	1.00			
9. (Southwest) Border counties	**0.59**	-0.33	0.32	-0.05	0.28	-0.05	0.18	-0.03	1.00		
10. Republican-preferred counties (%)	-0.13	0.12	-0.41	0.06	-0.07	-0.11	-0.09	-0.15	0.03	1.00	
11. Counties with private prison detaining immigrants in their jurisdictions	0.31	-0.14	0.25	-0.01	0.19	-0.01	0.14	0.03	0.25	-0.09	1.00

6.5. Finding Factors Shaping Local Immigration Enforcement Policy Participation Through Multinomial Logistic Regression

Table 6.4 shows multinomial logistic regression results representing influences of four types of contextual factors and their interactions on distinct levels of local immigration enforcement policy participation. This table consists of five models in the first row: estimating influence of demographic factors for the first model; economic factors for the second model; a geographical factor and related interaction effects for the third model; political factors and related interaction effects for the fourth model; and a combined model including all four contextual factors for the fifth model. To analyze influences of each contextual factor and prevent statistical misinterpretations, I did multicollinearity checks after doing the regression of each model, and then dropped problematic predictors bringing about high intercorrelations between IVs beyond the threshold of the variance inflation factor (VIF).[75]

With regard to Model 1 on demographic factors, shares (%) of foreign-born population at the county level significantly help counties lean toward a more punitive and

[75] I checked the VIFs to diagnose a multicollinearity problem per model estimation, and most predictors had an acceptable level of VIFs. Conventionally a threshold value for VIF commonly used by quantitative scholars for checking for a multicollinearity problem is 10 or higher, which is identical to 0.1 or less than 0.1 for tolerance (=1/VIF). However, I found that interaction terms on the predictors (i.e., an interaction between geographical factor and demographic factor, or an interaction between political factor and demographic factor) indicate relatively high VIFs, which was a sign of multicollinearity. It is inescapable when a model has interaction terms as a predictor; when the model is composed of predictors *a*, *b*, and *ab*, both *a* and *b* are likely to be highly correlated with their product (Allison, 2012). Econometric studies (Allison, 2012; Wooldridge, 2010) recommend that in such situations, researchers can ignore the high multicollinearity issue. Centering is frequently recommended for reducing high VIFs, but I did not use such a strategy here, and selected another option, dropping problematic predictors and interaction terms. When percentages of foreign-born population and Hispanic population were simultaneously interacted with geographical factor (Model 3) and political factor (Model 4), multicollinearity problems arose, so I dropped one of them in their models. It might be due to a relatively high bivariate correlation between these two IVs. However, interestingly, in Model 1 including them simultaneously, I found no sign of a multicollinearity problem and VIFs ranged from 1.02 to 2.52.

active noncitizen enforcement policy turn than a mixed immigration perspective, given that the other variables in the model are held constant (β = .77, relative risk ratio[76] [*rrr*] = 2.15). However, interestingly, percent of Hispanic population as a proxy demographic factor did not significantly influence local choices toward more active immigration enforcement actions. Rather, Hispanic population change rate makes counties more likely to become Class 1 counties having an *administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive* immigration perspective (β = 2.94, *rrr* = 19.04), and less likely to select a more active enforcement-focused policy either administratively or legally (β = -4.27, *rrr* = .01). As previous studies have had mixed results on the influence of demographic factors on local immigration perspectives, this result follows that trend.

Economic contexts in Model 2, including unemployment rate and poverty rate at the county level, did not significantly influence local immigration enforcement policy participation, although previous studies showed mixed signals on these factors (Chand & Schreckhise, 2014; Walker, 2014; Wong, 2014b). When an economic factor (unemployment rate) is linked with a geographical factor (border area), however, localities tend to lean slightly and significantly toward a more punitive immigration policy turn, through passing local versions of punitive and restrictive immigration ordinances or resolutions, not administrative enforcement actions (β=.16, *rrr* = 1.17). With regard to the influence of the geographical factor in Model 3, southwest border localities that are close to the U.S.-Mexico border appear to have active immigration

[76] Under a multinomial logistic model, a relative risk ratio (*rrr*) as the exponentiated coefficient is used rather than an odd ratio. When an ordered logistic model is estimated, the values of response are not independent because they are considered to be ordered, while the responses under a multinomial logistic model are unordered and therefore are independent of each other (Hilbe, 2009). However, this coefficient using *rrr* can also be interpreted as an odd ratio.

enforcement participation when the geographical factor is combined (interacted) with a demographic factor (percentage of Hispanic population) or an economic context (unemployment rate) at the community level, but it was not significant at the conventional level. On the other hand, counties in Class 1 are less likely to be located in the southwest border area than localities in Class 3 (β= -5.10, *rrr* =.01). This result does not support the first hypothesis for this study, but follows the logic of Walker and Leitner (2011) arguing that geographical factors are not directly associated with more restrictive immigration policy at the local level, but combining them with other local contexts significantly accounts for a local punitive and enforcement turn on immigration issues.

As many previous studies (Lewis, Provine, Varsanyi, & Decker, 2013b; Ramakrishnan & Wong, 2010; Wong, 2014a, 2014b) mentioned, political factors in Model 4 provide the strongest and most consistent incentives for localities to lean toward more active immigration enforcement policy participation. Republican-leaning counties participated more strongly than other counties in local immigration enforcement policy via administrative and legal options given that the other variables in the model are held constant (β =2.54, *rrr* = 12.65). Counties that are strongly Republican-leaning and have high foreign-born populations also tend to be more actively involved in local immigration enforcement policy than other counties with *inactive-but-mixed* immigration policy stances (β = 1.02, *rrr* = 2.76). On the other hand, the interaction of partisanship and demographic factors made counties with an *administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive* immigration perspective less likely than other counties to participate in local immigration enforcement policy actions (β = -.61, *rrr* = .54). Interestingly, private prison involvement

in immigration enforcement actions at the local level plays an important role in shaping local immigration enforcement policy activation and implementation (β = 1.05, *rrr* = 2.85). That is, counties with private prison facilities in their jurisdictions for immigrant detention via public-private contracts for immigration enforcement policy tend to consider immigration as a public safety and security issue. Private prison businesses, considering immigration as a kind of business opportunity for maximizing their benefits, may use strong lobbying powers and participation of conservative public-private partnerships such as ALEC to influence local politicians and policymakers to adopt local ordinances toward a more punitive and enforcement-focused immigration turn. This series of different interests between local governments and the private sector made it possible for some localities to create and implement more active immigration enforcement policy administratively and legally.[77]

In Model 5, which includes a series of factors from Models 1 to 4, effect sizes of regression coefficients are slightly changed due to interactions and combinations among predictors, but directions and significance levels are almost the same. Political factors and a demographic factor - specifically the percentage of foreign-born population, not Hispanic population, at the county level - play a role in shaping more active immigration enforcement policy participation in their jurisdictions. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is partially

[77] Barry (2009) provides another possible or plausible incentive or interest for more punitive immigration enforcement policy implementation between local governments and private prison businesses. Some cities and municipalities with economic difficulties since the end of the 2000s began to consider invitations of private prison facilities in their jurisdictions for immigration detainments as a kind of "economic redevelopment project." According to Barry's logic, some localities with economic decline or lack of economic capital are likely to make such public-private contracts regarding immigration detainments. I did not test this hypothesis for this study, so future studies will analyze this assumption to understand the link between local governments' more punitive immigration enforcement policy turn and the involvement of the private prison sector.

verified. Combination of contextual factors did not clearly make counties lean toward a more enforcement-focused and punitive immigration turn. How is this statistical result interpreted in policy contexts? Why did some localities have mixed perspectives on immigration issues (Class 3) or have an administratively inactive stance on immigration enforcement actions while leaning toward a legally punitive tendency (Class 1)? Immigration politics (adopting local immigration ordinances reflecting local political and policy voices) and implementation of such legal/institutional laws through administrative actions are different tasks carried out by two branches of governments, but they should be logically connected. However, under the S-Comm framework, even some localities that have integrative immigration perspectives or noninterventionist perspectives must participate in this mandatory program based on intergovernmental enforcement cooperation. In such an ironic and dilemmatic situation, localities tend to make inconsistent and incompatible enforcement actions in their jurisdictions, such as an early activation of S-Comm while passing integrative immigration ordinances. Class 1 counties appear to consider immigration as a local issue, so the federal involvement or lead under intergovernmental enforcement cooperation was not welcomed in their jurisdictions, which might have brought about inactive participation in such intergovernmental administrative immigration enforcement programs. Through this first analysis, I found that counties have participated in the current intergovernmental immigration enforcement policy due to mainly local political and demographic contexts. However, as in previous studies on this linkage between local immigration policy choices and contextual factors, this study also found mixed results. Economic and geographical factors did not

significantly influence local involvement of immigration enforcement policy participation.

Table 6.4. Multinomial Logistic Regression on Factors Influencing the Extent of Local Immigration Enforcement Policy Participation

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Class 1 Localities	**Class 2** Localities	**Class 1** Localities	**Class 2** Localities	**Class 1** Localities	**Class 2** Localities	**Class 1** Localities	**Class 2** Localities	**Class 1** Localities	**Class 2** Localities
Demographic factors										
Hispanic population (%)	.15	-.20							.34	-.98*
	(1.16)	(.82)							(1.41)	(.38)
Hispanic population change (%, 2008 - 12)	2.95***	-4.27**							3.24***	-4.02**
	(19.04)	(.01)							(25.55)	(.02)
Foreign-born population (%)	-.53*	.77**							-.12	1.60**
	(.59)	(2.15)							(.89)	(4.97)
Foreign-born population change (%, 2008 - 12)	-.08	.01								
	(.92)	(1.01)								
Economic factors										
Unemployment rate (%)			.03	.05					.13*	-.13
			(1.03)	(1.06)					(1.13)	(.88)
Unemployment rate change (%, 2010 - 12)			-.04	-.45**					.01	-.51**
			(.96)	(.64)					(1.01)	(.60)
Poverty rate (%)			.02	-.04						
			(1.02)	(.96)						
Poverty rate change (%, 2010 - 12)			.09	.03						
			(1.09)	(1.03)						
Geographical factors										
Border localities					-5.10**	-.15			-3.08*	1.59

		(.006)	(.86)	(.05)	(4.88)
Border + Hispanic		-1.46**	.30	-1.44	1.30
population (%)		(.23)	(1.35)	(.24)	(3.66)
Border +		.16*	.07		
unemployment rate (%)		(1.17)	(1.07)		
Political/contextual factors					
Republican-preferred		-1.09	2.54**	.27	2.38**
		(.34)	(12.65)	(1.31)	(10.77)
Republican + Hispanic population (%)				-.20	.56
				(.82)	(1.75)
Republican + foreign-born population (%)		-.61**	1.02**		
		(.54)	(2.76)		
Private prison		-.89	1.05**	-12.59	1.36**
		(.41)	(2.85)	(3.39e-06)	(3.88)
N	422	541	541	541	422
Model χ^2	44.45***	12.31	27.23**	30.40***	87.41***
Log likelihood	-274.45	-354.82	-347.36	-345.77	-256.14
Pseudo R^2	.085	.017	.038	.042	.146

Notes: Regression coefficients here are based on unstandardized parameter estimates, and the numbers in parentheses are relative risk ratios. Robust standard errors were used for statistical tests of parameter estimates. The dependent variable, local immigration enforcement policy participation, consists of three categories, and the third of which (localities with *inactive-but-mixed* immigration enforcement policy) was set as the reference/comparison category for group comparisons, so it was omitted in this model. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Some predictors and interaction terms were dropped after multicollinearity checks.

6.6. Implementation Result from S-Comm: Estimation of Local Crime Rate Changes Through Noncitizen Deportation LGMs

The second model fits a univariate LGM with the addition of a continuous outcome variable referring to community safety level, which was operationalized by local crime rate changes during a recent four years (2010 - 2013). Through this modeling, I empirically analyze how the implementation of S-Comm, specifically noncitizen deportation numbers as the final enforcement outcomes under this program, influences local community safety. Figure 6.3 indicates the relationship between noncitizen deportation trajectories during a 13-month period (Dec. 2011 - Jan. 2013) and consequent crime rate changes in terms of three crime categories: total crime, violent crime, and property crime rate changes during four years (2010 - 2013).

LGMs in Figure 6.3 have basically the same model fitting and estimation compared to a linear noncitizen trajectory in Model 3 in Table 5.3 - the same five repeatedly measured time points, covering a 13-month period - but one difference between them is the addition of the outcome variable here. In terms of effect sizes and directions of estimates of LGM per se, they have similar effect sizes and directions: the mean of the intercept for noncitizen deportation is positively and significantly different from zero, and in terms of county variability, there was county-level variability in noncitizen deportation numbers (outcomes) at the first time (Dec. 2011) and the rate of change of noncitizen deportations over time. However, unlike model 3 in Table 5.3, insignificant rate of change of noncitizen deportation numbers over time, slope factor means for LGMs in Figure 6.3 commonly show statistical significance, indicating that

noncitizen deportations did significantly decrease over time. For each one-month change in time, noncitizen deportation numbers at the county level decreased by 0.27 units.



Figure 6.3. Linear noncitizen deportation trajectory model with local crime rate changes during a recent 4 years (2010 - 2013) as the outcome

Note: There are three individual noncitizen deportation LGMs here: LGMs with total crime rate changes as the DV (top left), with violent crime rate changes (top right), and with property crime rate changes (bottom left). Each of two latent factors (the intercept factor left and the slope factor right) have latent factor mean

(*M*) and variance or disturbance (*D*). Observed endogenous variables (rectangular-shaped under SEM framework) have residual variances, including measurement errors. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Model fit indexes of all three LGMs, including χ^2, CFI, TLI, and SRMR, had acceptable values: larger than 0.95 for CFI, TLI, and below .05 for SRMR. RMSEA has a rather higher than recommended good model fit, .05, ranging from .096 to .098. I already discussed this point in Chapter 5. Estimates used in three LGMs were based on the unstandardized solution.

In terms of the relationship between latent factors (the intercept and slope factors under LGM) and the outcome variable, crime rate changes, three LGMs commonly indicate that there were no crime-prevention effects from the implementation of S-Comm during a 13-month period. In terms of the latent intercept factor, increasing numbers of noncitizen deportations in 541 counties at the 1st month (Dec. 2011) were associated with a significant increasing crime trend (positive crime rate changes over four years). However, considering the rate of noncitizen deportation number changes during a 13-month period, insignificantly positive relationships between variables were commonly found with all three LGMs. That means that the more noncitizen deportations are made over time in 541 counties, the more crime rates at the county level remain unchanged (or rather increasing), although it is not statistically significant. This suggests that the basic logic for the implementation of S-Comm - that through nationwide implementation of intergovernmental immigration enforcement actions and removal of dangerous noncitizens at the local level, community safety can be finally accomplished - has never been kept. Rather, as in the results of Figure 6.3, no meaningful crime rate decreases can be seen in the 541 counties during a 13-month period. These results are consistent with other national-level comprehensive research on the implementation of S-Comm (Chand & Schreckhise, 2014; Cox & Miles, 2013; Miles & Cox, 2014; Treyger, Chalfin, & Loeffler, 2014). Figure 6.4 graphically analyzes how these two variables - noncitizen

deportation numbers and crime rate changes (total, violent, and property crimes) - are related to each other in terms of per local classifications (extracted from LCA) and longitudinal perspective. As seen there, most graphs show no clear decreasing crime trends over time via the implementation of S-Comm at the community level. Many of the graphs appear to have an almost flat line. Based on these empirical results, hypothesis 5 is not supported.

As a sensitivity analysis of the second model I tested in this study, Table 6.5 reports on the retest of the relationship between the implementation of S-Comm at the county level and consequent community safety level during a 13-month period with different types of indicators related to community safety. Based on the FBI's UCR format, I first classified the previous two comprehensive crimes - violent and property crimes - into seven individual crime categories (homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assaults for violent crimes and burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft for property crimes). Then I fit seven univariate LGMs with seven individual crime categories as the DV. As consistent in Figures 6.3 and 6.4, no significant and meaningful crime decrease and prevention effects were found from the implementation of S-Comm during a 13-month period. With regard to crime categories, including murder and rape, increasing numbers of noncitizen deportations in 541 counties at the 1st month were associated with a significant increasing crime trend. However, over time, rates of murder and rape-related offenses decreased, but these rates of crime change were not significant at the conventional level. Other individual crime categories had different crime status (1st month) and rate of change (growth or decline) over time via increasing noncitizen

deportation numbers under the S-Comm framework, but no significant crime decline effects were found.

Class 1 (Localities with *administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive*-immigration enforcement policy participation): 88 localities







Class 2 (Localities with *active* immigration enforcement policy participation): 34 localities







Class 3 (Localities with *inactive-but-mixed* immigration enforcement policy participation): 419 localities



Figure 6.4. Scatterplots representing relationships between removal (deportation) outcomes under Secure Communities and crime rate changes (total, violent, and property crimes) by three classes of county

Note: Each group has two lines on the data distributions: one is regression fit line (linear, curvilinear, or cubic form) and the other is local weighted scatterplot smoothing (frequently called "LOWESS").

Table 6.5. Sensitivity Analysis for the Second Model Regarding the Relationship Between Noncitizen Deportation Trajectory and Local Crime Changes (Seven Individual Crime Categories)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
The 1st month of noncitizen deportation (Dec. 2011)							
Mean				2.51*** (.06)			
Variance				1.45*** (.10)			
Grow rate of noncitizen deportation							
Mean				-.27*** (.03)			
Variance				.19*** (.04)			
	DV: Violent Crime Category				**DV: Property Crime Category**		
	Murder	Rape	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Burglary	Larceny	Motor Vehicle Theft
The 1st month (status)	**.04** (.02)**	**.04** (.02)**	**-.01 (.01)**	**-.00 (.01)**	**-.00 (.01)**	**-.07 (.07)**	**-.02 (.02)**
Growth rate (growth)	**-.03 (.07)**	**-.02 (.07)**	**.02 (.05)**	**.02 (.03)**	**.02 (.03)**	**.00 (.30)**	**.09 (.09)**
χ^2(df)	69.69 (11) *p* <.001	69.28 (11) *p* <.001	66.59 (11) *p* <.001	65.76 (11) *p* <.001	65.65 (11) *p* <.001	67.33 (11) *p* <.001	65.42 (11) *p* <.001
CFI	.984	.984	.985	.985	.985	.984	.985
TLI	.978	.978	.979	.979	.979	.979	.979
RMSEA	.099 (90% CI: .08, .12)	.099 (90% CI: .08, .12)	.097 (90% CI: .08, .12)	.096 (90% CI: .07, .12)	.096 (90% CI: .08, .12)	.097 (90% CI: .08, .12)	.096 (90% CI: .07, .12)
SRMR	.022	.021	.021	.021	.021	.021	.021

Note: *N*= 541. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

6.7. Comprehensive Review of Current U.S. Immigration Enforcement Policy Implementation and Related Results from S-Comm: Using a Combined Model

As the final model, Table 6.6 represents a combined model including all variables used in this study. Through this model, the key analytic point is still to understand whether removals of dangerous noncitizens through the implementation of S-Comm have really secured local communities and thus improved public safety. The bottom row in Table 6.6 directly confirmed that there has been no evidence that the removals of noncitizens from the 541 counties were associated with any significant declines of local crime rates (including total, violent, and property crimes) over a recent four years, fully covering a 13-month period for detainer issuance and noncitizen deportation trajectories. Increasing noncitizen deportations in terms of status (1st month) and growth factor (rate of change) are only weakly associated with any significant changes of crime rates. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis for this study is finally rejected.

Most effect sizes and directions of estimates in this combined model remain similar compared to those separated models that were discussed in this chapter and Chapter 5. As in the first model in this chapter, a demographic factor (percentage of foreign-born population) and political factors (Republican-preferred counties and involvement of private prison business in local immigration enforcement policy) played key contextual driving forces for local communities to lean toward a more restrictive and active immigration enforcement policy. As discussed in Chapter 5, detainer issuance trajectories have tended to follow a curvilinear trend, increasing at the 1st month, but instantaneously decreasing over time, and then turning to a steep increase for counties

with active immigration enforcement policy participation. For a noncitizen deportation trajectory, Class 2 counties with active immigration enforcement policy involvement tended to increase deportation numbers at the initial month, but over time their deportation rates were significantly decreased, except under the model with violent crime rate changes as the DV. On the other hand, Class 1 counties with administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning immigration perspectives had no clear trend on noncitizen deportation: decreasing deportation numbers at the 1st month compared to counties with inactive-but-mixed immigration policy perspectives (Class 3 as the reference group), but over time, there was no significant trend on deportation number changes. As in parallel-process LGMs and longitudinal mediation analyses in Chapter 5, two intergovernmental interaction points under S-Comm - immigration detainer issuances and noncitizen deportations - were significantly interrelated, and immigration detainer issuances were used as a mediator between Class 2 counties and their deportation outcomes under the implementation of S-Comm during a 13-month period in this combined model. Finally, I add Figure 6.5 here to graphically reconfirm my conclusion that the implementation of S-Comm has not made local communities safer; this figure includes comparisons of mean-level crime rate change before and after the full-scale expansion of this program across the county as a mandatory enforcement program, specifically using six key individual crime categories.

Table 6.6. LGMs Including All Variables on the Current U.S. Immigration Enforcement Policy: Focusing on Community Safety as Implementation Results of S-Comm

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Factors influencing local immigration enforcement policy participation (esp. regarding **Class 2** counties having *active* immigration enforcement policy participation; Class 3 as the reference group)	• % Hispanic population change (2008-12) (-) • % foreign-born (+) • Unemployment change (-) • Republican-preferred (+) • Private prison (+)		
Detainer (first month)			
"Active" counties		.26 (.35)	
"inactive/punitive leaning" counties		-.23* (.13)	
Detainer (growth rate - linear)			
"Active" counties		-.74** (.35)	
"inactive/punitive leaning" counties		-.43 (.28)	
Detainer (growth rate - quadratic)			
"Active" counties		.89** (.38)	
"inactive/punitive leaning" counties		.36 (.25)	
Deportation (1st month)			
"Active" counties	1.01** (.33)	1.00** (.34)	1.02** (.34)
"inactive/punitive leaning" counties	-.44** (.20)	-.46** (.20)	-.45** (.20)
Deportation (growth rate - linear)			
"Active" counties	-.16* (.10)	-.15 (.10)	-.16* (.10)
"inactive/punitive leaning" counties	-.00 (.09)	.02 (.08)	-.00 (.08)
Interrelationship between two key intergovernmental interaction points (detainer issuance → noncitizen deportation)	Yes I1 → I2 Q1→ I2	Yes I1 → I2 Q1→ I2	Yes I1 → I2 Q1→ I2
Mediation effect among three contextual factors (local immigration enforcement policy participation → detainer issuance → noncitizen deportations)	Yes (D1 →Q1 →I2)	Yes (D1 →Q1 →I2)	Yes (D1 →Q1 →I2)
	DV: **Total crime rate change** (2010 - 2013)	DV: **Violent crime rate change** (2010 - 2013)	DV: **Property crime rate change** (2010 - 2013)
Noncitizen deportation trajectory			
The 1st month (status)	**-.001 (.00)**	**.002 (.13)**	**-.002 (.01)**
Growth rate (growth)	**.04 (.30)**	**.01 (.05)**	**.04 (.85)**

Note: N = 422 (due to missing data from IVs), standard errors in parentheses. (+) refers to positive and significant associations between variables, while (-) refers to negative and significant associations between them. As in Chapter 5, for detainer issuances, the quadratic model with constrained residual variances, and for noncitizen deportations, the linear model with freely estimating residual variances were finally selected for analysis. I1, L1, and Q1 refer to intercept, linear slope, and quadratic slope for detainer issuances trajectory, while I2 and S2 refer to intercept and linear slope for noncitizen deportation trajectory. D1 refers to Class 2 counties with *active* immigration enforcement policy participation, while D2 refers to Class 1 counties with *administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning* immigration policy perspectives. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.



Figure 6.5. Mean-Level crime rate change before and after full-scale activation of S-Comm by class: six key individual crime categories by the FBI

Note: Each graph has a dotted vertical line indicating the date (Oct. 2010) beginning of the full-scale activation of S-Comm across the country. Moreover, through the classification of localities by latent class analysis, each graph has four lines, a solid line for all 541 localities a square- dot line for Class 1 localities, a round-dot line for Class 2 localities, and a dashed line for Class 3 localities.

6.8. Discussion

In this chapter, I used a more comprehensive perspective to analyze how current U.S. immigration enforcment policy has been carried out. Two questions were mainly discussed: (1) how and what local political, economic, demographic, and geographical contexts influence local choices on active immigration enforcemnt policy participation; and based on intergovernmental stepped-up enforcement efforts under the S-Comm framework, (2) whether the implementation of this program has really secured local communities as this program promised. As in previous studies, I found mixed results on the first question. Of four representive contexutal factors, political factors - such as Republican-preferred counties and involvment of private prison business regarding local immigration enforcement actions through public-private contracts - have strongly and consistently shaped local communities' lean toward more active and specifically punitive and restrictive immigration policy stances in their jurisdictions administratively and legally. Moreover, interestingly, only shares of forign-born population at the county level, not Hispanic population, signficantly influence local directions of more active immigration enforcement policy participation. More in-depth research on the relationship between various local contexts and policy choices on immigration issues will be needed in future scholarship.

With regard to the second question, as in Chapter 4, I reconfirmed that the implementation of S-Comm has been carried out unlike its promised direction, making communities safer via catching, detaining, and finally removing dangerous noncitizens at the community level. As in the empirical results of the second and third models in this

chapter, little relationship between increasing stepped-up noncitizen enforcment actions, expanding deportation numbers, and the level of community safety was found. This result is very suggestive to the current policy direction and political logic that DHS/ICE and Washington and local conservative politicians have steadily argued. Enforcement-only hysteria since the 2000s and its jusitification has been considered as a kind of reasonable thesis at the national level, and with the backup of the conservative media, immigration and immigrants living in local communities have been constructed as a security and public safety issue. In spite of a continued decreasing crime trend at the national level during the last decades, wrong policy assumptions on the immigration phenomenon and efforts to connect immigrants to crimes after the 9/11 terrorist attack made immigration issues in the United States more difficult and unsolvable. Politicians and policymakers have habitually said that "our immigration system is broken," but few of them have critically and clearly pointed out what specific parts of the administrative or legal systems are broken (Suro, 2015). Interestingly but ironcially, fewer politicians, including many Democrats, have fully presented this problem of an enforcement-only policy direction, and discussions of immigration issues in today's political atmosphere are still dominated by the control and enforcement perspectives.

This study still has limitations. The first is a need of a more concrete and comprehensive understanding of local choices on immigration issues. I dicussed four broad contexts influencing immigration issues at the local level based on previous scholarship, but many undiscussed factors - such as local history, role of media, and influential individuals such as political and ethical immigration entreprenuers - should be

deeply considered together in future studies. The second point is related to a measurement of "community safety" in the immigration contexts. As poltical or policy rhetoric, the term *community* or *public safety* can be operationalized and measured with various angles and perspectives. Following the previous studies, I considered this as the level or rate of local crimes with public data, but public perspectives on community safety can be changeable and differently expressed beyond mere numerical data on crimes. Qualitative backup - through interviews of local residents, including immigrants, or participation observations on community safety issues and related policy agendas - is also needed for more valid measurement of community safety.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The United States has created an enormous deportation machinery. The budget for border security and immigration enforcement is now eighteen billion dollars a year - substantially more than the budget for all other criminal federal law-enforcement agencies combined (the F.B.I., the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Secret Service, the U.S. Marshals, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives)... The machinery exists, it has its political incentives, and because its targets are weak, its accountability is slight, its impunity great… Between 1892 and 1997, the United States deported 2.1 million people. By the end of the next year, if present trends continue, the Obama administration will have deported that many in a mere six years.

William Finnegan, "The Deportation Machine," *The New Yorker*, April 19, 2013

The goal of Secure Communities was to more effectively identify and facilitate the removal of criminal aliens in the custody of state and local law enforcement agencies. But the reality is the program has attracted a great deal of criticism, is widely misunderstood , and is embroiled in legal litigation; its very name has become a symbol for general hostility toward the enforcement of our immigration laws. Governors, mayors, and state and local law enforcement officials around the country have increasingly refused to cooperate with the program, and many have issued executive orders or signed laws prohibiting such cooperation. A number of federal courts have rejected the authority of state and local law enforcement agencies to detain immigrants pursuant to federal detainers issued under the current Secure Communties program.

The overarching goal of the Secure Communities remains in my view a valid and important law enforcment objective, but a fresh start and a new program are necessary. As recommended by the Homeland Security Advisory Council Task Force, Secure Communities "must be implemented in a way that supports community policing and sustains the trust of all elements of the community in working with local law enforcement."… Accordingly, I am directing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to discontinue Secure Communities.

Policy memo from Jeh Johnson, Secretary of Department of Homeland Security, Nov. 20, 2014

7.1. Summary

Paying special attention to an increasing enforcement-only immigration policy hysteria, crimmigration trend, and complicated intergovernmental relations on immigration issues in the United States since the 2000s, this dissertation analyzed how the current Obama administration's immigrant control and punishment policy has been

carried out, and what policy outcomes we found through the implementation of S-Comm during the last 6 years. In spite of DHS/ICE's grandiose policy visions and goals for making local communities safer through "smarter" and more "proactive" immigration enforcement policy, policy implementation and the consequent results at the community level from S-Comm have given rise to conflicts, concerns, and ambiguities among policymakers, local communities, law enforcement agencies, and the public. Therefore, the main goal of this study was to criticially evaluate S-Comm in terms of a program or policy implementation perspective, using immigration enforcment data. Many social science studies - specifically in the fields of sociology, social justice studies, political science, and legal studies - have discussed S-Comm with different focal points and angles, but few studies have analyzed this program with longitudinal enforcement data from S-Comm. With more than 4 years' data collection efforts through FOIAs, TRAC, and public resources, this study analyzed whether S-Comm has really secured our local communities as DHS/ICE promised, and how the current immigration enforcement machines immersed in mass detention and deportation of noncitizens have been carried out under complicated intergovernmental interactions.

In Chapters 2 and 3, I reviewed American immigration policymaking and related administrative and policy contexts in terms of historical and threotical perspectives. U.S. immigration policy has historically targeted some noncitizen groups for controlling their influx onto the American soil, and these unwanted and unwelcome noncitizen groups have changed over time depending on socioeconomic and political contexts. From such a historical analysis on immigration policy, two interesting points were found. The first is a

"racialized" or "racially motivated" immigration policy trend, which made it possible for policymakers to select and frame who can and cannot be admitted and naturalized, and who can or should be unwelcome and finally removed from American soil (FitzGerald & Cook-Martin, 2014; Melta, 2015; Moloney, 2012). The second is that some noncitizen groups, specifically the Hispanic population, have been the main target for control and punishment since the 1980s. In Chapter 3 as another theoretical background for this study, multiple contextual factors shaping enforcement-oriented policy at the local level - political, economic, demographic, geographical, and their interaction effects - were discussed, as well as how the current immigration enforcement policy has been carried out with what working mechanisms, policy assumptions, and goals, specifically focusing on S-Comm.

As key analysis parts, Chapters 4 and 6 presented longitudinal noncitizen deportation data and discussed whether S-Comm has faithfully followed the stated program goal of making communities safer. In terms of deportation numbers and level of criminality for enforcement actions (Chapter 4), S-Comm has been wrongfully implemented through removal of noncitizens with misdemeanor charges or immigration violations who, in the name of dangerous "criminal aliens," make up over half of those deported under the program. Such implementation outcomes were reconfirmed in Chapter 6 through analysis of the correspondence of policy goals (proactively enforcing and removing dangerous noncitizens at the local level) and outcomes (improving local community safety); there was no significant and meaningful association between these two factors. Moreover, I also found that political factors (e.g., Republican-preferred

counties and the involvement of private prison businesses on immigration detainment in their jurisdictions) and demographic factors (e.g., shares of foreign-born population) significantly made counties lean toward more enforcement-oriented immigration policy actions and policies.

In Chapter 5, I focused on how two key intergovernmental interactions under the current enforcement machine system - immigration detainer issuances and noncitizen deportations - were interrelated, and how localities under the multilayered jurisdictional patchwork trend followed what trajectories of immigration enforcement actions over time. Through LCA, three distinct, statistically reliable subclasses on local immigration enforcement perspectives were extracted, and based on the result of LCA, longitudinal modeling via LGMs indicates that there were interrelationships between and among three variables on the implementation of S-Comm. Through a series of analyses on the implementation of S-Comm, I finally argue that this program has been mismanaged with a biased policy assumption - that of an "immigrant-crime nexus" - and in DHS/ICE's efforts to meet an enforcement quota set by Washington politicians and policymakers, too many noncitizens - including legal residents and the undocumented - have fallen into the trap of current enforcement and deportations as they are administratively named as dangerous criminals.

7.2. Policy Implications

Based on this study, the following three implications should be critically discussed. The first implication is related to reconsideration of policy discourse on

immigrant “illegality” and “criminality” which has been mainly used by immigration restrictionists for legitimating immigration control and punishment. Since the passage of the 1996 federal immigration laws, negative social and legal constructions of immigrants have drastically and institutionally expanded, and consequently the numbers of administratively named “illegal” and “criminal” noncitizens under a strong crimmigration trend have been explosively inflated. Post-1996 immigration governance and management has followed stepped-up enforcement-focused policy directions at the border and interior areas with back-to-back administrative initiatives, such as Operation Streamline. A series of legal and administrative steps have made it possible for federal immigration agencies to create and manage an enforcement regime and almost automatic machinery system run by mass detainment and deportations via immigrant control and punishment.

Such an enforcement-only policy direction since the 2000s without comprehensive understanding of the immigration phenomenon in the American context caused immigration issues to be considered as political issues, not economic issues based on circular migrations of people with a supply-and-demand mechanism. To most Washington politicians and immigration policymakers, noncitizens should merely be subjects of control and expulsion; noncitizens don’t have any legal and administrative rights in the current immigration system, and violations of constitutional rights for them can be tolerated in the name of public safety and national security. Many criminal categories - such as aggravated felony charges under the 1996 laws for mandatory detention and final removal regardless of a noncitizen’s legality - were created and

expanded over time, and these charges have retroactively applied to noncitizens who have lived in the United States for decades and who have strong family and community ties. Under the current enforcement hysteria, immigration enforcement and the consequent criminal and deportation numbers have been administratively created and "manufactured" as Warner (2005 - 06) argued. Under the current enforcement-only policy regime and working mechanisms focusing on punishment and immigration control and prioritizing a frame of immigrant illegality and criminality, policymakers cannot solve the fundamental problems of immigration - including why noncitizens immigrate here, what administrative actions or initiatives from the federal government made it impossible for noncitizens who already resided in the United States to return to their countries, and how noncitizens are connected with local communities and their socioeconomic systems.

Narrowing down the scope of the discussion to S-Comm, federal immigration policymakers should recognize how the implementation of S-Comm has negatively influenced local communities and brought about intergovernmental conflicts through biased program assumptions and program implementation. ICE's obsession to expand enforcement and deportation numbers - with an enforcement quota of 400,000 removals per fiscal year - might bring about unreasonable discretionary power in the process of deciding noncitizens' "dangerousness" under the enforcement machine system. One of the key contentious issues on S-Comm implementation was how ICE defines noncitizen "dangerousness" for removals, and whether such enforcement actions based on dangerousness should be recognized by local counterparts and the public. By using the

three levels of criminality (severity), ICE clearly argues their enforcement actions focus on catching and removing noncitizens with Level 1 convictions - such as murders, sexual assaults, aggravated felonies, and terrorism - who pose a serious threat to public safety and national security. However, as seen in the empirical results from this study (esp. Chapter 4), more than half of noncitizens deported during a 61-month period had Level 3 and immigration violations, the lowest enforcement priorities. Many of the so-called "dangerous" aliens would not have been criminally charged before the 1996 federal immigration laws and related administrative initiatives. Such hugely different perspectives between federal immigration agencies and localities (and the public) on what level of seriousness or dangerousness warrants noncitizen enforcement actions has caused serious intergovernmental conflicts, leading several localities - including states, counties, and cities - to pass local laws institutionally preventing local law enforcement agents from communicating or sharing information with ICE[78]. Through empirical data analyses under the implementation of S-Comm, I would argue that federal bureaucrats' current enforcement actions of removing "dangerous" criminal noncitizens have been seriously biased and mismanaged.

To break the current serious immigration policy malfunctions and repeated policy failures, we need, as Jones-Correa and Graauw (2013) pointed out, to reframe the current

[78] Local resistance to ICE's immigration enforcement actions has generally followed two tracks. The first track is to pass state-level laws or local-level ordinances to limit local interactions with ICE in the process of immigration enforcement policy or rescind the existing intergovernmental agreement. California and Connecticut's Transparency and Responsibility Using State Tools (TRUST) Act in 2012 and 2013, and Washington D.C. city council's resolution can be placed in this category. The second track was mainly made by local law enforcement agencies, via noncompliance with ICE's detainer issuances requesting noncitizens with minor charges be forwarded to federal facilities for deportation proceedings. Many local law enforcement agencies - including Santa Clara County, CA; Champaign County, IL; Milwaukee County, WI; and Multnomah County, OR - have passed local ordinances or County Sheriff policy against ICE's detainer policy since 2012.

enforcement-only immigration perspective and policy approach. As seen in the empirical results from this study (esp. Chapter 6), the enforcement-only policy drives and implementations did not create any meaningful decline in crime over time. Actually, null effects between deportation outcomes under S-Comm and local public safety were found. A policy goal of S-Comm - making communities safer through targeting and removing dangerous noncitizens at the community level - was wrong at the start line; DHS/ICE never targeted dangerous noncitizens as they declared in the enforcement priorities, and they framed many noncitizens with immigration violations and misdemeanor charges as very "dangerous" and the "worst of the worst" who pose a serious threat to public safety and national security. As Davies and Fagan (2012, p. 100) pointed out, community crimes are closely related to the "neighborhood conditions, specifically poverty, anonymity, and heterogeneity" that a locality faces, not a certain racial and ethnic group per se.

The final implication of S-Comm implementation is reconsideration of the role and place of noncitizens. Under an enforcement-only policy drive, voices of noncitizens have been thoroughly ignored. If DHS/ICE and LEAs really want to consider local community safety in the immigration policy context, the first role of federal and local governments is to directly meet community members residing in local communities, including noncitizen residents, and consider their vivid voices about the problems and concerns related to various (sub)groups of noncitizens, and reach a consensus about how these problematic and insecure situations can be solved. Under the S-Comm framework, LEAs have been required to implement incompatible roles simultaneously - as

community protectors for all community members and as immigration agents for catching immigrants residing there - and ICE dealt with noncitizen residents via enforcement-focused frames (Jung, 2015b). Policy intentions for making communities safer through the implementation of S-Comm have ironically made their fellow communities more insecure, through expanding serious mistrust between and among the federal government (ICE), LEAs, and local (including immigrant groups) communities. The experience of S-Comm during the last 6 years makes us ask the following questions: community safety for whom? Does the local community safety under S-Comm consider the migrant communities' voices and concerns? Do or should immigrants living in local communities be considered the subject of management and control? When a policy is wrongfully implemented with biased policy assumptions or information, how do we overcome such problems? A series of self-questions might be finally connected and permit us to return to the basic but fundamental questions of immigration: who we are, how we deal with migration issues as an inescapable global phenomenon in today's world, and how we coexist with noncitizens who are living in our communities.

With serious debates and conflicts on the program relevance and unintended enforcement outcomes during the last six years, DHS Director Jeh Johnson issued two policy memos in December 2014, in which he declared the discontinuation of S-Comm and the slight revision of immigration enforcement priorities, as stated in the epigraph of this chapter. Many migrant rights groups and localities celebrated and welcomed the end of S-Comm, and expected the creation of a new direction and discourse for a better immigration policy. However, in spite of the official ending of S-Comm, everything

except the name of the program - including information sharing between levels of government for immigration enforcement actions, catching and detaining noncitizens at the local level and then transporting them to federal facilities for deportation proceedings via immigration detainer issuances, and deportation of noncitizens based on enforcement priorities - is continuing.[79] Under the current situation, it is still unclear how a new program - sometimes called the "Priority Enforcement Program" (PEP) - will be implemented to replace S-Comm, and whether we can create more meaningful routes for overcoming previous serious policy failures from S-Comm. From an empirical analysis of longitudinal noncitizen deportation outcomes, the message of this study is clear: It is essential to set clear enforcement priorities, clearly define what categories of noncitizens are really dangerous and pose a serious threat to public safety and security, and minimize enforcement for noncitizens with minor charges or immigration violations. This will be

[79] In spite of the termination of S-Comm and a proclamation of an alternative immigration intergovernmental enforcement program (tentatively called the Priority Enforcement Program, or "PEP"), ICE's interoperability system between different levels of government for enforcement actions is continuing. This is nicely shown in ICE's deportation outcomes after S-Comm. Since DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson's Nov. 2014 policy memo on the discontinuation of S-Comm, three monthly IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability statistics showing immigration enforcement actions in the post-S-Comm period were released from ICE's FOIA library (Dec. 2014, Jan. 2015, and Feb. 2015). ICE no longer uses the name "Secure Communities program" in these statistics, but almost everything else - including biometric data sharing and related monthly fingerprint submissions between the federal immigration agency (ICE) and LEAs, monthly IDENT matches in terms of three levels of criminality, and monthly noncitizen deportation numbers in terms of three levels of criminality - remains the same. Ironically but interestingly, these post-S-Comm data appear to show a continuation of the enforcement structure, outcome, and data format seen during the 6 years of S-Comm (2008 - 2014). However, detainer issuances, according to a policy memo from the secretary, will be changed from "the request for detention" to "the request for notification" (Department of Homeland Security, 2014b). Few follow-up guidelines and procedures for PEP have been released from DHS/ICE, so it is still unclear whether this alternative program will be positively carried out according to the policy goal and with the prevention of several problems seen under S-Comm - such as too many noncitizen deportations with minor charges and noncriminal violations. The National Immigration Law Center (2015) follows a pessimistic viewpoint on the direction of PEP, arguing that "PEP is more of the same old, failed detention and deportation system and suffers the same fatal flaws identified with the S-Comm program."

the first step toward fair and effective immigration enforcement policy at the national and local level.

7.3. Limitations

In spite of empirical data-driven analyses on the implementation of S-Comm in terms of longitudinal perspecitves, two limitations should be recognized. The first limitation is related to the data I used for analysis. As I already pointed out, I had no choice but to select some proxy data, specifically regarding monthly immigration detainer issuance, due to ICE's strong resistance to the data release. ICE barely responded to multiple FOIA requests during the last 3 years, and finally rejected some requests with multiple reasons, including lack of public interests, the decision that my data requests were possible "commercial" requests, and nonexistence of the data or information requested. Under such circumstances, I used proxy data, which could not control the possibility of biased results.

ICE's IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability statistics including deportation numbers under the implementation of S-Comm, which I used for analysis, was the by-product of long legal litigations from human rights and migrant rights groups, such as the National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON) and the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR). However, these statistics still have a very limited range of information on noncitizen deportations under S-Comm because they include deportation numbers at the national and local level in terms of level of criminality, and total numbers of fingerprint submissions and IDENT mathces at the national and local level. In spite of these data, the

public cannot know more concretely about noncitizens deported through this program, specifically in terms of which noncitizen groups as defined by nationality, race, and ethnicity have mainly been deported and why; noncitizens' age level, gender, and law violation categories related to their deportation orders; how long they have been detained and where (what federal or local jails or detention facilities); how they have been dealt with in these facilities; and whether they can get any minimum level of legal advice or help. For analyzing whether S-Comm has been carried out with the program goal, more in-depth research is needed with these data and information.

This series of data limitations for more in-depth research is connected with the lack of full understanding about how the current enforcement machines for maximizing enforcement numbers have been worked with what mechanisms, incentives, and interactions. For understanding current immigration enforcement policy under S-Comm, I created a conceptual framework focusing on interactions between and among related policy actors, as in Figure 6.1, but this represents a simplified working mechanism with limited information. With valid and reliable data and qualitative backup - from interviews of ICE's local field agents and LESC agents, as well as local law enforcement agents, or participation observations in immigration courts and administrative processing of individual cases under the implementation of S-Comm - the public could come a little closer to understanding how each case on immigration enforcement actions has been dealt with in the federal-local interaction framework.

7.4. Future Research

Based on this study, various follow-up research and academic communications on the implementation of current immigration enforcement policy, specifically S-Comm, can be made in future scholarship. The first extension is a more in-depth analysis of working mechanisms of the current enforcement machines with longitudinal data. For this study, I analyzed enforcement trajectories under the S-Comm framework in 541 counties with five time points, covering a 13-month period (Dec. 2011 - Jan. 2013). I expect follow-up studies about such enforcement outcomes and trajectories with different research units (e.g., states or cities) and multiple time points will be made, with comparisons made between their outcomes and mine. Analysis of different but closely connected enforcement outcomes under the Obama administration, such as 287(g) partnerships and the Criminal Alien Program, will be another desirable research area for deeper understanding of current immigration control policy.

The second extension is to understand intergovernmental relations on immigration issues with more critical viewpoints and methods. As I discussed in this dissertation, different levels of government have dynamically interacted with each other under a *multilayerd jurisdictional patchwork* trend on immigration issues. They have cooperative enforcement systems and programs administratively, but different local perspectives on immigration caused such intergovernmental enforcement programs to have considerable local variations on the implementation of immigration enforcement policy. However, as in the case of Arizona's local experiment from SB1070 in 2010 and its copycat laws across several states, there are serious legal conflicts on the role and rights of

immigration policy and its implementation, which brought about much legal litigation during the last few years. With the understanding of such *administratively-cooperative-but-legally-conflicting* intergovernmental relations on immigration issues, future scholarship will need to study how different levels of governments interact and increase their political and policy voices in the process of immigration policy. For example, how do federal immigration agencies (DHS/ICE) get local (non)compliance in their interrelation of enforcment actions? When and under what conditions can localities cooperate or resist federal enforcement requests? Have federal financial supports for local law enforcement agencies' immigration enforcement involvement, such as via the implementation of the State Criminal Alien Assistnace Program (SCAAP), made localities become more involved in the current intergovernmental immigration enforcement policy?

Finally, more understanding about the usage of discretionary power in the implementation of immigration enforcement policy is also needed. As I pointed out in this study, there are multiple administrative points or stages when different levels of government agents, specficially front-line bureuacrats, have no choice but to use their discretionary authority in their everyday enforcement work. For example, local law enforcement agents decide what suspected noncitizens' fingerpints should (not) be submitted to ICE for immigration status checks. At the federal level, ICE agents should decide what noncitizens are administratively set as Level 1 criminal noncitizens or as a different level of criminals (or noncriminals), which is inescapably involved in agents' discretionary power usage. There are still murky areas on this use of discretionary power

by immigration agents in the process of immigration enforcement policy, so future studies will need to undertake this research topic in-depth via case studies and interviews of federal agents and local law enforcement agents dealing with immigration enforcement issues.

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APPENDIX A

STAGGERED ROLLOUT SCHEME OF S-COMM:

ACTIVATION DATE (MONTH) OF LOCALITY

Local (County) Participation in the Secure Communities Program: Based on a Staggered Rollout Scheme

Time (Month)	Monthly # of Counties activating S-Comm	State (Name of county/city) activating S-Comm
Oct. 2008	1	TX (**Harris**)
Nov. 2008	6	MA (**Suffolk**), NC (**Buncombe**, **Gaston**, **Henderson** & **Wake**), TX (**Dallas**)
Dec. 2008	7	AZ (**Pinal**), PA (**Bucks** & **Montgomery**), TX (Kinney, Maverick, Real & **Val Verde**)
Jan. 2009	15	AZ (**Maricopa**, **Yavapai** & **Yuma**), FL (**Duval** & **Marion**), NC (**Cabarrus**, **Catawba**, **Duplin**, **Harnett**, **New Hanover** & **Orange**), TX (**Collin**, **Denton**, Uvalde & Zavala)
Feb. 2009	13	FL (**Charlotte**, **Clay**, **Collier**, **Hillsborough**, **Miami-Dade**, St. Johns & **St. Lucie**), NC (**Cumberland** & **Durham**), TX (**Grayson**, **Hunt**, **Johnson** & **Kaufman**)
May 2009	2	CA (**San Diego**), VA (**Fairfax**)
Jun. 2009	20	NM (**Dona Ana**), TX (**Bexar**, Brewster, Brooks, Dimmit, **El Paso**, **Hidalgo**, Jeff Davis, Jim Wells, Kennedy, Kleberg, **Nueces**, Pecos, Presidio, **Starr**, Terrell, **Travis**, **Webb**, **Willacy** & **Zapata**)
Jul. 2009	7	CA (**Ventura**), NM (Grant, Hidalgo & Luna), PA (**Philadelphia**), TX (Culberson & Hudspeth)
Aug. 2009	3	CA (**Los Angeles**), FL (**Broward**), TX (**Tarrant**)
Sep. 2009	8	CA (**Imperial**), NM (**Bernalillo**), TX (**Brazoria**, **Fort Bend**, **Galveston**, **Jefferson** & **Montgomery**), VA (**Prince William**)
Oct. 2009	4	FL (**Brevard** & **Manatee**), MI (**Wayne**), NC (**Mecklenburg**)
Nov. 2009	13	AZ (**Cochise**, **Pima** & **Santa Cruz**), FL (**Monroe** & **Pinellas**), GA (**Clayton**, **DeKalb** & **Gwinnett**), IL (**DuPage** & **Kane**), LA (**Jefferson Parish**), OK (**Oklahoma** & **Tulsa**)
Dec. 2009	3	FL (**Highlands** & **Lake**), MD (**Prince George's**)
Jan. 2010	8	CA (**Sacramento**, **Santa Barbara**, **San Luis Obispo** & **Solano**), OH (**Cuyahoga** & **Franklin**), TX (**McLennan** & **Williamson**)
Feb. 2010	2	CA (**San Joaquin** & **Stanislaus**)
Mar. 2010	17	CA (**Fresno**, **Sonoma** & **Orange**), NC (Brunswick, Columbus, Dare, Halifax, Jackson, **Lee**,

		Transylvania & **Union**), UT (**Davis**, **Utah** & **Salk Lake**), VA (**Alexandria City**, Fauquier & **Loudoun**)
Apr. 2010	34	CA (**Alameda**, **Contra Costa**, **Monterey** & **San Bernardino**), DE (Kent, **New Castle** & **Sussex**), FL (**Escambia**, **Leon**, **Orange**, **Osceola**, **Palm Beach**, **Polk**, **Sarasota** & **Volusia**), HI (**Oahu**), IL (**Lake**, **Madison**, **McHenry**, St. Clair, **Will** & **Winnebag**o), MD (**Frederick**, Queen Anne's & St. Mary's), OR (**Clackamas**), UT (Box Elder & **Weber**), VA (**Arlington**, **Henrico**, **Norfolk City**, Rappahannock, **Richmond City**, **Virginia Beach City**)
May. 2010	28	CA (**Riverside, San Mateo** & **Santa Clara**), LA (**Orleans Parish**), OR (**Marion** & **Multnomah**), TX (**Bell**, Hemphill, **Lubbock**, **Potter** & Randall), UT (Cache), VA (Brunswick, Caroline, **Chesterfield**, Colonial Heights City, Dinwiddie, Falls Church City, Greensville, **Hanover**, Hopewell City, **Newport News City**, Nottoway, Petersburg City, Prince Edward, Prince George, Richmond & **Stafford**)
Jun. 2010	205	CA (**San Francisco**), CT (**Fairfield**), FL (**Alachua**, Baker, **Bay**, Bradford, Calhoun, Citrus, Columbia, **DeSoto**, Dixie, Flagler, Franklin, Gadsden, Gilchrist, **Glades**, Gulf, Hamilton, **Hardee**, **Hendry**, Hernando, Holmes, **Indian River**, Jackson, Jefferson, Lafayette, **Lee**, Levy, Liberty, Madison, **Martin**, Nassau, **Okaloosa**, **Okeechobee**, **Pasco**, Putnam, Santa Rosa, **Seminole**, Sumter, **Suwannee**, Taylor, Union, Wakulla, **Walton** & Washington), ID (**Ada** & **Canyon**), LA (**East Baton Rouge**), SD (**Minnehaha** & Pennington), TN (**Hamilton**, **Knox** & **Shelby**), TX (Aransas, **Atascosa**, Bandera, **Bastrop**, Bee, Blanco, Bosque, **Burnet**, Caldwell, Calhoun, **Comal**, Coryell, Duval, Edwards, Falls, Fayette, Freestone, Frio, **Gillespie**, **Gonzales**, **Guadalupe**, Hamilton, **Hays**, Hill, Jackson, Jim Hogg, Karnes, **Kendall**, **Kerr**, Kimble, Lampasas, Lavaca, **Limestone**, Llano, La Salle, **Live Oak**, Mason, Matagorda, McCulloch, McMullen, Medina, San Patricio, San Saba, Somervell, **Victoria**, **Wharton** & Wilson), UT (Beaver, Sevier & **Washington**), VA (Alleghany, Amelia, Amherst, Appomattox, Bath, Bedford, Bedford City, Bland, Botetourt, Bristol City, Buchanan, Buckingham, Buena Vista City, Campbell, Carroll, Charles City, Charlotte, Covington City, Craig, Cumberland, Danville City, Dickenson, Essex, Floyd, Franklin City, Galax City, Giles, Goochland, Grayson, Halifax, Henry, King and Queen, King William, Lancaster, Lee, Lexington City, Lunenburg, Lynchburg City, Martinsville City, Mathews, Mecklenburg, Middlesex, Montgomery, New Kent, Northumberland, Norton City, Powhatan, Surry, Sussex, Westmoreland, Accomack, **Albemarle**, Augusta, Charlottesville City,

		Chesapeake City, Clarke, Culpeper, Fluvanna, Franklin, Frederick, Fredericksburg City, Gloucester, Greene, Hampton City, Harrisonburg City, Highland, Isle of Wight, James City, King George, Louisa, Madison, Nelson, Northampton, Orange, Page, Patrick, Pittsylvania, Portsmouth City, Pulaski, Redford City, Roanoke, **Roanoke City**, Rockingham, Russell, Salem City, Scott, Shenandoah, Smyth, Southampton, **Spotsylvania**, Staunton City, Suffolk City, Tazewell, Warren, Washington, Waynesboro City, Williamsburg City, **Winchester City**, Wise, Wythe & York)
Jul. 2010	78	AZ (**Mohave** & **Apache**), CA (**Butte**, **El Dorado**, **Placer**, **Shasta**, **Tulare**, **Yolo** & **Yuba**), MI (**Oakland**), MS (Warren), MT (Lewis and Clark & Missoula), NV (**Clark** & **Washoe**), NC (Cherokee, Clay, Graham, Haywood, Macon, Madison, Swain, Yancey), OH (**Butler**, **Hamilton** & **Montgomery**), TX (Anderson, Andrews, **Angelina**, Bowie, **Cameron**, Camp, Cass, Chambers, **Cherokee**, **Colorado**, Crane, Delta, DeWitt, **Ector**, Fannin, Franklin, Goliad, **Gregg**, Hardin, **Harrison**, Henderson, Hopkins, Jasper, Lamar, **Liberty**, Loving, Marion, Martin, **Midland**, Morris, **Nacogdoches**, Newton, Orange, Panola, Polk, Rains, Red River, **Reeves**, Refugio, Rusk, San Augustine, Shelby, **Smith**, **Titus**, Tyler, Upshur, Upton, Van Zandt, Ward, Winkler & Wood), UT (**Iron** & Millard)
Aug. 2010	93	AZ (**Navajo** & **Coconino**), AR (**Benton**, **Pulaski**, & **Washington**), CA (**Humboldt**, **Lake**, **Marin**, **Mendocino**, **Merced**, **Napa** & **Santa Cruz**), IA (**Polk**), LA (**Lafourche** & **Terrebonne**), MI (**Macomb**), MS (**Harrison**, Lowndes & **Rankin**), MT (Yellowstone), NE (**Douglas** & **Lancaster**), NC (Burke, Caldwell, Cleveland, Davidson, **Forsyth**, **Iredell**, Lincoln, McDowell, Polk & Rutherford), OH (Summit), OR (**Washington**), SD (Custer, Fall River & Jackson), TN (**Davidson**), TX (Archer, Baylor, Borden, Brown, Callahan, Clay, Coleman, Comanche, Coke, **Concho**, Cooke, Crockett, Dawson, Eastland, **Ellis**, Erath, Fisher, Foard, Gaines, Glasscock, Hardeman, Haskell, **Hood**, **Howard**, Iron, Jack, Jones, Kent, King, Knox, Menard, Mitchell, Mills, Montague, **Navarro**, Palo Pinto, **Parker**, Reagan, **Rockwall**, Runnels, Sabine, Schleicher, Scurry, Shackelford, Stephens, Sterling, Stonewall, Sutton, **Taylor**, Throckmorton, Tom Green, **Wichita**, Wilbarger, **Wise** & Young)
Sep. 2010	85	CA (**Kern**, **Kings** & **Madera**), GA (**Cobb**, **Fulton** & **Muscogee**), HI (**Hawaii**, Kauai & **Maui**), IL (Alexander, Clinton, Franklin, Jackson, Massac, Pulaski & Washington), MI (**Kent**), MS (**DeSoto**), MO (**St. Louis City** & **St. Louis**), NC (**Alamance**, Bladen, Chatham, Edgecombe, Granville, **Hoke**, **Johnston**, Moore & Nash), SC (**Charleston**, **Greenville** & **Horry**), TX (Armstrong, Austin,

		Bailey, **Brazos**, Briscoe, Burleson, Carson, Castro, Childress, Cochran, Collingsworth, Cottle, Crosby, Dallam, **Dear Smith**, Dickens, Donley, Floyd, **Garza**, Gray, Grimes, Hale, Hall, Hansford, Hartley, Hockley, Houston, Hutchinson, Lamb, Lee, Leon, Lipscomb, Lynn, Madison, Milam, **Moore**, Motley, Nolan, **Ochiltree**, Oldham, Parmer, Roberts, Robertson, San Jacinto, Sherman, Swisher, Terry, Trinity, **Walker**, **Waller**, **Washington**, Wheeler & Yoakum)
Oct. 2010	87	AZ (Gila, Graham, Greenlee, & La Paz), GA (**Hall** & **Whitfield**), IL (**Champaign**, Christian, Effingham, Marion, Stephenson, Vermillion & Williamson), KY (**Fayette**), NV (Carson City, Churchill, Douglas & Lyon), NC (Alexander, Alleghany, Ashe, Avery, Mitchell, Rockingham, Stokes, Surry, Watauga, Wilkes & Yadkin), SC (**Beaufort**, **Berkley**, Dorchester & **York**), WV (Barbour, Berkeley, Boone, Braxton, Brooke, Cabell, Calhoun, Clay, Fayette, Gilmer, Grant, Greenbrier, Hampshire, Hancock, Hardy, Harrison, Jackson, Jefferson, Kanawha, Lewis, Lincoln, Logan, Marion, Marshall, Mason, McDowell, Mercer, Mineral, Mingo, Monongalia, Monroe, Morgan, Nicholas, Ohio, Pendleton, Pleasants, Pocahontas, Preston, Putnam, Raleigh, Randolph, Ritchie, Roane, Summers, Taylor, Tucker, Tyler, Upshur, Wayne, Webster, Wetzel, Wirt, Wood & Wyoming)
Nov. 2010	55	GA (**Cherokee**), IL (Crawford, De Witt, Ford & Piatt), LA (**Caddo Parish** & **St. Tammany Parish**), MO (Clay, **Jackson** & Platte), NE (Adams, Buffalo, **Hall**, Hamilton, Howard, **Madison** & Merrick), NV (Lincoln & Nye), NM (Catron, Chaves, **Cibola**, Curry, Eddy, **Lea**, McKinley, Mora, Otero, Sandoval, Sierra, Socorro, Torrance & Valencia), NC (Anson, Davie, **Guilford**, Montgomery, Randolph, Richmond, Rowan, Scotland &Stanly), OH (**Clark** & **Warren**), OK (Canadian, **Cleveland**, **Garfield**, Grady, Lincoln, Logan, McClain & Pottawatomie), SC (Allendale, Bamberg & Bamwell)
Dec. 2010	91	AR (Crawford, **Garland**, Jefferson, Miller, **Saline**, **Sebastian**, Union & White), CA (Mariposa, Mono & Tuolumne), GA (**Forsyth**), IA (Pottawattamie), KS (**Sedgwick**), LA (Washington), MD (**Baltimore**, Carroll & **Anne Arundel**), MS (**Forrest**, Hancock, Jackson, **Jones** & Pearl River), NE (**Sarpy**), NM (Colfax, DeBaca, Guadalupe, Harding, Lincoln, Los Alamos, Quay, Rio Arriba, Roosevelt, **San Juan**, San Miguel, Taos & Union), NC (Bertie, Caswell, Martin, Pender, Person, **Pitt**, **Sampson**, Vance & Wayne), OH (Champaign, Logan, Madison, Muskingum & Union), OK (Bryan, Carter, Cherokee, Comanche, Creek, Kay, McIntosh, **Muskogee**, Okfuskee, Okmulgee, Osage, Pawnee, Payne, Pittsburg, Pontotoc, Rogers, Sequoyah, Stephens, Wagoner & Washington),

		SC (Colleton, Hampton & Jasper), TN (Anderson, **Bedford**, **Blount**, **Bradley**, Carter, Coffee, Greene, **Hamblen**, Jefferson, **Madison**, McMinn, Obion, Roane, **Sevier**, Sullivan, **Warren** & **Washington**)
Jan. 2011	107	CA (**Colusa**, **Nevada**, Plumas, **Sutter** & **Tehama**), GA (**Henry**, **Rockdale** & Spalding), IA (Hardin), KS (**Saline**), MO (Pettis, Adair, Buchanan, Clark, Montgomery, Perry, Scott), NV (Storey), NY (**Putnam** & **Rockland**), NC (Franklin, Greene, Jones, Lenoir, Onslow, Robeson, Warren & Wilson), OH (Athens & Licking), SC (Cherokee, Greenwood, Laurens & Oconees), WI (Adams, Ashland, Barron, Bayfield, **Brown**, Buffalo, Burnett, Calumet, Chippewa, Clark, Columbia, Crawford, **Dane**, Dodge, Door, Douglas, Dunn, Eau Claire, Florence, Fond du Lac, Forest, Grant, Green, Green Lake, Iowa, Iron, Jackson, Jefferson, Juneau, **Kenosha**, Kewaunee, La Crosse, Lafayette, Langlade, Lincoln, Manitowoc, Marathon, Marinette, Marquette, Menominee, **Milwaukee**, Monroe, Oconto, Oneida, Outagamie, Ozaukee, Pepin, Pierce, Polk, Portage, Price, Racine, Richland, Rock, Rusk, Saint Croix, Sauk, Sawyer, Shawano, Sheboygan, Taylor, **Trempealeau**, Vernon, Vilas, **Walworth**, Washburn, Washington, **Waukesha**, Waupaca, Waushara, Winnebago & Wood), WY (**Laramie**)
Feb. 2011	69	CA (Alpine, Amador, Calaveras, Del Norte, **Glenn**, Inyo, **Lassen**, Modoc, **San Benito**, Sierra, Siskiyou & Trinity), CO (**Arapahoe**, **Denver** & **El Paso**), GA (**Barrow**, Newton & Walton), MD (Caroline, Dorchester, Kent, Somerset, Talbot & Worcester), MO (Boone, Cape Girardeau, **Cass**, Cole, Dunklin, **Jasper**, Marion & **Saint Charles**), NE (**Dodge**), NV (Mineral), NM (**Santa Fe**), NY (**Dutchess**, Genesee, **Nassau**, **Orange**, Orleans, **Suffolk**, Sullivan, Ulster & **Westchester**), NC (Beaufort, Carteret, Craven, Hyde, Pamlico, Tyrrell & Washington), OH (Ashtabula, Belmont, Coshocton, Fairfield, Fayette, Guernsey, Hocking, Jefferson, **Lake**, Monroe, Morgan, Morrow, Noble, Perry, Vinton & Washington), SC (Abbeville & **Spartanburg)**
Mar. 2011	76	GA (**Chatham**, **Coweta**, **Fayette**, **Glynn**, **Houston** & **Troup**), IA (Benton, Black Hawk, **Johnson**, Linn & **Woodbury**), KS (**Douglas**, **Finney**, **Johnson**, Leavenworth, Miami, **Shawnee** & **Wyandotte**), MD (Calvert, Cecil, Charles, Harford & **Howard**), MI (Genesee, Monroe & **Washtenaw**), MO (Camden, Christian, **Greene**, McDonald, Newton, Stone & Taney), NV (Pershing), NY (Monroe, Schuyler & Wyoming), NC (Camden, Chowan, Currituck, Gates, Hertford, Northampton, Pasquotank & Perquimans), OH (Allen, Ashland, Delaware, Geauga, Harrison, Hancock, Hardin, Huron, Knox, Lorain, Marion, Ottawa, Paulding, Pickaway, Portage,

		Sandusky, Seneca, Trumbull, Williams, Wood & Wyandot), RI (Bristol, Kent, Newport, **Providence** & Washington), SC (**Chester**, McCormick & Union), UT (**Summit** & Tooele)
Apr. 2011	110	AL (Autauga, **Baldwin**, Blount, **Chilton**, Elmore, Escambia, Etowah, **Jefferson**, Lee, **Limestone**, **Marshall**, **Mobile**, **Morgan**, Tallapoosa, & **Tuscaloosa**), GA (**Carroll**, **Colquitt**, **Douglas**, **Lowndes** & Paulding), ID (Kootenai), IN (Benton, Boone, Cass, Carroll, **Clark**, Clinton, Fountain, Fulton, Jasper, Miami, Newton, Pulaski, Starke, Steuben, Wabash, Warren, Warrick & White), IA (Clinton, Dubuque, Muscatine & Scott), KS (**Ford**), MD (Allegany, Garrett, Washington & Wicomico), MI (**Allegan**, Barry, **Calhoun**, Clinton, Eaton, **Ingham**, Ionia, Jackson, Kalamazoo, Livingston, Muskegon, **Ottawa**, Saint Clair & Shiawassee), MO (Daviess, Douglas, Howell, Laclede, Oregon, Ozark, Pulaski, Texas & Webster), NV (Humboldt), NY (**Cayuga**, **Chautauqua**, Fulton, Livingston, Niagara, **Ontario**, Otsego, Senaca, **Steuben** & Yates), OH (Adams, Brown, Clermont, Clinton, Crawford, Darke, Gallia, Greene, Henry, Highland, Jackson, Lawrence, Lucas, Miami, Meigs, Pike, Preble, Putnam, Ross, Scioto, Shelby, Van Wert & Wayne), OR (Columbia), SC (Kershaw, Lancaster, **Orangeburg** & **Richland**)
May 2011	66	AL (Calhoun, Cherokee, Clay, Colbert, Coosa, Cullman, Franklin, Jackson, **Shelby**, Talladega), GA (**Bartow**, **Floyd** & Polk), ID (Bannock, Bonner, **Bonneville** & **Twin Falls**), IN (**Elkhart**, Grant, **Hendricks**, Henry, Howard, Huntington, Madison, **Marion**, Montgomery, Noble, Parke & Tippecanoe), IA (Story), MO (Barton, Cedar, Putnam, Saint Clair, Sullivan & Vernon), NE (Saunders), NV (Elko), NY (**Allegany**, Clinton & Warren), OH (Stark & Tuscarawas), OK (Adair, Beckham, Choctaw, Cotton, Custer, Delaware, Ellis, Jackson, Haskell, Jefferson, Le Flore, Marshall, Mayes, Noble, Ottawa, Roger Mills, **Texas** & Woodward), OR (Clatsop), SC (Calhoun, Chesterfield & Sumter), UT (Uintah)
Jun. 2011	100	AL (**DeKalb**, Lamar, Lawrence, Marengo, Marion, Monroe), GA (**Clarke**, Coffee, Dougherty, Habersham, Grady, Jackson, Jeff Davis & Pickens), IN (**Bartholomew**, Brown, Clay, Crawford, Davies, Delaware, Gibson, Green, **Johnson**, Knox, Lawrence, Morgan, Orange, Pike, Posey, Ripley, **Shelby**, Switzerland, Vermillion, Union, Wayne, Wells), KS (Harvey & Reno), MI (Bay, **Berrien**, Lapeer, Midland, Saginaw & **Van Buren**), MO (Ray), NV (Lander), NY (Cattaraugus, **Essex**, Montgomery & Schoharle), OH (Auglaize, Carroll, Columbiana, Erie, Holmes, Medina & Mercer), OR (**Jackson** & Josephine), SC (Clarendon, Fairfield & Lee), WA (**Yakima**), PR (Aguadilla, Aibonito, Arecibo, Braceloneta, Barranquitas, Bayamon, Cabo Rojo, Caguas, Camuy,

		Carolina, Catano, Cayey, Ceiba, Cidra, Corozal, Fajardo, Guayama, Guaynabo, Gurabo, Humacao, Jayuya, Juncos, Lajas, Luquillo, Mayaguez, Moca, Orocovis, Ponce, Rincon, Rio Grande, San Juan, San Lorenzo, San Sebastian, Toa Alta, Trujillo Alto, Utuado & Villalba)
Jul. 2011	83	AL (Choctaw, Conecuh, Dallas, Hale, Perry, Washington), AR (Boone, Carroll, **Faulkner**, Hempstead, Johnson, Pope, Sevier & Yell), GA (Catoosa, **Gordon**, Monroe, Murray & Walker), IN (**Jackson**), KS (Geary & Pottawatomie), LA (Ascension, Iberia, **Lafayette**, **Livingston**, **St. Bernard**, St. Charles & St. John the Baptist), MI (Huron, Sanilac & Tuscola), MS (Attala, Claiborne, Copiah, Covington, Franklin, George, Greene, **Hinds**, Jefferson Davis, Lamar, Lauderdale, Lawrence, Leake, Lincoln, **Madison**, Marion, Montgomery, Neshoba, Noxubee, Perry, Pike, Quitman, **Scott**, Sharkey, Stone, Sunflower, Tallahatchie, Walthall, Wayne, Wilkinson & Yalobusha), MO (Callaway, Jefferson, Johnson, Miller, Moniteau & Saint Francois), OH (Defiance, Fulton, **Mahoning** & Richland), SC (**Aiken**, Anderson, Darlington, **Florence** & Georgetown), WA (**Benton**, **Franklin**, **Grays Harbor**, **Lewis** & Pacific)
Aug. 2011	6	MI (Chippewa, Gogebic, Houghton & Mackinac), MO (Sainte Genevieve & Washington)
Sep. 2011	86	MI (Alcona, Alger, Alpena, Antrim, Arenac, Baraga, Benzie, Branch, Cass, Charlevoix, Cheboygan, Clare, Crawford, Delta, Dickinson, Emmet, Gladwin, Grand Traverse, Gratiot, Hillsdale, Iosco, Iron, Isabella, Kalkaska, Keweenaw, Lake, Leelanau, Lenawee, Luce, Manistee, Marquette, Mason, Mecosta, Menominee, Missaukee, Montcalm, Montmorency, Newaygo, **Oceana**, Ogemaw, Ontonagon, Osceola, Oscoda, Otsego, Presque Isle, Roscommon, Saint Joseph, Schoolcraft & Wexford), OR (Baker, Benton, Coos, Crook, Curry, **Deschutes**, Douglas, Gilliam, Grant, Harney, **Hood River**, Jefferson, Klamath, Lake, **Lane**, Lincoln, **Linn**, Malheur, Morrow, Polk, Sherman, Tillamook, **Umatilla**, Union, Wallowa, Wasco, Wheeler & **Yamhill**), SC (Dillon, Edgefield, **Lexington**, Marion, Marlboro, Newberry, Pickens, Saluda & Williamsburg)
Nov. 2011	171	ID (Adams, Bear Lake, Benewah, Bingham, Blaine, Boise, Boundary, Butte, Camas, Caribou, **Cassia**, Clark, Clearwater, Custer, Elmore, Franklin, Fremont, Gem, **Gooding**, Idaho, Jefferson, **Jerome**, Latah, Lemhi, Lewis, Lincoln, Madison, Minidoka, Nez Perce, Oneida, Owyhee, Payette, Power, Shoshone, Teton, Valley & Washington), MS (**Adams**, Alcorn, Amite, Benton, Bolivar, Calhoun, Carroll, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Clarke, Clay, Coahoma, Grenada, Holmes, Humphreys, Issaquena, Itawamba, Jasper, Jefferson, Kemper, Lafayette, Lee, Leflore, Marshall, Monroe, Newton, Oktibbeha, Panola, Pontotoc, Prentiss, Simpson, Smith, Tate, Tippah, Tishomingo,

		Tunica, Union, Washington, Webster, Winston & Yazoo), MO (Andrew, Atchison, Audrain, Barry, Bates, Benton, Bollinger, Butler, Caldwell, Carroll, Carter, Chariton, Clinton, Cooper, Crawford, Dade, Dallas, DeKalb, Dent, Franklin, Gasconade, Gentry, Grundy, Harrison, Henry, Hickory, Holt, Howard, Iron, Knox, Lafayette, Lawrence, Lewis, Lincoln, Linn, Livingston, Macon, Madison, Maries, Mercer, Mississippi, Monroe, Morgan, New Madrid, Nodaway, Osage, Pemiscot, Phelps, Pike, Polk, Ralls, Randolph, Reynolds, Ripley, Saline, Schuyler, Scotland, Shannon, Shelby, Stoddard, Warren, Wayne, Worth & Wright), OK (Alfalfa, Atoka, Beaver, Blaine, Caddo, Cimarron, Coal, Craig, Dewey, Garvin, Grant, Greer, Harmon, Harper, Hughes, Johnston, Kingfisher, Kiowa, Latimer, Love, Major, McCurtain, Murray, Nowata, Pushmataha, Seminole, Tillman, Washita & Woods)
Dec. 2011	261	GA (Appling, Atkinson, Bacon, Baker, Baldwin, Banks, Ben Hill, Berrien, Bibb, Bleckley, Brantley, Brooks, Bryan, Bulloch, Burke, Butts, Calhoun, Camden, Candler, **Charlton**, Chattahoochee, Chattooga, Clay, Clinch, Columbia, Cook, Crawford, Crisp, Dade, Dawson, Decatur, Dodge, Dooly, Early, Echols, Effingham, Elbert, Emanuel, Evans, Fannin, Franklin, Gilmer, Glascock, Greene, Hancock, Haralson, Harris, Hart, Heard, Irwin, Jasper, Jefferson, Jenkins, Johnson, Jones, Lamar, Lanier, Laurens, Lee, Liberty, Lincoln, Long, Lumpkin, Macon, Madison, Marion, McDuffie, McIntosh, Meriwether, Miller, Mitchell, Montgomery, Morgan, Oconee, Oglethorpe, Peach, Pierce, Pike, Pulaski, Putnam, Quitman, Rabun, Randolph, **Richmond**, Schley, Screven, Seminole, Stephens, Stewart, Sumter, Talbot, Taliaferro, Tattnall, Taylor, **Telfair**, Terrell, Thomas, Tift, Toombs, Towns, Treutlen, Turner, Twiggs, Union, Upson, Ware, Warren, Washington, Wayne, Webster, Wheeler, White, Wilcox, Wilkes, Wilkinson & Worth), IN (Adams, **Allen**, Blackford, De Kalb, Dearborn, Decatur, Dubois, Fayette, Floyd, Franklin, Hamilton, Hancock, Harrison, Jay, Jefferson, Jennings, Kosciusko, La Porte, Lagrange, **Lake**, Marshall, Martin, Monroe, Ohio, Owen, Perry, Porter, Putnam, Randolph, Rush, Saint Joseph, Scott, Spencer, Sullivan, Tipton, **Vanderburgh**, Vigo, Washington & Whitley), KS (Allen, Anderson, Atchison, Barber, Barton, Bourbon, Brown, Butler, Chase, Chautauqua, Cherokee, Cheyenne, Clark, Clay, Cloud, Coffey, Comanche, Cowley, Crawford, Decatur, Dickson, Doniphan, Edwards, Elk, Ellis, Ellsworth, Franklin, Gove, Graham, Grant, Gray, Greeley, Greenwood, Hamilton, Harper, Haskell, Hodgeman, Jackson, Jefferson, Jewell, Kearny, Kingman, Kiowa, Labette, Lane, Lincoln, Linn, Logan, Lyon, Marion, Marshall, McPherson, Meade, Mitchell, Montgomery, Morris, Morton, Nemaha, Neosho, Ness, Norton, Osage, Osborne, Ottawa, Pawnee, Phillips, Pratt, Rawlins,

		Republic, Rice, Riley, Rooks, Rush, Russell, Scott, **Seward**, Sheridan, Sherman, Smith, Stafford, Stanton, Stevens, Sumner, Thomas, Trego, Wabaunsee, Wallace, Washington, Wichita, Wilson & Woodson), UT (Carbon, Daggett, Duchesne, Emery, Garfield, Grand, Juab, Kane, Morgan, Piute, Rich, San Juan, Sanpete, Wasatch & Wayne)
Jan. 2012	160	IA (Adair, Adams, Allamakee, Appanoose, Audubon, Boone, Bremer, Buchanan, Buena Vista, Butler, Calhoun, Carroll, Cass, Cedar, Cerro Gordo, Cherokee, Chickasaw, Clarke, Clay, Clayton, Crawford, Dallas, Davis, Decatur, Delaware, Des Moines, Dickinson, Emmet, Fayette, Floyd, Franklin, Fremont, Greene, Grundy, Guthrie, Hamilton, Hancock, Harrison, Henry, Howard, Humboldt, Ida, Iowa, Jackson, Jasper, Jefferson, Jones, Keokuk, Kossuth, Lee, Louisa, Lucas, Lyon, Madison, Mahaska, Marion, Marshall, Mills, Mitchell, Monona, Monroe, Montgomery, OBrien, Osceola, Page, Palo Alto, Plymouth, Pocahontas, Poweshiek, Ringgold, Sac, Shelby, **Sioux**, Tama, Taylor, Union, Van Buren, Wapello, Warren, Washington, Wayne, Webster, Winnebago, Winneshiek, Worth & Wright), TN (Benton, Bledsoe, Campbell, Canon, Carroll, Cheatham, Chester, Claiborne, Clay, Cocke, Crockett, Cumberland, Decatur, DeKalb, Dickson, Dyer, Fayette, Fentress, Franklin, Gibson, Giles, Grainger, Grundy, Hancock, Hardeman, Hardin, Hawkins, Haywood, Henderson, Henry, Hickman, Houston, Humphreys, Jackson, Johnson, Lake, Lauderdale, Lawrence, Lewis, Lincoln, Loudon, Macon, Marion, Marshall, Maury, McNairy, Meigs, Monroe, **Montgomery**, Moore, Morgan, Overton, Perry, Pickett, Polk, **Putnam**, Rhea, **Robertson**, **Rutherford**, Scott, Sequatchie, Smith, Stewart, **Sumner**, Tipton, Trousdale, Unicoi, Union, Van Buren, Wayne, Weakley, White, **Williamson** & Wilson)
Feb. 2012	117	CT (**Hartford**, Litchfield, Middlesex, **New Haven**, New London, Tolland & Windham), MD (**Baltimore City** & **Montgomery**), MN (Aitkin, **Anoka**, Becker, Beltrami, Benton, Big Stone, Blue Earth, Brown, Carlton, Carver, Cass, Chippewa, Chisago, Clay, Clearwater, Cook, Cottonwood, Crow Wing, **Dakota**, Dodge, Douglas, Faribault, Fillmore, Freeborn, Goodhue, Grant, **Hennepin**, Houston, Hubbard, Isanti, Itasca, Jackson, Kanabec, Kandiyohi, Kittson, Koochiching, Lac Qui Parle, Lake, Lake of the Woods, Le Sueur, Lincoln, Lyon, Mahnomen, Marshall, Martin, McLeod, Meeker, Mille Lacs, Morrison, **Mower**, Murray, Nicollet, **Nobles**, Norman, **Olmsted**, Otter Tail, Pennington, Pine, Pipestone, Polk, Pope, **Ramsey**, Red Lake, Redwood, Renville, Rice, Rock, Roseau, Saint Louis, **Scott**, **Sherburne**, Sibley, **Stearns**, Steele, Stevens, Swift, Todd, Traverse, Wabasha, Wadena, Waseca, **Washington**, Watonwan, Wilkin,

		Winona, Wright & Yellow Medicine), NJ (**Atlantic**, **Bergen**, Burlington, **Camden**, Cape May, **Cumberland**, **Essex**, Gloucester, **Hudson**, Hunterdon, **Mercer**, **Middlesex**, **Monmouth**, **Morris**, **Ocean**, **Passaic**, Salem, **Somerset**, Sussex, **Union** & Warren)
Mar. 2012	200	KY (Adair, Allen, Anderson, Ballard, Barren, Bath, Bell, Boone, Bourbon, Boyd, Bracken, Breathitt, Breckinridge, Bullitt, Butler, Caldwell, Calloway, Campbell, Carlisle, Carroll, Carter, Casey, Christian, Clark, Clay, Clinton, Crittenden, Cumberland, **Daviess**, Edmonson, Elliott, Estill, Fleming, Floyd, Franklin, Fulton, Gallatin, Garrard, Grant, Graves, Grayson, Green, Greenup, Hancock, Hardin, Harlan, Harrison, Hart, Henderson, Henry, Hickman, Hopkins, Jackson, **Jefferson**, Jessamine, Johnson, Kenton, Knott, Knox, Larue, Laurel, Lawrence, Lee, Leslie, Letcher, Lewis, Lincoln, Livingston, Logan, Lyon, Madison, Magoffin, Marion, Marshall, Marin, Mason, McCracken, McCreary, McLean, Meade, Menifee, Mercer, Metcalfe, Monroe, Montgomery, Morgan, Muhlenberg, Nelson, Nicholas, Ohio, Oldham, Owen, Owsley, Pendleton, Perry, Pike, Powell, Pulaski, Robertson, Rockcastle, Rowan, Russell, Scott, Shelby, Simpson, Taylor, Todd, Trigg, Trimble, Union, Warren, Washington, Wayne, Webster, Whitley, Wolfe & Woodford), NE (Antelope, Arthur, Banner, Blaine, Boone, Box Butte, Boyd, Brown, Burt, Butler, Cass, Cedar, Chase, Cherry, Cheyenne, Clay, Colfax, Cuming, Custer, Dakota, Dawes, **Dawson**, Deuel, Dixon, Dundy, Fillmore, Franklin, Frontier, Furnas, Gage, Garden, Garfield, Gosper, Grant, Greeley, Harlan, Hayes, Hitchcock, Holt, Hooker, Jefferson, Johnson, Kearney, Keith, Keya Paha, Kimball, Knox, Lincoln, Logan, Loup, McPherson, Morrill, Nance, Nemaha, Nuckolls, Otoe, Pawnee, Pawnee, Perkins, Phelps, Pierce, Platte, Polk, Red Willow, Richardson, Rock, Saline, Scotts Bluff, Seward, Sheridan, Sherman, Sioux, Stanton, Thayer, Thomas, Thurston, Valley, Washington, Wayne, Webster, Wheeler & York)
Apr. 2012	227	AK (Aleutians East Borough, Aleutians West Borough Census Area, Anchorage Borough, Bethel Census Area, Bristol Bay Borough, Denali Borough, Dillingham Census Area, Fairbanks North Star Borough, Haines Borough, Juneau Borough, Kenai Peninsula Borough, Ketchikan Gateway Borough, Kodiak Island Borough, Lake and Peninsula Borough, Matanuska-Susitna Borough, Nome Census Area, North Slope Borough, Northwest Arctic Borough, Petersburg Census Area, Prince of Wales-Outer Ketchikan Census Area, Sitka City and Borough, Skagway-Hoonah-Angoon Census Area, Southeast Fairbanks Census Area, Valdez-Cordova Census Area, Wade Hampton Census Area, Wrangell-Petersburg Census Area, Yakutat City and Borough, & Yukon-koyukuk

		Census Area), MT (Beaverhead, Big Horn, Blaine, Broadwater, Carbon, Carter, Cascade, Chouteau, Custer, Daniels, Dawson, Deer Lodge, Fallon, Fergus, Flathead, Gallatin, Garfield, Glacier, Golden Valley, Granite, Hill, Jefferson, Judith Basin, Lake, Liberty, Lincoln, Madison, McCone, Meagher, Mineral, Musselshell, Park, Petroleum, Phillips, Pondera, Powder River, Powell, Prairie, Ravalli, Richland, Roosevelt, Rosebud, Sanders, Sheridan, Silver Bow, Stillwater, Sweet Grass, Teton, Toole, Treasure, Valley, Wheatland & Wibaux), ND (Adams, Barnes, Benson, Billings, Bottineau, Bowman, Burke, Burleigh, Cass, Cavalier, Dickey, Divide, Dunn, Eddy, Emmons, Foster, Golden Valley, Grand Forks, Grant, Griggs, Hettinger, Kidder, LaMoure, Logan, McHenry, McIntosh, McKenzie, McLean, Mercer, Morton, Mountrail, Nelson, Oliver, Pembina, Pierce, Ramsey, Ransom, Renville, Richland, Rolette, Sargent, Sheridan, Sioux, Slope, Stark, Steele, Stutsman, Towner, Trail, Walsh, Ward, Wells & Williams), SD (Aurora, Beadle, Bennett, Bon Homme, Brookings, Brown, Brule, Buffalo, Butte, Campbell, Charles Mix, Clark, Clay, Codington, Corson, Davidson, Day, Deuel, Dewey, Douglas, Edmunds, Faulk, Grant, Gregory, Haakon, Hamlin, Hand, Hanson, Harding, Hughes, Hutchinson, Hyde, Jerauld, Jones, Kingsbury, Lake, Lawrence, Lincoln, Lyman, Marshall, McCook, McPherson, Meade, Mellette, Miner, Moody, Perkins, Potter, Roberts, Sanborn, Spink, Stanley, Sully, Todd, Tripp, Turner, Union, Walworth, Yankton & Ziebach), WA (Adams, Asotin, **Chelan**, Clallam, **Clark**, Columbia, Cowlitz, Douglas, Ferry, Garfield, **Grant**, Island, Jefferson, **King**, **Kitsap**, Kittitas, Klickitat, Lincoln, **Mason**, **Okanogan**, Pend Oreille, **Pierce**, San Juan, **Skagit**, Skamania, **Snohomish**, **Spokane**, Stevens, Thurston, Wahkiakum, Walla Walla, **Whatcom** & Whitman)
May 2012	340	AR (Arkansas, Ashley, Baxter, Bradley, Calhoun, Chicot, Clark, Clay, Cleburne, Cleveland, Columbia, Conway, **Craighead**, Crittenden, Cross, Dallas, Desha, Drew, Franklin, Fulton, Grant, Greene, Hot Spring, Howard, Independence, Izard, Jackson, Lafayette, Lawrence, Lee, Lincoln, Little River, Logan, Lonoke, Madison, Marion, Mississippi, Monroe, Montgomery, Nevada, Newton, Ouachita, Perry, Phillips, Pike, Poinsett, Polk, Prairie, Randolph, Saint Francis, Scott, Searcy, Sharp, Stone, Van Buren, & Woodruff), CO (**Adams**, Alamosa, Archuleta, Baca, Bent, **Boulder**, Broomfield, Chaffee, Cheyenne, Clear Creek, Conejos, Costilla, Crowley, Custer, Delta, Dolores, **Douglas**, **Eagle**, Elbert, **Fremont**, **Garfield**, Gilpin, Grand, Gunnison, Hinsdale, Huerfano, Jackson, **Jefferson**, Kiowa, Kit Carson, La Plata, Lake, **Larimer**, Las Animas, Lincoln, Logan, **Mesa**, Mineral, Moffat, Montezuma, **Montrose**, Morgan, Otero, Ouray, Park, Phillips, Pitkin, Prowers, **Pueblo**, Rio Blanco, Rio Grande, Routt, Saguache, San Juan, San Miguel,

		Sedgwick, Summit, Teller, Washington, **Weld** & Yuma), LA (Acadia Parish, Allen Parish, Assumption Parish, Avoyelles Parish, Beauregard Parish, Bienville Parish, **Bossier Parish**, **Calcasieu Parish**, Caldwell Parish, Cameron Parish, Catahoula Parish, Claiborne Parish, Concordia Parish, De Soto Parish, East Carroll Parish, East Feliciana Parish, Evangeline Parish, Franklin Parish, **Grant Parish**, Iberville Parish, Jackson Parish, Jefferson Davis Parish, La Salle Parish, Lincoln Parish, Madison Parish, Morehouse Parish, Natchitoches Parish, **Ouachita Parish**, Plaquemines Parish, Pointe Coupee Parish, Rapides Parish, Red River Parish, Richland Parish, Sabine Parish, Saint Helena Parish, Saint James Parish, Saint Landry Parish, Saint Martin Parish, **Saint Mary Parish**, Tangipahoa Parish, Tensas Parish, Union Parish, Vermillion Parish, Vernon Parish, Webster Parish, **West Baton Rouge Parish**, West Carroll Parish & West Feliciana Parish & Winn Parish), ME (Androscoggin, Aroostook, Cumberland, Franklin, Hancock, Kennebec, Knox, Lincoln, Oxford, Penobscot, Piscataquis, Sagadahoc, Somerset, Waldo, Washington & York), MA (Barnstable, Berkshire, **Bristol**, Dukes, **Essex**, Franklin, Hampden, Hampton, Hampshire, **Middlesex**, Nantucket, **Norfolk**, Plymouth & **Worcester**), NV (Esmeralda, Eureka & White Pine), NH (Belknap, Carroll, Cheshire, Coos, Grafton, **Hillsborough**, Merrimack, Rockingham, Strafford & Sullivan), NY (**Albany**, Bronx, Broome, Chemung, Chenango, Columbia, Cortland, Delaware, Erie, Franklin, Greene, Hamilton, Herkimer, Jefferson, Kings, Lewis, Madison, **New York City**, Oneida, **Onondaga**, Oswego, Queens, Rensselaer, Richmond, Saint Lawrence, Saratoga, Schenectady, Tioga, Tompkins, Washington & Wayne), PA (Adams, Allegheny, Armstrong, Beaver, Bedford, **Berks**, Blair, Bradford, Butler, Cambria, Cameron, Carbon, **Centre**, **Chester**, Clarion, Clearfield, Clinton, Columbia, Crawford, Cumberland, **Dauphin**, **Delaware**, Elk, Erie, Fayette, Forest, Franklin, Fulton, Greene, Huntington, Indiana, Jefferson, Juniata, **Lackawanna**, Lancaster, Lawrence, Lebanon, Lehigh, Luzerne, Lycoming, McKean, Mercer, Mifflin, Monroe, Montour, Northampton, Northumberland, Perry, Pike, Potter, Schuylkill, Snyder, Somerset, Sullivan, Susquehanna, Tioga, Union, Venango, Warren, Washington, Wayne, Westmoreland, Wyoming & **York**), VT (Addison, Bennington, Caledonia, Chittenden, Essex, Franklin, Grand Isle, Lamoille, Orange, Orleans, Rutland, Washington, Windham & Windsor), WY (Albany, Big Horn, Campbell, Carbon, Converse, Crook, Fremont, Goshen, Hot Springs, Johnson, Lincoln, Natrona, Niobrara, Park, Platte, Sheridan, Sublette, Sweetwater, Teton, Uinta, Washakie & Weston)
Jun. 2012	4	American Samoa, **District of Columbia (DC)**, Guam & U.S. Virgin Islands

Jan. 2013	107	AL (Barbour, Bibb, Bullock, Butler, Chambers, Clarke, Cleburne, Coffee, Covington, Crenshaw, Dale, Fayette, Geneva, Greene, Henry, Houston, Lauderdale, Lowndes, Macon, **Madison**, **Montgomery**, Pickens, Pike, Randolph, Russell, Saint Clair, Sumter, Walker, Wilcox, & Winston), IL (Adams, Bond, Boone, Brown, Bureau, Calhoun, Carroll, Cass, Clark, Clay, Coles, **Cook**, Cumberland, DeKalb, Douglas, Edgar, Edwards, Fayette, Fulton, Gallatin, Greene, Grundy, Hamilton, Hancock, Hardin, Henderson, Henry, Iroquois, Jasper, Jefferson, Jersey, Jo Daviess, Johnson, Kankakee, Kendall, Knox, La Salle, Lawrence, Lee, Livingston, Logan, Macon, Macoupin, Marshall, Mason, McDonough, McLean, Menard, Mercer, Monroe, Montgomery, Morgan, Moultrie, Ogle, Peoria, Perry, Pike, Pope, Putnam, Randolph, Richland, Rock Island, Saline, Sangamon, Schuyler, Scott, Shelby, Stark, Tazewell, Union, Wabash, Warren, Wayne, White, Whiteside & Woodford), N. Mariana
Total	3,175	

Note: Words in bold refer to the 541 localities (counties/cities) that this dissertation used for analysis, which have at least one monthly noncitizen deportation at the county level during 61 months (Oct. 2008 - Nov. 2013).

APPENDIX B

DEPORTATION RESULTS UNDER SECURE COMMUNITIES:

IN TERMS OF LOCAL CLASSIFICATIONS

Descriptive Statistics: Deportation Outcomes under S-Comm in Terms of Three Local Subclasses (Time covered: 61-month period, from Oct. 2008 to Nov. 2013)

Variable	*Minimum*	*Maximum*	*Mean*	*SD*
Total: 541 counties				
Monthly # of fingerprint submissions	19.80	31,618.68	1,267.79	2,505.62
Monthly # of IDENT matches	2.64	3,702.05	73.81	250.19
Monthly deportation number (raw)	1.00	635.39	**12.23**	41.90
Per capita deportation rate (100,000 pop.)	.19	347.22	**5.07**	21.11
Per capita deportation rate (1,000 Hispanic pop.)	.01	6.40	**.31**	.63
Activation length of S-Comm (as of Nov. 2013)	11	61	**37.01**	10.91
Deportation rate (%) with **Level 1** convictions	.00	.96	**.27**	.12
Deportation rate (%) with **Level 2** convictions	.04	.80	**.22**	.09
Deportation rate (%) with **Level 3** convictions	.00	.64	**.30**	.10
Deportation rate (%) with **Noncriminal** convictions	.00	.67	**.21**	.14
Deportation rate (%) with Level 3 + noncriminal convictions	.00	.86	**.51**	.14
Class 1: **88 counties**				
Monthly # of fingerprint submissions	86.78	4,959.58	829.84	785.79
Monthly # of IDENT matches	3.05	211.79	29.41	39.00
Monthly deportation number (raw)	1.04	22.87	**4.04**	4.20
Per capita deportation rate (100,000 pop.)	.27	41.73	**2.92**	5.68
Per capita deportation rate (1,000 Hispanic pop.)	.02	3.96	**.36**	.54
Activation length of S-Comm (as of Nov. 2013)	11	61	**33.84**	8.81
Deportation rate (%) with **Level 1** convictions	.00	.67	**.25**	.12
Deportation rate (%) with **Level 2** convictions	.04	.43	**.23**	.09
Deportation rate (%) with **Level 3** convictions	.14	.59	**.33**	.10
Deportation rate (%) with **Noncriminal** convictions	.00	.63	**.19**	.13
Deportation rate (%) with Level 3 + noncriminal convictions	.19	.85	**.52**	.15
Class 2: 34 counties				
Monthly # of fingerprint submissions	312.52	29,745.45	4,224.63	6,240.78
Monthly # of IDENT matches	10.81	3,031.61	339.39	622.43
Monthly deportation number (raw)	2.34	635.39	**78.85**	141.97
Per capita deportation rate (100,000 pop.)	.64	10.23	**4.53**	2.66
Per capita deportation rate (1,000 Hispanic pop.)	.07	1.75	**.28**	.28
Activation length of S-Comm (as of Nov. 2013)	38	61	**47.32**	8.18
Deportation rate (%) with **Level 1** convictions	.09	.51	**.28**	.11
Deportation rate (%) with **Level 2** convictions	.08	.36	**.20**	.06
Deportation rate (%) with **Level 3** convictions	.19	.49	**.30**	.08
Deportation rate (%) with **Noncriminal** convictions	.07	.58	**.23**	.12
Deportation rate (%) with Level 3 + noncriminal convictions	.26	.79	**.52**	.12
Class 3: 419 counties				
Monthly # of fingerprint submissions	19.80	31,618.68	1,119.84	2,033.17
Monthly # of IDENT matches	2.64	3,702.05	61.58	208.95

Monthly deportation number (raw)	1.00	169.69	**8.55**	16.87
Per capita deportation rate (100,000 pop.)	.19	347.22	**5.56**	23.82
Per capita deportation rate (1,000 Hispanic pop.)	.01	6.40	**.30**	.66
Activation length of S-Comm (as of Nov. 2013)	11	61	**36.84**	11.03
Deportation rate (%) with **Level 1** convictions	.00	.96	**.27**	.12
Deportation rate (%) with **Level 2** convictions	.04	.80	**.22**	.09
Deportation rate (%) with **Level 3** convictions	.00	.64	**.29**	.10
Deportation rate (%) with **Noncriminal** convictions	.00	.67	**.22**	.14
Deportation rate (%) with Level 3 + noncriminal convictions	.00	.86	**.51**	.15

Note: *Per capita deportation rate weighting 100,000 population* per county was calculated as follows: (monthly noncitizen deportation/total population)*100,000; *Per capita deportation rate weighting 1,000 Hispanic population* per county was calculated as follows: (monthly noncitizen deportation/total Hispanic population)*1,000; deportation rates per level of criminality under S-Comm (Levels 1 - 3 and noncriminal convictions) were based on cumulative data (61-month period).

APPENDIX C

PROBABILITY OF EACH OF FOUR ITEMS FOR LATENT CLASS ANALYSIS

(BASED ON THE THREE-CLASS SOLUTION)

Class 1: 88 counties (16.3%)



Class 2: 34 counties (6.3%)



Class 3: 419 counties, (77.4%)



Figure C-1. Three-class solution for latent class analysis based on four immigration policy indicators (items) reflecting the extent of current local immigration enforcement policy involvement.

Note: Each of the four items per class is based on a binary scale, coded as 0 (= no) and as 1 (= yes). Latent class proportions are shown in parenthesis above each barplot. Based on the local classifications, Class 1 counties are operationalized as those with *administrative-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning* immigration enforcement policy participation; Class 2 counties are those with *active* immigration enforcement policy participation; Class 3 counties are those with *inactive-but-mixed* immigration enforcement policy participation. The *x*-axis refers to probability of each of four items, ranging from 0 to 1.

APPENDIX D

SPECIFICATIONS (THROUGH CHI-SQUARE DIFFERENCE TESTS) OF LATENT GROWTH CURVE MODELINGS FOR TWO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS UNDER SECURE COMMUNITIES: IMMIGRATION DETAINER ISSUANCES AND NONCITIZEN DEPORTATIONS

Model Fit and Estimates of Two Immigration Enforcement Actions under S-Comm

Measure	Model	-2*LL*	*df*	AIC	df		*p*	RMSEA	RMSEA 90% CI	CFI
Immigration detainer issuance trajectory	Linear LGM with R1 (1)	-2,695.49	9	5,412.98	-	-	-	.113	.09 -.14	.983
	Linear LGM with R2 (2)	-2,694.92	12	5,405.83	3 (= 2-1)	-1.14	*ns*	.094	.07 -.12	.984
	Quadratic LGM with R1 (3)	-2,664.59	6	5,357.18	6 (= 2-3)	45.81	<.001	.031	.00 -.07	.999
	Quadratic LGM with R2 (4)	**-2,665.40**	**10**	**5,350.81**	4 (= 4-3)	1.63	*ns*	.012	.00 -.05	1.00
	Cubic LGM with R1* (5)	-2,661.83	5	5,353.65				.000	.00 -.10	1.00
	Cubic LGM with R2* (6)	-2,660.29	1	5,358.57				.000	.00 -.05	1.00
Noncitizen deportation trajectory	**Linear LGM with R1 (1)**	**-2,545.49**	**10**	**5,110.98**	-	-	-	.075	.05 -.10	.990
	Linear LGM with R2 (2)	-2,568.14	12	5,152.27	2 (= 2-1)	45.29	<.001	.106	.09 -.13	.976
	Quadratic LGM with R1 (3)	-2,544.63	9	5,111.26	1 (= 1-3)	1.72	*ns*	.078	.05 -.10	.990
	Quadratic LGM with R2 (4)	-2,566.59	9	5,155.18	1 (= 1-4)	-42.20	*ns*	.123	.10 -.15	.976
	Cubic LGM with R1* (5)	-2,539.83	1	5,117.67				.227	.16 -.30	.991
	Cubic LGM with R2 (6)	-2,550.87	4	5,133.74	6 (=1-6)	-10.77	*ns*	.147	.11 -.19	.984

Note: LGM = latent growth curve modeling based on SEM framework; R1 = Residuals freely estimating; R2 = Residuals constrained; -2*LL* = -2 time the log likelihood; *df* = degree of freedom; AIC = Akaike's information criterion; *df* = change in degrees of freedom; = change in chi-square value from the full model to reduced (nested) model; *p* = *p* value of difference between two models; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CFI = comparative fit index; *ns* = nonsignificant at the conventional level; * refers to a model with an error message (regarding negative variance), so it could not be selected as the best fit model. One model in bold in each of two measures on immigration enforcement actions under S-Comm was finally selected as the best model fit based on difference test.

APPENDIX E

CONTACT (INCLUDING WEB SEARCH) LISTS OF STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES FOR CRIME STATISTICS AT THE COUNTY LEVEL

List of State Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) Releasing County-level Crime Statistics

State	Name of contact agency (LEA) and related web link
AL	Alabama Law Enforcement Agency http://dps.alabama.gov/home/wfContent.aspx?PLH1=plhACJIC-CrimeInAlabama
AR	Arkansas Crime Information Center http://acic.org/crimeStatistics/Pages/default.aspx
AZ	- Arizona Department of Administration http://www.workforce.az.gov/population-estimates.aspx - Department of Public Safety http://www.azdps.gov/about/reports/crime_in_arizona/
CA	- California Department of Finance http://www.dof.ca.gov/research/demographic/reports/estimates/e-2/view.php - California Department of Justice http://oag.ca.gov/crime/cjsc/stats/crimes-clearances
CO	Colorado Crime Information Center https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cbi/crime-colorado1
CT	Department of Public Safety http://www.dpsdata.ct.gov/dps/ucr/ucr.aspx
DC	DC Metropolitan Police Department http://mpdc.dc.gov/page/statistics-and-data
DE	State of Delaware - Criminal Justice Council http://cjc.delaware.gov/sac/sac_pubs_crime.shtml
FL	Florida Department of Law Enforcement http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/FSAC/Menu/Data---Statistics-(1)/UCR-Offense-Data.aspx
GA	Georgia Bureau of Investigation http://gbi.georgia.gov/crime-statistics
HI	Hawaii Crime Prevention and Justice Assistance Division http://ag.hawaii.gov/cpja/rs/
ID	Idaho State Police https://www.isp.idaho.gov/BCI/ucr/crimeinidaho2013.html
IL	Illinois State Police http://www.isp.state.il.us/crime/ucrhome.cfm#anlrpts
IN	- No data were publicly released on the web site, so on Jan. 26, 2015, I contacted the Indiana State Police (ISP) and requested state data on county-level crime statistics during 4 years. - ISP first responded on Feb. 13, 2015, that ISP has no crime statistics collection at the county level, and recommended that I should contact another LEA in that state, the Indiana Criminal Justice Institute (ICJI). - I contacted ICJI on Feb. 15, 2015, but there was no response. Therefore, I finally dealt with it as missing data.
KS	Kansas Bureau of Investigation http://www.accesskansas.org/kbi/stats/stats_crime2013.shtml

KY	Kentucky State Police http://www.kentuckystatepolice.org/data.html
LA	Lousiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice http://www.lcle.la.gov/programs/sac.asp
MA	- No data were publicly released on the web site, so on Nov. 2014 I contacted the Massachusetts Police Department (MPD) and requested state data on county-level crime statistics during 4 years (2010 - 2013). - MPD responded and released county-level crime statistics in the state, but the data covers 3 years (2010 - 2012), not including 2013 data. So I used 3 years' crime statistics from MA for analysis.
MD	Governor's Office of Crime Control & Prevention http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/msac/crime-statistics.php
MI	Michigan State Police http://www.michigan.gov/msp/0,1607,7-123-1645_3501_4621---,00.html
MN	Minnesota Department of Public Safety https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/bca/bca-divisions/mnjis/Pages/uniform-crime-reports.aspx
MO	Missouri State Highway Patrol http://www.mshp.dps.missouri.gov/MSHPWeb/SAC/data_and_statistics_ucr_query_backup.html
MS	- No data were publicly released on the web site, so on Jan. 27, 2015 I contacted the Mississippi Department of Public Safety (MDPS) and requested state data on county-level crime statistics during 4 years (2010 - 2013). - MDPS did not respond, so I dealt with it as missing data.
NC	North Carolina Department of Justice http://crimereporting.ncdoj.gov/Reports.aspx
NE	Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice http://www.ncc.nebraska.gov/statistics/data_search/arrest/offense_crosstab.html
NH	New Hampshire Department of Safety http://www.nh.gov/safety/divisions/nhsp/ssb/crimrecords/
NJ	New Jersey State Police http://www.njsp.org/info/ucr_currentdata1.html?agree=0
NM	New Mexico Department of Public Safety http://www.dps.state.nm.us/index.php/uniform-crime-reports/
NV	Nevada Department of Public Safety http://nvrepository.state.nv.us/crimejustice.shtml
OK	Oklahoma Bureau of Investigation http://www.ok.gov/osbi/Publications/Crime_Statistics.html
OR	Oregon State Police http://www.oregon.gov/osp/CJIS/Pages/annual_reports.aspx
PA	Pennsylvania Uniform Crime Reporting System http://www.paucrs.pa.gov/UCR/ComMain.asp
RI	Rhode Island State Police

	http://www.risp.ri.gov/stats/
SC	South Carolina Law Enforcement Division http://www.sled.sc.gov/SCCrimeBooks.aspx?MenuID=CrimeReporting
TN	Tennessee Bureau of Investigation http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/crime_stats_online.shtml
TX	Texas Department of Public Safety http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/administration/crime_records/pages/crimestatistics.htm
UT	Utah Department of Public Safety http://publicsafety.utah.gov/bci/crimestatistics.html
VA	Virginia State Police http://www.vsp.state.va.us/Crime_in_Virginia.shtm
WA	Washington Statistical Analysis Center http://wa-state-ofm.us/UniformCrimeReport/
WI	Wisconsin Department of Justice http://www.doj.state.wi.us/office-justice-assistance
WY	Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation http://wyomingdci.wyo.gov/dci-criminal-justice-information-systems-section/uniform-crime-reporting

APPENDIX F

LIST OF 541 COUNTIES IN TERMS OF THREE CLASSIFICATIONS

List of Localities (Counties) in Terms of Three Classifications: 541 Counties (Including Some Cities) Under Analysis

Class 1: Localities with *Administratively-Inactive-but-Legally-Punitive-Leaning* Immigration Enforcement Policy Participation (88 counties)					
Baldwin, AL	Coconino, AZ	Clayton, GA	Telfair, GA	Saint Bernard, LA	Greenville, SC
Chilton, AL	Mohave, AZ	Colquitt, GA	Troup, GA	Worcester, MA	Horry, SC
DeKalb, AL	Navajo, AZ	Coweta, GA	Kane, IL	Anne Arundel, MD	Lexington, SC
Jefferson, AL	Santa Cruz, AZ	Douglas, GA	Allen, IN	Montgomery, MD	Orangeburg, SC
Limestone, AL	Adams, CO	Fayette, GA	Bartholomew, IN	St. Charles, MO	Richland, SC
Madison, AL	Highland, FL	Floyd, GA	Clark, IN	Buncombe, NC	Spartanburg, SC
Marshall, AL	Lee, FL	Forsyth, GA	Elkhart, IN	Forsyth, NC	Montgomery, TN
Mobile, AL	Walton, FL	Glynn, GA	Hendricks, IN	Dodge, NE	Denton, TX
Montgomery, AL	Barrow, GA	Gordon, GA	Jackson, IN	Suffolk, NY	Galveston, TX
Morgan, AL	Bartow, GA	Henry, GA	Johnson, IN	Warren, OH	Iron, UT
Shelby, AL	Carroll, GA	Houston, GA	Lake, IN	Montgomery, PA	Summit, UT
Tuscaloosa, AL	Charlton, GA	Lowndes, GA	Marion, IN	Aiken, SC	Utah, UT
Sebastian, AR	Chatham, GA	Muscogee, GA	Shelby, IN	Berkeley, SC	Brown, WI
Apache, AZ	Cherokee, GA	Richmond, GA	Vanderburgh, IN	Chester, SC	
Cochise, AZ	Clarke, GA	Rockdale, GA	Shawnee, IN	Florence, SC	
Class 2: Localities with *Active* Immigration Enforcement Policy Participation (34 counties)					
Benton, AR	Yuma, AZ	DeKalb, GA	Oakland, MI	Charleston, SC	Washington, UT
Washington, AR	Los Angeles, CA	Fulton, GA	St. Louis, MO	York, SC	Weber, UT
Maricopa, AZ	Orange, CA	Gwinnett, GA	Gaston, NC	Davidson, TN	Fairfax, VA
Pima, AZ	San Bernardino, CA	Hall, GA	Mecklenburg, NC	Dallas, TX	Prince William, VA
Pinal, AZ	San Diego, CA	Whitfield, GA	Tulsa, OK	Harris, TX	
Yavapai, AZ	Cobb, GA	Frederick, MD	Beaufort, SC	Salt Lake, UT	
Class 3: Localities with *Inactive-But-Mixed* Immigration Enforcement Policy Participation (419 counties)					

Craighead, AR	Charlotte, FL	Lafayette Parish, LA	Sampson, NC	Yamhill, OR	Montgomery, TX
Faulkner, AR	Clay, FL	Lafourche Parish, LA	Union, NC	Berks, PA	Moore, TX
Garland, AR	Collier, FL	Livingston Parish, LA	Wake, NC	Bucks, PA	Nacogdoches, TX
Pulaski, AR	Desoto, FL	Orleans Parish, LA	Dawson, NE	Centre, PA	Navarro, TX
Saline, AR	Duval, FL	Ouachita Parish, LA	Douglas, NE	Chester, PA	Nueces, TX
Alameda, CA	Escambia, FL	St. Mary Parish, LA	Hall, NE	Dauphin, PA	Ochiltree, TX
Butte, CA	Glades, FL	St. Tammany Parish, LA	Lancaster, NE	Delaware, PA	Parker, TX
Colusa, CA	Hardee, FL	Terrebonne Parish, LA	Madison, NE	Lackawanna, PA	Potter, TX
Contra Costa, CA	Hendry, FL	West Baton Rouge Parish, LA	Sarpy, NE	Philadelphia, PA	Reeves, TX
El Dorado, CA	Hillsborough, FL	Bristol, MA	Hillsborough, NH	York, PA	Rockwall, TX
Fresno, CA	Indian River, FL	Essex, MA	Atlantic, NJ	Providence, RI	Smith, TX
Glenn, CA	Lake, FL	Middlesex, MA	Bergen, NJ	Minnehaha, SD	Starr, TX
Humboldt, CA	Leon, FL	Norfolk, MA	Camden, NJ	Bedford, TN	Tarrant, TX
Imperial, CA	Manatee, FL	Suffolk, MA	Cumberland, NJ	Blount, TN	Taylor, TX
Kern, CA	Marion, FL	Baltimore, MD	Essex, NJ	Bradley, TN	Titus, TX
Kings, CA	Martin, FL	Baltimore City, MD	Hudson, NJ	Hamblen, TN	Travis, TX
Lake, CA	Miami-Dade, FL	Howard, MD	Mercer, NJ	Hamilton, TN	Val Verde, TX
Lassen, CA	Monroe, FL	Prince George's, MD	Middlesex, NJ	Knox, TN	Victoria, TX
Madera, CA	Okaloosa, FL	Allegan, MI	Monmouth, NJ	Madison, TN	Walker, TX
Marin, CA	Okeechobee, FL	Berrien, MI	Morris, NJ	Putnam, TN	Waller, TX
Mendocino, CA	Orange, FL	Calhoun, MI	Ocean, NJ	Robertson, TN	Washington, TX
Merced, CA	Osceola, FL	Ingham, MI	Passaic, NJ	Rutherford, TN	Webb, TX
Monterey, CA	Palm Beach, FL	Kent, MI	Somerset, NJ	Sevier, TN	Wharton, TX
Napa, CA	Pasco, FL	Macomb, MI	Union, NJ	Shelby, TN	Wichita, TX
Nevada, CA	Pinellas, FL	Oceana, MI	Bernalillo, NM	Sumner, TN	Willacy, TX

Placer, CA	Polk, FL	Ottawa, MI	Cibola, NM	Warren, TN	Williamson, TX
Riverside, CA	Sarasota, FL	Van Buren, MI	Dona Ana, NM	Washington, TN	Wise, TX
Sacramento, CA	Seminole, FL	Washtenaw, MI	Lea, NM	Williamson, TN	Zapata, TX
San Benito, CA	St. Lucie, FL	Wayne, MI	San Juan, NM	Angelina, TX	Davis, UT
San Francisco, CA	Suwannee, FL	Anoka, MN	Santa Fe, NM	Atascosa, TX	Albemarle, VA
San Joaquin, CA	Volusia, FL	Dakota, MN	Clark, NV	Bastrop, TX	Alexandria City, VA
San Luis Obispo, CA	Hawaii, HI	Hennepin, MN	Washoe, NV	Bell, TX	Arlington, VA
San Mateo, CA	Honolulu, HI	Mower, MN	Albany, NY	Bexar, TX	Chesapeake City, VA
Santa Barbara, CA	Maui, HI	Nobles, MN	Allegany, NY	Brazoria, TX	Chesterfield, VA
Santa Clara, CA	Johnson, IA	Olmstead, MN	Cayuga, NY	Brazos, TX	Hanover, VA
Santa Cruz, CA	Polk, IA	Ramsey, MN	Chautauqua, NY	Burnet, TX	Henrico, VA
Shasta, CA	Sioux, IA	Scott, MN	Dutchess, NY	Cameron, TX	Loudoun, VA
Solano, CA	Woodbury, IA	Sherburne, MN	Essex, NY	Cherokee, TX	Newport News City, VA
Sonoma, CA	Ada, ID	Stearns, MN	Nassau, NY	Collin, TX	Norfolk City, VA
Stanislaus, CA	Bonneville, ID	Washington, MN	New York City, NY	Colorado, TX	Richmond City, VA
Sutter, CA	Canyon, ID	Cass, MO	Onondaga, NY	Comal, TX	Roanoke City, VA
Tehama, CA	Cassia, ID	Greene, MO	Ontario, NY	Concho, TX	Spotsylvania, VA
Tulare, CA	Gooding, ID	Jackson, MO	Orange, NY	Deaf Smith, TX	Stafford, VA
Ventura, CA	Jerome, ID	Jasper, MO	Putnam, NY	Ector, TX	Virginia Beach City, VA
Yolo, CA	Twin Falls, ID	St. Louis City, MO	Rockland, NY	El Paso, TX	Winchester City, VA
Yuba, CA	Champaign, IL	Adams, MS	Steuben, NY	Ellis, TX	Benton, WA
Arapahoe, CO	Cook, IL	Desoto, MS	Westchester, NY	Fort Bend, TX	Chelan, WA
Boulder, CO	DuPage, IL	Forrest, MS	Butler, OH	Garza, TX	Clark, WA
Denver, CO	Lake, IL	Harrison, MS	Clark, OH	Gillespie, TX	Franklin, WA
Douglas, CO	Madison, IL	Hinds, MS	Cuyahoga, OH	Gonzales, TX	Grant, WA
Eagle, CO	McHenry, IL	Jones, MS	Franklin, OH	Grayson, TX	Grays Harbor, WA
El Paso, CO	Will, IL	Madison, MS	Hamilton, OH	Gregg, TX	King, WA
Fremont, CO	Winnebago, IL	Rankin, MS	Lake, OH	Guadalupe, TX	Kitsap, WA
Garfield, CO	Douglas, KS	Scott, MS	Mahoning, OH	Harrison, TX	Lewis, WA

Jefferson, CO	Finney, KS	Alamance, NC	Montgomery, OH	Hays, TX	Mason, WA
Larimer, CO	Ford, KS	Cabarrus, NC	Cleveland, OK	Hidalgo, TX	Okanogan, WA
Mesa, CO	Johnson, KS	Catawba, NC	Garfield, OK	Hood, TX	Pierce, WA
Montrose, CO	Saline, KS	Cumberland, NC	Muskogee, OK	Howard, TX	Skagit, WA
Pueblo, CO	Sedgwick, KS	Duplin, NC	Oklahoma, OK	Hunt, TX	Snohomish, WA
Weld, CO	Seward, KS	Durham, NC	Texas, OK	Jefferson, TX	Spokane, WA
Fairfield, CT	Wyandotte, KS	Guilford, NC	Clackamas, OR	Johnson, TX	Whatcom, WA
Hartford, CT	Daviess, KY	Harnett, NC	Deschutes, OR	Kaufman, TX	Yakima, WA
New Haven, CT	Fayette, KY	Henderson, NC	Hood River, OR	Kendall, TX	Dane, WI
District of Columbia	Jefferson, KY	Hoke, NC	Jackson, OR	Kerr, TX	Kenosha, WI
New Castle, DE	Bossier Parish, LA	Iredell, NC	Lane, OR	Liberty, TX	Milwaukee, WI
Sussex, DE	Caddo Parish, LA	Johnston, NC	Linn, OR	Limestone, TX	Trempealeau, WI
Alachua, FL	Calcasieu Parish, LA	Lee, NC	Marion, OR	Live Oak, TX	Walworth, WI
Bay, FL	East Baton Rouge Parish, LA	New Hanover, NC	Multnomah, OR	Lubbock, TX	Waukesha, WI Laramie, WY
Brevard, FL	Grant Parish, LA	Orange, NC	Umatilla, OR	McLennan, TX	
Broward, FL	Jefferson Parish, LA	Pitt, NC	Washington, OR	Midland, TX	

APPENDIX G

SCATTERPLOTS SHOWING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ACTIVATION LENGTH OF SECURE COMMUNITIES AND TOTAL CRIME RATE CHANGES (2010 - 2013) BY LOCAL CLASSIFICATIONS

(a): All 541 localities activating Secure Communties Program



(b): Class 1 counties (with *administratively-inactive-but-legally-punitive-leaning* immigration enforcement policy participation)



(c): Class 2 counties (with *active* immigration enforcement policy participation)



(d): Class 3 counties (with *inactive-but-mixed* immigration enforcement policy participation)



Figure G-1. Graphical analysis on the relationship between crime rate changes (2010 - 2013) and activation length of Secure Communities program (month) by class. The *x*-axis refers to activation length (month, ranging from a minimum of 11 months to a maximum of 61 months), and the *y*-axis refers to crime rate changes during 4 years (2010 - 2013). Each scatterplot has two lines: one for the regression fit line and the other for LOWESS (locally weighted scatterplot smoothing). Each row has three scatterplots: the left one shows total crime rate change during 4 years, the middle shows violent crime rate change during the same period, and the right shows property crime rate change during the same period.

APPENDIX H

THE LIST OF COUNTIES AND PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES IN THEIR JURISDICTIONS FOR IMMIGRATION DETAINMENT

Involvement of Private Prison Companies on Immigration Detainment at the County Level and Types of Public-Private Contracts

State	County	Facility name	Private prison company involved & type of contract
AZ	Pinal	Central Arizona Correctional Center	IGSA* + CCA**
AZ	Pinal	Eloy Detenton Center	IGSA + CCA
AZ	Pinal	Florence Correctional Center	IGSA + CCA
AZ	Pinal	Florence Service Processing Center	IGSA + CCA
AZ	Yuma	San Luis Regional Detention Center	IGSA + Emerald Corretional Management
CA	Imperial	El Centro Service Processing Center	ICE SPC *** + Asset Protection and Security Services, Inc
CA	Kern	California City Correctional Center	IGSA + CCA
CA	Los Angeles	Alhambra City Jail	Geo Group, Inc.
CA	San Bernadino	Adelanto Detention Facility	Geo Group, Inc.
CA	San Diego	Otay Detention Facilty	IGSA + CCA
CA	San Diego	San Diego Correctional Facility	CCA
CO	Arapahoe	Denver Contract Detention Facility	Geo Group, Inc.
CO	Arapahoe	Aurora Detention Facility	Geo Group, Inc.
FL	Broward	Broward Transitional Center	Geo Group, Inc.
FL	Miami-Dade	Krome Service Processing Center	ICE SPC + Akal Security
GA	Hall	North Georgia Detention Center	CCA
GA	Irwin	Irwin County Detention Center	Detention Management, LLC
GA	Stewart	Stewart Detention Center	IGSA + CCA
IL	Pulaski	Tri-County Detention Center	IGSA + Paladin Eastside Psychological Service, Inc.
LA	Acadia	South Lousiana Correctional Center	Geo Group, Inc.
LA	La Salle	La Salle Detention Facility	IGSA + Geo Group, Inc.
NJ	Essex	Delany Hall Detention Facility	IGSA + Community Education Center
NJ	Union	Elizabeth Contract Detention Facility	CCA
NM	Dona Ana	Otero County Prison Facility	IGSA + Management and Training Corportation
NM	Monmouth	Monmouth County Correctional Facility	IGSA + Management and Training Corportation
NM	Torrence	Torrance County Detention Facility	CCA
NY	Batavia	Buffalo Service Processing Center	Valley-Metro Barbosa Group
TN	Tipton	West Tennessee Detention Facility	CCA
TX	Bexar	Central Texas Detention Facility	IGSA + Geo Group, Inc.
TX	Burnet	Burnet County Jail	IGSA + LaSalle Southwest Correctional
TX	Cameron	Port Isabel Service Processing Center	ICE SPC + Ahtna Technical

			Services
TX	Ector	Odessa Detention Center	IGSA + Community Education Center
TX	El Paso	El Paso Processing Center	ICE SPC + Akal Security
TX	Frio	South Texas Detention Facility	Geo Group, Inc.
TX	Harris	Houston Processing Center	CCA
TX	Haskell	Rolling Plains Correctional Facility	IGSA + Emerald
TX	Hidalgo	East Hidalgo Detention Center	IGSA + LCS Corrections
TX	Hudspeth	West Texas Detention Facility	IGSA + Emerald Correctional Management
TX	Johnson	Johnson County Law Enforcement Center	ICE SPC + LaSalle Southwest Correctional
TX	Karnes	Karnes County Residential Center	IGSA + Geo Group, Inc.
TX	La Salle	La Salle Regional Detention Center	IGSA + Emerald
TX	Limestone	Limestone County Detention Center	IGSA + Management and Training Corportation
TX	McLennan	McLennan County Detention Center	IGSA + Community Education Center
TX	Montgomery	Joe Corley Detention Center	IGSA + Geo Group, Inc.
TX	Nueces	Coastal Bend Detention Center	IGSA + LCS Corrections
TX	Polk	Polk County Adult Detention Center	IGSA + Community Education Centers
TX	Webb	Laredo Processing Center	IGSA + CCA
TX	Williamson	T. Don Hutto Residential Center	ICE Juvenile Facility + CCA
TX	Val Verde	Val Verde Correctional Facility and County Jail	IGSA + Geo Group, Inc.
WA	Pierce	Tacoma Northwest Detention Center	Geo Group, Inc.

*IGSA: Intergovernmental Service Agreement between the federal immigration agency (ICE) and a state or local government; ** CCA: Corrections Corporation of America; ***ICE SPC: ICE Service Processing Center.

Note: The lists in this table do not include all private prison companies detaining noncitizens for deportation proceedings across the country, but include private prison companies that contract directly with federal immigration agencies (DHS/ICE) for immigrant detainment. In policy reality, however, many noncitizens across the country, specifically those detained with criminal charges, have been detained in local jails that do not have direct contracts with ICE, and some of which were operated by private prison companies. For example, noncitizens are held in Arizona State Prison - Phoenix West (within Maricopa County) for criminal violations, and this detention facility is operated and managed by Geo Group, Inc. under a contract with the Arizona Department of Corrections. Although this facility has not directly make any contracts with ICE, it has detained criminal noncitizens who are then transferred into ICE custody after completing their criminal charges for immigration enforcement actions.

The "type contract" in the right column in this table refers to the way private prison companies under the current immigration enforcement policy are involved. According to TRAC data on immigrant detention trajectories (http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/222/), private prison complexes can be involved in immigration detention business in one of four ways: (1) detention facilities are owned and run by private prison companies , (2) detention facilities are owned by ICE but operated and managed by private prison companies, (3) facilities are owned by mutual agreements between federal or local governments (IGSA), and are operated by state or local governments or private prison companies, and (4) facilities are created and run for specific categories of noncitizens (juveniles or family residential centers for noncitizens seeking asylum), and federal/local or private prison companies can be involved in their management and operation. Many counties in this table follow a third option, in which immigrant detainments are done

through an IGSA between different levels of government, but actual operation and management is done by the private sector. In cases where only private prison companies are listed, this indicates that detention facilities are owned and run by private prison companies.

The list of private prisons in this table was collected from the American Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico (2011), Mason (2012), using website search tools provided by Texas Prison Bid'ness (http://www.texasprisonbidness.org/map), TRAC's Detention Facility Reports (http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/detention/exit.shtml), Community Initiatives for Visiting Immigrants in Confinement (http://www.endisolation.org/about/immigration-detention/), using detention facility locator searches from Geo Group's facility locator (http://www.geogroup.com/maps/) and CCA (http://www.cca.com/locations), and referring to Detention Watch Network's *Expose and Clos*e series on uncovering conditions of immigrant detention facilites across the country (http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/exposeandclose2014).